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This line will be read more than any other in this thesis. Some of you might go
on and read part of this page while others might even skim through the manuscript.
So let me tell you about how this thesis came to be and single out some of the
individuals that helped me write it.
I remember (hazily, yet vividly) walking in my hometown sometime in the late
90’s thinking about the word ”Globalization”. Of course, i did not fully compre-
hend what the word meant back then, and to be honest, i still don’t. Perhaps, it is
exactly because of this inherent ambiguity of the term that the Globalization debate
is probably ”the greatest story ever told” in the social sciences. Four years and a
dissertation into this story my conclusion is one i never expected to draw. We are so
easily seduced by stories that we are sometimes willing to disregard trivial things
such as...facts!
As an example, think about the book The World is Flat by Thomas Friedman.
A book describing how technology is transforming the modern world. Distance
is ”dying”, money ”teleports”, and everyone is interconnected to a degree never
seen before. Published in 2005 the book was cited more than 9000 times in aca-
demic work by 2014 and received many prestigious awards. Compare this to the
attention that Pankaj Ghemawat’s work received. About 2 years after Friedman’s
book was published, Ghemawat published an article (followed by a book a few
years later) that put the base upon which the view of the Flat World was build
in serious question. ”Just a fraction of what we consider globalization exists...”
wrote Ghemawat. In fact, all major indicators of connectivity and economic mo-
bility used by Ghemawat show that Globalization is far from sweeping the face of
the earth. ”The levels of internationalization associated with cross-border migra-
tion, telephone calls, management research and education, private charitable giv-
ing, patenting, stock investment, and trade, as a fraction of gross domestic product,
all stand much closer to 10 percent than 100 percent.” How many times were these
facts cited in academic work? Less than 80.
If this 120:1 (aprox.) ”citation gap” is generalizable it could have some seri-
iv
ous repercussions. Beyond selling book copies and attracting citations, stories like
Globalization can affect the living conditions of, well, everyone! This is because
accounts of the world create the mental framework within which people, and es-
pecially policy makers, act. In the Globalization debate the possible effects of this
battle of ideas are felt at the national level as local political configurations (along
with the accountability that goes with them) are treated as obsolete. I believe that
theories with such astounding repercussions should be firmly based on facts. This
is the purpose of this dissertation. To ask whether there is still a role for local insti-
tutional configurations (national States included) in the global economy. And the
answer that i provide in the following chapters is that indeed there is still a role. It is
within local institutional environments that the agents of Globalization (people and
organizations alike) develop their interests, and it is through (or within) those en-
vironments that they interact with each other. For reaching this conclusion i would
like to thank (without implicating) the following people.
First of all my supervisors, Robbert Maseland and Harry Garretsen, for making
me feel comfortable and welcome already from our very first meeting. That made a
great difference! Furthermore, i would like to thank you for your patience all these
years while i was pedaling around in circles. I arrived at most of what is good in
this thesis through your guidance.
This thesis would look very differently if i hadn’t spend a year working as a
research assistant for Martin Andersson in Jo¨nko¨ping. All the skills in data analysis
that i utilized in the making of this thesis were acquired during that time.
Chapter 5 of this dissertation is joined work with Andre´ van Hoorn. I’m grate-
ful for that and happy that it turned out to be perhaps the most interesting chapter.
Teaching-wise, i had the pleasure of developing and delivering a course in IPE
together with Tristan Kohl. It was a truly rewarding and enjoyable experience!
Finally, Ines Wagner did me the favor of going through this dissertation and sav-
ing me from a lot of embarrassment with her suggestions while posing interesting
questions along the way!
Coming to Groningen, i had a lot of good times with many individuals some of
which i already miss. Instead of name dropping i choose to aggregate you in three
broad categories. The Plutolanders, the Me Llamo Ernesto and affiliates, and all the
colleagues that i spent time with in and out of office. You kept my heart warm!
Outside of Groningen i had the honor, privilege, and luck to be associated to
a group of individuals that has shaped who i am in every way. Particularly, The
Alleyrats, Boredom Overdose, and Mηδeν Teλeια. ”When i got the music... i got a
vplace to go”.
Finally, the biggest thank you goes out to my family. Including my parents,
sister, all cousins and their wonderful kids for making me feel a part of something
bigger than my self. I can’t thank you all enough for this. This dissertation is
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To assert that the state is in retreat is nowadays perhaps a cliche´. With the collapse
of the Bretton Woods regime in the 70‘s, the Reagan-Thatcher administrations in
the 80’s, and finally, the demise of the Soviet Block in the 90’s the world seemed
more amenable to economics than politics. Around that time a new buzzword
gained great attention; Globalization. The tale of a flat earth and the end of his-
tory (Friedman, 2006; Fukuyama, 2006)! The word replaced the previous term used
to describe the increasingly interconnected economic relations between States; In-
terdependence. Why the new term? The interconnectedness of world economies is
thought to be much more dynamic than in earlier epochs, and it affects more than
just economic relations. Indeed, as a word, Globalization captures more effectively
the universality (“global-”) and dynamism (-“zation”) of this new experience.
Kofi Annan, former secretary general of the United Nations and Peace Noble
laureate is often credited with the phrase “Arguing against Globalization is like ar-
guing against the laws of gravity.” Nothing could be closer to the way Globalization
is viewed by a great number of social scientists and commentators. It is pictured as
a process exogenous to the State that shapes the new economic, political, and social
realities in much the same way as the forces of gravity shape the physical world.
This “exogeneity” is attributed to the main driving force of Globalization that is
-ultimately- technology. In his influential book The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman
argued that such innovations as personal computers, work-flow software, and the
Internet, gave rise to Globalization version 3.0. Unlike previous eras of Globaliza-
tion whose agents where governments (v. 1.0) or firms (v. 2.0), this time the agent
is -at least in theory- everyone. Of course this view did not go unchallenged. Other
scholars maintained that not much has really changed. For example, Ghemawat
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(2007) argued that despite the increase in the potential for more global flows, about
90% of phone calls, traffic in the web, and investments are still local. Others argued
that in some instances the world is in fact less flat than before (Stiglitz, 2002) or
that Globalization is expected to lead to a more “spiky” or “bumpy” geographical
allocation of economic activity (Christopherson et al., 2008).
The story of Globalization did not only capture the imagination of economists,
but of political scientists and International Relations (IR) scholars alike. Following
the discussion on the economic consequences of Globalization, the 90’s witnessed
an equally vigorous and -alas- perplexed discussion about the relevance of the in-
tertwining of national economies for the political reality of the nation-state. It seems
that world markets have trumped the States appropriating their authority over so-
ciety and economy (Strange, 1996, p. 4). Politics “lags behind economics, like a
horse and buggy haplessly trailing a sports car” (Roger, 1996, p. 1). In reality, this
is not a separate discussion from the one focusing on economic outcomes alone. In
fact, it is a direct descendant. They share the same underlying assumption; that
Globalization is a process exogenous to the State driven by technological advance-
ments that shifted the balance of authority in favor of non-State organization (e.g.,
Strange, 1996; Ohmae, 1995).
These theoretical debates, particularly the view of “exogenous” Globalization
and independent non-State actors, still inform the way we understand the world.
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 caused the failure of large financial institutions,
forced governments to intervene by bailing out banking institutions, and led to a
world-wide recession as well as the European Sovereign Debt crisis. These devel-
opments reminded everyone that Globalization -referring to international financial
flows- is as powerful as ever, but more importantly, it highlighted the role that non-
State actors can play in driving these developments.
One particular incidence is the discussion surrounding Credit Rating Agencies
(CRAs). Since the financial crises, but even earlier crises like the East Asian one,
the names of the most influential CRAs -Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch-
have often made headlines in newspapers and news programs around the world.
The attention these organizations have drawn can be summarized in one of Thomas
Friedman’s comments: “There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion.
There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can
destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds.
And believe me; it’s not clear sometimes who’s more powerful”. This phrase encapsulates
much of the essence in the debate on Globalization and non-State actors. It not
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only points out the great power of a non-State actor but it compares it with the
most powerful State in the world.
Friedman is not alone in thinking these organizations can influence the global
political economy. A small but growing literature supports these arguments and
elaborates the issue in a theoretical way consistent with previous studies on other
organization such as firms, NGO’s, and international institutions (Sinclair, 1994;
Datz, 2004; Bruner & Abdelal, 2005; Sinclair, 2005; Paudyn, 2012). Traditionally,
non-State actors are theorized as entities challenging the authority, or even the
very existence, of the nation-state as the locus of economic activity and political
organization. They do so through their great influence on matters of global pro-
duction, rule-making, and opinion setting (Strange, 1996; Bieler et al., 2004; Chand-
ler, 2005). In much the same way, the CRAs are hypothesized to erode national
political autonomy either through force (e.g., downgrading national bonds when
governments do not abide by neo-liberal standards), or by creating a consensus of
what constitutes “good” and “bad” policies thus limiting the degrees of freedom
for rated governments with regard to public policy (Bruner & Abdelal, 2005; Sin-
clair, 2005).
Is it really so? Are non-State organizations, particularly the CRAs, powerful
actors operating in a new social sphere independent of State influence or are they
shaped by the social and political particularities of their home environments? And
in a more fundamental way, is Globalization a process exogenous to the State or is
it taking place within an environment created, regulated, and enforced by powerful
States? This dissertation is an exploration of these questions.
The main contention that this dissertation seeks to advance is that Globalization
is not an “exogenous process” or a “natural phenomenon” that arises out of inher-
ent developments such as technological advancements. In contrast, Globalization
is embedded. Meaning that it is shaped, constrained, and regulated by the environ-
ment within which it takes place. The main premise to support this argument is that
Globalization, regardless of how we define it or which of its dimensions (economic,
political, cultural) we focus on, is the outcome of multiple actors interacting. These
actors are shaped by the particularities of their social and political environment (i.e.,
they are embedded). They are carriers of norms and values, and are subject to insti-
tutional structures and social relationships that affect their interests and regulate
their choices and behaviors. Consequently, the outcome of their interaction, which
we call “Globalization” when it involves actors embedded in more than one States,
is shaped accordingly. Even if we treat the “Global” as a new level of analysis it
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still involves embedded agents and is thus embedded itself. This view is differ-
ent from the Realist counterargument to Globalization, that presents the process as
constituted by States. In fact, in both the Liberal and the Realist perspectives, the
tension arises between the global reach of markets and the local character of States.
In this dissertation, the actors-centered approach taken recasts the old debate of
Globalization as a tension between the actor’s local embeddedness and the global
institutional environment they are contributing to.
This dissertation promotes the view that the Globalization debate could benefit
by an approach based on New Institutionalism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio
& Powell, 1983; DiMaggio et al., 1991; Scott, 2008), a theory that can provides an
explanation of how, but also why, the behavior of Globalization’s constitutive parts
-States, Firms, and International Organizations- is dependent on their social and
political environment. The view that “institutions matter” is not new in Interna-
tional Relations theory and International Political Economy (IPE)1. This view has
been a driving force in main theoretical debates with a prominent example being
that of International Regimes. These Regimes are defined as “principles, norms,
rules and decision making procedures” (Krasner, 1982, p. 1) or simply “social in-
stitutions” (Ruggie, 1982, p. 380) around which actor expectations converge in a
given issue area of international relations.
In the second Chapter of this dissertation, which deals with the theoretical con-
sideration of this project, it will be shown that the same paradigm debate between
Neo-Realists, Neo-Liberalists, and Constructivists, which shaped the Regimes lit-
erature, is also the one driving the Globalization debate, with one important dif-
ference. The International Regimes’ debate is focused on arrangements or rela-
tionships created almost exclusively among States. Globalization is essentially a
discussion of how non-State actors, in particular non-governmental and business
oriented organizations, interact among them creating challenges for the territorial
configuration of the economy, politics, and culture. Drawing from a New Institu-
tional approach, and in particular the synthesis by Scott (2008), this dissertation will
strive to give empirical evidence of how actors -including both States and non-State
actors- and thus the process of Globalization, are embedded in the institutional
configurations of its environment.
The first actor the book focuses on are the U.S. Credit Rating Agencies and their
1 The term “Institutions” will be used as a way of referring to all those enduring social elements such as
norms, values, formal regulations, and conventions. This is done purely for convenience and to avoid
dull repetition of long phrases. When relevant, the differences between these concepts are elaborated,
in particular, when referring to the different ways in which they affect actors’ behavior.
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potential as instigators of political and economic reform. Starting from Chapter
two, I discuss how traditional views of the nature and function of the CRAs have
been one-sided treating the interests and identity of the agencies as essentially exo-
genous. Borrowing from the tradition of New Institutionalism, I theorize that the
agencies are embedded in the socio-political environment of their home countries
and, in addition, a web of relationships with home country stakeholders. This em-
beddedness affects their interests, making them carriers of their home countries’
financial culture compromising the usefulness of their ratings2.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5, deal exclusively with the content and possible effect of
sovereign ratings. In the third Chapter I provide evidence on how the U.S.- based
CRAs contribute towards the creation of a Global economic system by projecting
Liberal conceptions of public policy with their sovereign bond ratings. Chapter 4
analyzes how rating agencies from different countries (particularly U.S. and China)
systematically disagree in their rating valuations in a way consistent with home
country interests. Thus, these two chapters provide evidence of how non-State act-
ors (re)produce Global structures while at the same time being embedded within
local Institutional configurations. Finally, Chapter 5 argues that the agencies are
embedded in the general modus operandi of the global economy and do not consti-
tute independent actors. Furthermore, it shows that there is no strong evidence that
countries have engaged in deregulation as a direct consequence of pressure by their
sovereign bond rating grade. Taking the three chapters together, I conclude that an
Institutional approach in this debate can generate valuable insights as to the role
that Credit Rating Agencies (and possibly other non-State actors) play in the pro-
cess of Globalization. Rather than conceptualizing them as independent non-State
actors, taking their interests as fixed and exogenous, it is potentially more useful
to picture them as operating embedded in their national environment that shapes
their interests and guides their behavior.
In the last two chapters of this dissertation, the question of “Globalization vs.
State Sovereignty” is recast drawing again on an Institutional approach. The nov-
elty in these chapters consists in the actor-centered approach. Instead of treating
Globalization as a given exogenous process, the two Chapters turn the Globaliza-
tion debate on its head. I theorize on the importance of the local Institutional envir-
2 The distinction between Constructivism in International Relations and New Institutionalism, espe-
cially its sociological variant, is a very thin line. In particular, both views share the view that actors
and structure are mutually constitutive and Institutions can have a normative/cognitive effect on the
actors’ behavior by specifying how actors “should” or “can imagine” acting in specific context (Hall
& Taylor, 1996). Nevertheless, sociological Institutionalism gives a richer explanation on why organ-
izations choose to internalize external scripts of behavior, and thus is treated in this dissertation as a
“competing” view to that of Constructivism.
6 Chapter 1
onments as the building blocks of Globalization focusing on the role of each State
as a prominent (albeit not the only) organizational structure in providing and en-
forcing a regulatory framework that enables transnational exchange. Globalization,
as I argue, is contingent on the existence of conducive Institutional environments
and is neither exogenous (as the Liberal perspective treats it) nor dependent upon
only a hegemon, unitary actor, State (as Realism posits).
A novel index of State Sovereignty is constructed (Chapter 6), based on Krasner’s
(2001) definition of State Sovereignty. This Index measures the organizational ef-
fectiveness of each State in providing ”‘those very basic functions for which the
State as an institution was created”’ (Strange, 1996, p. xii). The last empirical
chapter ( Chapter 7) uses the index to test the relationship between Economic Glob-
alization and State Sovereignty. Evidence is offered that countries experiencing an
increase in the strength and quality of domestic institutions also experience an in-
crease of economic flows. In addition, the findings support that, statistically, caus-
ality is more likely to run from State Sovereignty to Globalization rather than the
other way around. Putting these results together, it is concluded that non-State
actors and Globalization in general, do not necessarily constitute a threat to the
nation-states’ autonomy and existence, but rather are shaped, sometimes enabled,
sometimes constraint by Institutional environments deeply embedded in national
States.







The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the theoretical traditions that inform
the wider Globalization debate, focusing mostly on how its economic dimension
affects the capacity of States to perform their basic functions. I start by discussing
how the dominant theories in this debate view the role of Institutional structures
and Globalization, including the actions of Non-State actors, with regard to the
prominence of the State as the dominant organization of economic and political life.
In particular I visit four approaches. Rational approaches, such as Neo-Realism
and Neo-Liberalism, and Phenomenological approaches like Constructivism and
Institutionalism1. I discuss their basic premises and worldviews and point out their
different expectations regarding the fate of the State.
Subsequently, I describe why Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have received an
increased attention as prominent Non-State actors and present the two ways in
which CRAs are hypothesized to cause policies to be more alike among States. This
happens either through their ability to influence market participants decisions or
the creation of a model of orthodoxy about public policy. I argue that both ap-
1 By Phenomenological approaches I refer to these theories of International Politics whose inquiry is
based on the premise that reality is not independent of human consciousness. It comprises of objects
and events as they are perceived or understood by the actors that experience them.
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proaches restrict our understanding of the role of the agencies. Specifically, I ar-
gue that both approaches overlook important ways in which some States have em-
powered these agencies restricting causality to run only from the CRAs to State
decision, and not the other way around. Thus a better theory to analyze the role
of CRAs is one that acknowledges that these organizations do not operate in a va-
cuum, but in an environment defined by norms and cultural understandings of
what constitutes “investment risk”.
The chapter culminates in subsection 4 were I argue in favor of an approach
influenced by the New Institutionalism(s) as a more useful intellectual background
for the analysis of the role of CRAs and Globalization vis-a`-vis the State. This ap-
proach takes as input the main premises of Phenomenological approaches, like
Constructivism and Old Institutionalism, but extends them by incorporating in-
sights from the field of Institutional Economics. In particular, I comment on how
the “Three Pillars of Institutional Analysis” -The Regulative dimension, the Norm-
ative dimension and the Cognitive/Cultural dimension- (Scott, 2008) can provide
guidance and testable hypotheses. The last two of these pillars are used to theorize
about the CRAs’ identity and interests. That is, these dimensions provide a mech-
anism that predicts how these agencies are embedded in local norms and culture,
and how this embeddedness will affect their rating valuations. The first pillar of In-
stitutions, referring to regulations, is then used to hypothesize how economic flows
depend on the regulative capacity of the State hence supporting the prominence of
this institution and the endogenous nature of Economic Globalization. The coming
chapters in this thesis provide empirical support for the hypotheses derived in this
chapter.
I begin with a short disambiguation of the terms “Globalization” and “Sover-
eignty” as they are used in this thesis2. The chapter is concluded with a detailed
road map of this thesis.
2.1.1 A Short Disambiguation
Globalization is of great importance for social scientists because it forces them to
consider its implications and occasionally reexamine many assumptions behind
their theories. In the field of IR, Globalization has caused a particularly worri-
some situation. Since the dominant views in this field presuppose the existence of a
State as their basic analytic unit, Globalization could bring about their very eclipse.
2 Chapter 6, discussing the quantification of State Sovereignty, offers a more lengthy discussion on the
ambiguity of the term “Sovereignty”.
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Nevertheless, Globalization did enter the field’s main research agenda and caused
doubt about the usefulness of its most fundamental concept; Sovereignty. The term
Sovereignty in this debate is used in non-consistent ways and has been given many
meanings that depend on the particularities of the research question investigated or
the background of the scholar investigating. In one of the most inclusive definitions
Thomson (1995) points out that the term includes both the dimension of “control”
-over actors and activities both within and across its boarders- but also that of “au-
thority” -over decision making-. Other IR scholar have a tendency to sometimes
refer to Sovereignty as an abstract Institution, a rule of the game between States
with no physical properties related to it (e.g., Werner & De Wilde, 2001). Most of-
ten than not, especially in fields like International Political Economy that are more
empirically oriented than IR, Sovereignty is conflated with other terms such as “na-
tional policy autonomy” -a State’s ability to determine its own policies unaffected
by external factors- or “State capacity” -the degree to which States can perform their
basic function-. Two exempts from Clark (Clark, 1999) illustrate a possible cause for
this misuse of terms in the discussion about Globalization.
“It is precisely because Globalization is perceived to be a threat to the
State’s continuing ability to function and to perform its traditional roles
that it holds such interests for political theorists... The combined case of
the State’s loss of Sovereignty in the face of Globalization is the short-
hand expression for this concern...” (Clark, 1999, p. 45)
“...the diminution of Sovereignty -generically, the quantum of State capacity-
indicates the intensification of Globalization [. . . ] If Globalization is be-
lieved to be eroding the effectiveness of State performance it follows
that this will inevitably show up in any discussion of Sovereignty.”
(Clark, 1999, p. 70)
One way to read these passages is that Globalization is theorized to amount to
a loss of State capacity (autonomy, control etc.), which is ultimately a prerequisite
for a loss of Sovereignty. There cannot be a discussion of the one (loss of capa-
city, autonomy) without the other. As such, in this dissertation I will use the term
“State Sovereignty” as a compromise to refer to the notion of empirical sovereign
statehood. What I propose is not to ask whether Globalization is canceling the in-
stitution of Sovereignty. No State lost its membership to the sovereign club because
it enabled trade flows. Neither wonder whether regulatory or economic autonomy
is compromised. Since -especially in the latter case- this is a matter of policy and
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political preferences rather than Sovereignty per se (Jackson, 1999b; Sørensen, 1999).
Instead we should ask how economic Globalization affects the capacity of the state
to perform the duties bestowed upon it after being admitted to the State system as
a sovereign player. This is consistent with the way IPE scholars see this debate. For
example Strange (1996, p. xii) talks about “those very basic functions for which the
State as an institution was created”.
Regarding Globalization, in this thesis I am interested in its economic side. I ad-
opt the -rather narrow, yet sufficient for my purpose- definition of economic Glob-
alization as the increased integration of world economies through trade and finan-
cial flows. In this regard I follow Strange (1996), Hirst (1997), Hirst and Thompson
(2009), Gilpin (2001), and Rodrik (2007), among many others.
2.2 Globalization and the State; the role of Institutions
and Non-State actors
2.2.1 Rational Approaches
The two approaches that dominate the Globalization debate, namely Neo-Realism
and Neo-Liberalism (henceforth the “Neo-” component is dropped for conveni-
ence) share a great deal of their main premises. Both Realism (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin,
1981) and variants of Liberalism (Keohane, 1986; Krasner, 1983) start with the as-
sumption that the world system is made up of autonomous nation-states. Further-
more, these States are rational actors and have interests and behaviors that are exo-
genously given by the structure of the system. In particular, as the system is char-
acterized by anarchy, both approaches share the conventional structuralists’ argu-
ment that States seek to maximize their power and satisfy their interests (Krasner,
1982). Nevertheless, the two theories diverge in the role they attribute to Globaliz-
ation and Institutions.
Economic Globalization, Non-State Actors, and the State
The bulk of the “Globalization vs. State” debate is made up of scholars belonging
to the two rational schools. In a broad sense, they can be divided in two schools
of thought. The Statists, meaning those who content that Globalization reflects the
configurations of international relations and distribution of power among States,
and the Liberals, those who view Globalization as an autonomous force external
to the State (Clark, 1997). The first broadly falls under the school of Realism and
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the later, unsurprisingly, to Liberalism. Statists content that Globalization is not a
natural phenomenon, but rather argue that a global open system can only emerge
with the backup of States, in particular hegemonic States like the U.S. and Britain
(Helleiner, 1996b) that provide appropriate public Institutions (P. Hirst, 1997). This
is true even for the international monetary system, a symbol of the footlessness of
Globalization (Germain, 1997), As such the impact of Globalization on the State,
viewed from this angle, cannot be that great all together. Globalization is created
by States.
Statist content that the State-Globalization nexus is not a zero-sum game. In
particular, those informed by the core of Realist theory view Globalization as the
project of hegemonic States, absence of which, a global system would be ill-fated
(Krasner, 1995; Waltz, 1999; Gilpin, 2001). Their argument is based on three premises
(Clark, 1999). First, market structures reflect political choices and frameworks of
hegemonic States (Gilpin & Gilpin, 1987). The actors of Globalization require pub-
lic power to protect them (P. Q. Hirst & Thompson, 1996, p. 188). Second, even the
“free market” needed to sustain Globalization is again a creation of the State (Gray,
1998; Helleiner, 1996a; Parker, 2003). Globalization thus is the result of repeated
State choices and actions that promote the needed framework. Finally, they believe
that there is still evidence of State autonomy with regard to public policy. States
and their system play a role to such areas as the global division of labor (Mittel-
man, 1996), the national economy (Freeman, 1995) and decision of public policy in
general (P. Hirst, 1997). In this view there is not much space for Non-State actors to
influence developments either.
The true core of Realism, whether the classical strand of Morgenthau (Mor-
genthau, 1949), or Waltz’s (1979) Structural Realism, do not allow for non-State
actors to be taken seriously in world politics (Archer, 2002, p. 85). This follows
directly from the main premises of the theory3. Actors’ behavior in world politics
is given by the structure of the system. The world is characterized by the lack of
any supreme authority (i.e., it is anarchical), at least at the international level. It is
populated by rational actors that seek the same goal; survival. The only thing in
which they differ is their capabilities to achieve that goal. According to Waltz (1979)
then, when analyzing this system, it makes sense to take under account the actions
of the stronger of those actors, namely the States, as they set the scene of action for
others as well as for themselves’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 72)4. Realism is a theory designed
3 I adhere to Structural Realism from here on as the reference point. In essence it does not differ signi-
ficantly to Classical Realism in its treatment of non-State actor (cf., Geeraerts & Mellentin, 1995).
4 In Classical realism the focus on States as the primary unit of analysis is based on the fact that they
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to understand interactions and relations between States and does not have much to
offer with regard the analysis of non-State actors (Glaser, 2003, p. 407).
On the other side of this debate the Liberal view contests almost every argu-
ment the Statists present. Liberals see Globalization as an autonomous force driven
by exogenous (to the State) factors like uncontrollable markets (Hurrell & Woods,
1995) or technological developments (Rosenau, 1997). As such, the consequences
that Globalization bears for the State are real and could prove decisive. Liberals of-
fer again three main arguments for their position. First, they see the end of national
economies. The State might be around for a while more as a political administrative
unit but not an economic one (Reich, 1991; Hoogvelt, 2001; Higgott, 1996). Second,
the State is now not the only major player out there but it has to compete with other
non-State organizations (more on this below). Finally, the third argument contents
that there is a general move of authority from the State to the market. Neverthe-
less, it is arguable that this can be merged with the previous argument since what
markets really do is empower non-State actors to take on more prominent roles in
the global political economy.
For many Liberals what makes the current wave of Globalization different from
previous ones is the rise of two non-State actors groups as important elements of
the global economic and political system. Alongside the State (the traditional locus
of authority, also known as the “first sector”), scholars have focused on the emer-
gence of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and Nongovernmental Organizations
(NGOs) (the “second and “third” sectors, respectively), as challenges to State au-
thority (Teegen et al., 2004; Bieler et al., 2004; Gilpin, 2001). The dominant view in
this strand is that authority is essentially a zero-sum game between State and non-
State actors (Sending & Neumann, 2006). To some, national governments not only
lose part of their authority, but actually share their powers with TNCs and NGOs
to the point that the very core of Sovereignty is compromised and the Westphalian
system of States is considered “over” (Mathews, 1997).
In reality though, very few authors would go as far as declaring the nation-state
dead or replaced by firms and NGOs. Similarly, not many would argue that the in-
ternational activity of these actors has not influenced the global political economy.
Rather, the disagreement is one of degree (see Gilpin, 2001, p. 233-253). Enabled by
decreasing costs in transportation and communication, TNC’s have spread some
of their activity around the world undercutting the importance of national bound-
aries (Ohmae, 1995). This internationalization of production has turned TNCs into
are the only actors satisfying three important conditions; Sovereignty, recognition of Statehood, and the
control of territory and population (Hocking & Smith, 1995)
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political actors (Strange 1996). Particularly, Strange, albeit being a scholar that takes
State power very seriously, argues that TNCs’ important role in world production
and distribution influences in a de facto manner who-gets-what. Given the multi-
territorial production scheme of TNCs, it seems that decisions once anchored to the
territorial nation-state, have now been moved sideways towards the global mar-
ket. This is not compatible with traditional notions of territorially defined authority.
However, these views are not unanimously accepted. Several arguments have been
presented to defend against globalists’ views of withering nation-states. The main
argument against the power of TNCs is that they are not really all that global. The
great balk of their operations is still local, their managing boards are primarily of
home nationality, and their strategies are shaped by the home country environment
(Doremus et al., 1998; Gilpin, 2001).
Institutions
The differences between Realism and Liberalism extend to the treatment of Insti-
tutions in International Politics, as exemplified by the debate on International Re-
gimes. These Regimes are social institutions’ (Ruggie, 1982, p. 380) made up of
principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures’ (Krasner, 1982, p. 1).
For Realists, Institutions do not matter (Strange, 1982). Basic causal factors, such
as egoistic-self interests and asymmetries in economic and political power dictate
directly the behavior and interests of actors. Environmental conditions such as
Institutions are constructions of the agents themselves and do not in themselves
constitute a causal force. The analogy is that of a highly idealized abstract market
with no transaction costs, information asymmetries, or any other market failures
that would necessitate some coordinating mechanisms to operate optimally.
On the other hand, this is exactly the way in which Liberalists view the role of
Institutions. While taking interests and power seriously, these views amend the
purely structural approaches of Realists by allowing for Institutions to play a role
in coordinating State behavior and promote desired or Pareto-optimal outcomes
(Keohane, 1982). Again, the parallel with economic views is apparent. Institutions
correct for friction in the market. Circumstances that give rise to situations like
Prisoner’s Dilemmas, or the game of Chicken (Stein, 1982), are all instances that
Institutions can act to assure coordination and optimal outcomes. Nevertheless, In-
stitutions work only as intervening variables between basic causal forces and out-
comes, and only in restricted cases. Institutions would be powerless in situations
that resemble zero-sum games (Krasner, 1982).Thus, while rational approaches of
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the “softer” type confer some role on Institutions, they are viewed as endogenous
creations of actors with limited influence at best.
These approaches differ significantly from the position taken in this disserta-
tion. Unlike Realism, an actors-based approach allows non-State actors to exercise
significant influence over the global political economy as Liberal theories predict.
Nevertheless, contrary to the Liberal approaches regarding Institutions as mere in-
tervening variables, the actors-based approach stresses that both the global market,
and the actors that constitute it, are embedded in institutional systems in which
States play a crucial role. Thus, the puzzle behind Globalization is note merely one
of ’market-vs.-States’, but rather a tension between local and global Institutional
structures.
2.2.2 Phenomenological Approaches
The theories that fall under this headline are those of Constructivism and Soci-
ological Institutionalism. Both schools share the premise that actors, like States,
organizations, and individuals do not have predetermined and exogenously given
interests and identities. They content that these latter characteristics are construc-
ted through interaction. In fact the two schools are intellectually so compatible that
some authors treat them as one strand (Risse, 2007a). Constructivism arose as a dir-
ect challenge to the classical approaches in International Relations. It appeared in
the mid-90s and was incorporated in the mainstream body of IR theories following
the very influential articles of Wendt (Wendt, 1992) and Katzenstein (Katzenstein,
1996). In its core, this school contests the deterministic role that structure (e.g.,
anarchic nature of the international system) plays in determining the outcome of
actors’ interaction. In greater detail, it argues that, whatever structure might exists
is not exogenously given, in the way that physical forces like gravity are, but it is
constructed ex nihilo and kept in place by common agreement among the parties in-
volved (Adler, 1997). As Wendt (1992) convincingly argued, “anarchy is what States
make of it”. What this really means is that the interests and behaviors of actors are
not fixed and should not be taken for granted; rather they are created out of the
identities that actors curry (Risse & Sikkink, 1999), which are constructed through
interaction governed by shared norms and values. Rather than (hard) power, it is
norms and values that shape the behavior of the actors in the system (Chandler,
2005).
This view is shared by the sociological variance of Institutionalism, but a greater
emphasis is put on the role of culture, and in particular global culture. The main
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contribution of Sociological Institutionalism to Globalization studies is the creation
of the notion of “world society”, meaning, an overarching globally applicable cul-
ture (Drori, 2008; Finnemore, 1996). They see nation-states as culturally constructed
and embedded rather than the rational actors of conventional IR theories (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977). While they attribute causal powers to the norms and values of the
environment, as Constructivists do, they go one step further and point out exactly
what this cultural environment is made of. In particular, it is composed of univer-
salistic world models that promote values typically associated with Western world
culture that emphasizes Weberian rationality (Meyer et al., 1997). These interna-
tional norms provide a script of behavior for all actors.
Economic Globalization, Non-State Actors and the State
Both Constructivism and Sociological Institutionalism have been applied to the
Globalization debate and helped us gain a better understanding of the issue. Never-
theless, there is no Constructivist (or Institutionalist) theory of Globalization (Risse,
2007a). The two approaches have been used in a way that produced a rich empir-
ical literature applying their main theoretical premises to global processes and act-
ors. Constructivists take a very different approach than rational theories do when
analyzing the effects of Globalization on the State, or for that matter, any other
actor. Instead of viewing Globalization as a constraint on the political autonomy of
the nation-state, effecting State behavior by changing opportunity costs between
choices, they emphasize the constitutiveness of Globalization and the State. Ac-
knowledging that Globalization is not a “faceless” exogenous force, but the result of
political and social agency, Constructivists point out how it changes the identities
of States (but also private actors like multinational corporations) to reconstituted
them into “Wannabe” globalizers. The reasoning follows the logic of appropriate-
ness (March & Olsen, 1984). As it becomes the norm to have a positive view on
economic integration, in fact it might be presented as a one way street5, actors will
act on the basis of what is appropriate, in which case, it would be to follow the
norm of economic integration.
Sociological Institutionalist follow this approach closely but emphasize the prom-
inence of global culture and norms and the effects of their diffusion (Meyer et al.,
1987, 1997). They point out on numerous occasions how the organization of States
with different traditions will end up isomorphic just because they follow the same
global rules. For example, science ministries will exists in countries that might
5 An example is Margaret Thatcher’s TINA, meaning There Is No Alternative.
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not even have universities, similar education curricula across dissimilar countries
and many more examples6. In addition, Sociological Institutionalists recognize the
role of local cultures as mediators of the adoption of global cultures and potential
source of conflict between the global and the local (cf., Finnemore, 1996). Finally,
they see Globalization as a State enhancing process rather than a challenge. This
follows from the fact that to institutionalize the global culture in the local environ-
ment one needs a properly working State apparatus (Meyer et al., 1997). As a final
remark, while both Constructivists and Institutionalists pay attention to the con-
stitutive effect of Institutions and culture, the latter are in general more inclined to
acknowledge the cognitive effects of Institutions on the agents rather than the cre-
ation of norms (DiMaggio et al., 1991; Scott, 2008). However, there is some overlap
between the two and the dividing lines, if any, are not water tight.
Both approaches are more easily demonstrated when discussed in combination
with the role of NGOs in the global political economy. NGOs, the numbers of which
have proliferated recently (Gautney, 2010; Bhagwati, 2007), owing to technologies
such as the internet (Bieler et al., 2004), are regarded as actors functioning inde-
pendently of the State or TNCs with a great potential to influence the decisions
of both (Teegen et al., 2004). This influence is gained by their capacity to perform
actions traditionally handled by States, as for example, the deployment of Human-
itarian Aid (e.g., Economist, 2000), or their involvement in shaping environmental
regulation (Raustiala, 1997). Their influence also draws from the fact that they can
act as independent “experts” (Gautney, 2010) and engage in “information polit-
ics” by generating politically useful information (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). NGOs are
able of generating norms and values that can influence and change the policies, in-
terests or even “identities” of nation-states (Chandler, 2005). Thus they can affect
State policy through what has been called “the power of persuasion” (Korey, 1999).
Nevertheless, NGOs are often far from independent of States and their relationship
is as much conflicting as symbiotic (Bieler et al., 2004; Gautney, 2010). It is possible
to conceptualize them as carriers of policies that States themselves support and
want to promote. In this sense, NGOs are not totally exogenous. To treat non-State
actors as independent players that operate in a global level, dis-embedded from
the norms and values of their home environments, is equally as troublesome as
treating Globalization as a exogenous process unaffected by its constitutive parts.
A better understanding of how non-State actors (NGOs or otherwise) are affected
themselves by their environment could be of value.
6 Meyer (1997, p. 153) provides a list of cases were isomorphism of policies across States is attributed
to the diffusion of global culture. Jepperson (2002) provides more examples.
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Institutions
As it must be clear from the discussion above, Institutions, including norms and
values, are fundamental elements of the two theories. Their position in the causal
chain that leads from fundamental causal factors to behaviors is much different
than in the rational approaches. Institutions do not only have the ability to in-
tervene between fundamental causes and behaviors. They can shape behaviors in
their own right. To use the example of International Regimes, writers that support a
Constructivist approach (also referred to as the “Grotian approach”), disaggregate
States into governing elites, and argue that the elites’ behavior is always embed-
ded in rules, norms, and principles which transcend national boundaries (Puchala
& Hopkins, 1982). It is patterned behavior that generates norms of contact, and
deviations from those norms usually results in some rebuke (Young, 1982). Con-
structivists thus stress, at least in the general discussion of regimes, the normative
way in which Institutions constraint behavior.
Sociological Institutionalists stress a more cognitive aspect of Institutions (Fin-
nemore, 1996).Institutions do not matter (only because) they create patterned modes
of behavior, but even more so, because they shape the agents perceptions about
reality (Meyer et al., 1997). They provide scripts that legitimate forms of organiz-
ation or behavior, and actors -individuals, organizations, States- internalize them.
They provide the “software for the mind” (Hofstede, 1984). As empirical evid-
ence for the power of Institutions and their global spread, these authors offer the
fact that States and organization with dissimilar traditions, resources, and histories
have very similar structures, or in the Institutionalist language, they exhibit Iso-
morphism. That, they content, must be the result of a universal culture that acts
upon all units in the global system (Meyer et al., 1997).
2.2.3 Contrasting the Views
To summarize the four approaches to the nexus between Globalization, Institutions,
and the State Table 2.1 depicts the main points of each theory. There is considerable
variation between the two main views as there is within them. This is particularly
true within the Rational Approaches. While Realism takes the State as the main,
and in some regard the only powerful player, Liberal views give an equally prom-
inent role to other non-State actors and Institutions. A direct consequence of this
premise is that Globalization has minor consequences for the State according to
Realists while it is omnipotent for Liberals.
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In the Phenomenological Approaches a more holistic view is adopted on all
these issues. Rather than focusing on any actor in isolation, it is the social environ-
ment, including its norms and ideas, as well as the agency of the actors within it,
that is of importance. In this environment, Institutions, most prominently culture,
but other norms and values as well, are seen as the bricks upon which interests and
identities (and consequently behaviors) are build. Globalization is seen as socially
constructed, driven by agency rather than exogenous forces, and it affects actors by
spreading normative behaviors or scripts of contact.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Having discussed the main theoretical approaches that inform the greater Glob-
alization debate, in the next section I turn to the empirical focus of this thesis, the
Credit Rating Agencies. I first motivate my choice of this actors as a typical example
of a Non-State actor relevant to the discussion of Globalization, and subsequently
I discuss how the theories discussed so far were used to theorize their role in the
global political economy.
2.3 Credit Ratings Agencies
2.3.1 Why should we care?
Credit Rating Agencies were put under the spotlight during such times as the fin-
ancial crisis in Asia in the late 90’s, the Enron bankruptcy, and the unfolding de-
velopments in Europe. Despite the recent surge in interest, CRAs existed well be-
fore the 20th century, but their scope was quite limited. Initially, CRAs provided
information regarding the creditworthiness of US railroad companies as possible
investment outlays. As Globalization intensified and financial mobility increased,
traditional modes of investment were gradually abandoned in favor of more disin-
termediated capital flows (Sinclair, 1994; Leyshon & Thrift, 1998). One of the func-
tions that give CRAs their prominent position, is their role as “the central nervous
system” of this disintermediated system of finance that gathers and analyzes data
reducing informational asymmetry (Sinclair, 2005). Others nevertheless support
that their influence is given to them simply by regulations already in place since
1930 (Partnoy, 2002). This latter view can also explain one of the main puzzles
in the CRAs literature. That is, how to reconcile on the one hand, the poor per-
formance of the agencies and the questionable informational value of their ratings,
with, on the other hand, the significant influence ratings exert on market parti-
cipants. Questions like these have by now spanned an interesting multidisciplinary
research agenda.
The growing literature on CRAs revolves mainly around two questions. Most
of the efforts thus far are centered on understanding the determinants of Sovereign
Bond Ratings (SBRs). This strand can be roughly divided between studies looking
at how economic fundamentals are related to SBRs, and those that emphasize polit-
ical variables as equally important factors. There are roughly 20 studies proposing
about 30 indicators as possible predictors of SBR. One drawback of this strand is
the inability to extract an overarching lesson regarding SBR determinants owning
to the fact that the empirical approaches used are not bound by a unifying the-
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oretical approach. Therefore, results between studies are not directly comparable
and depend upon specifications and samples used. This drawback is very relevant
to the other important question in this debate namely, the economic and political
significance of the ratings.
Whether one focuses on the cost of borrowing that governments face (Kiff et al.,
2012), FDI and bank inflows (Janicki & Wunnava, 2004; Kim & Wu, 2011), or do-
mestic trading markets and the financial sector at large (Janicki & Wunnava, 2004;
Kim & Wu, 2008, 2011), the influence of SBRs has been shown to be significant. On
the face of it, the power that CRAs exert over market participants created the ex-
pectation that bond ratings could potentially affect domestic politics (Datz, 2004;
Elkhoury, 2009). Given the view that ratings reflect political factors as much as eco-
nomic fundamentals, several authors speculate that the great influence ratings exert
over the market can afford them to exercise political pressure upon rated countries.
Empirically this effect is nevertheless not conclusively demonstrated. Beyond a
couple of case studies (e.g., Sinclair, 2005; Paudyn, 2012) the effect of SBRs on do-
mestic government policies is still speculative. Can the actions, or mere existence,
of the agencies explain at least a part of the reform pattern seen since the turn of
the century?
A second approach to the power of the rating agencies is not connected to their
potential to influence the market, rather, it is concerned with the effect that the
ratings have on the way policy makers and investors think about public policies
(Sinclair, 2005). In this approach, CRAs communicate, through their ratings, their
views on what constitutes acceptable policies thus establishing a “mental frame-
work” of “good” and “bad” policies. These views have the potential of influencing
policy making in countries with a particular need of international investment, and
consequently a good rating grade (Datz, 2004; Bruner & Abdelal, 2005).
Drawing a parallel between CRAs, firms, and NGOs it can be argued that CRAs
combine both ways in which the other two organizations potentially influence the
State. As mentioned above, firms are thought to challenge State authority by af-
fecting the production structure of the world economy. They have the power to
decide who gets to produce what, a function some see as taken away from the State
(Strange, 1996). A similar line of thought is applied to the CRAs stressing their
power to affect market participants (Sinclair, 2005). Alternatively, CRAs, much like
NGOs, are seen as potentially able to change the structure of ideas and conceptions
of appropriateness in issues of public policy (Sinclair, 1994, 2005; Paudyn, 2012).
The next subsection critically discusses these approaches.
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2.3.2 Theoretical Consideration in the Study of Credit Rating Agen-
cies
Realist Approaches
What is meant here with the term Realist Approaches is an effort to understand the
role of the CRAs by emphasizing whether and how these actors can yield power,
in particular, hard or relational power and possibly coerce States into adopting sim-
ilar policies. Strange (1996) defined two types of power in a political economy.
These are relational power, where party A gets party B to do something it would not
have done otherwise, and structural power, which describes the power to shape the
structures within which actors interact. It is thus customary for people adopting
a relational power approach to CRAs to emphasize how these agencies can influ-
ence the financial markets, and thus the allocation of valuable capital flows (Datz,
2004; Elkhoury, 2009; Paudyn, 2012). These studies have every right to be skeptical
about the market power of the agencies. There is ample evidence that the agen-
cies can significantly influence the financial market (Cantor & Packer, 1996; Kiff et
al., 2012). Nevertheless, these approaches, focusing on power alone, make certain
assumptions that are not necessarily true. First, they assume the agencies to be
way more powerful than they really are. In additions, they view governments as
apolitical managers of the macro-economy that yield all too easily to market forces
disregarding the political costs that behaviors like these might entail. Finally, they
assume abiding to the ratings prescriptions of proper fiscal contact will necessarily
lead to a betterment of their rating grade and an automatic inflow of cheap(er) cap-
ital. As Chapter 5 in this thesis discusses at more length, these assumptions can be
problematic rendering the Realist approach an oversimplification.
Notwithstanding these issues, what makes this approach even more problem-
atic is that it falsely projects the relational power of CRAs as entirely their own.
That is, this power is not strictly “natural”, in the sense that it does not emanate
from their position in the global economy alone. To be fair, some of it definitely is.
A great part of it though comes from the State, and particularly U.S. and Europe.
Ratings are a vital part of financial regulation and supervisory practices around the
world (BIS, 2009, p. 3-14). As an example, several European directive have made
rating grades relevant as part of the criteria determining capital requirements for
credit institutions, investment firms, and the insurance sector as well as qualifiers
of assets posed as collateral7. Another example is the Basel II accord where banks
7 A detailed description of these directives can be found at Staikouras (2012, p. 73)
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are required to use ratings produced by External Credit Rating Agencies in their
calculation credit risk (known as the standardized approach). Finally, in the case
of the U.S a triple A rating from the agencies is a requirement for pension funds’
investments. Thus arguing that the agencies are able to yield relational power over
States through their market influence, an influence afforded to them by State regu-
lation, is an exercise in tautology.
In summary, Realist approaches, with their focus on relational power operate
on the basis of oversimplifying assumptions and tautological reasoning. An altern-
ative to these approaches comes from the theory of Constructivism.
Constructivist Approached
From a Constructivist perspective, the agencies create what Strange (1994) has called
a “knowledge structure” capable of creating a set of de facto rules that act as a bench-
mark (read: norm) for investors and policy makers alike (Mintz & Schwartz, 1987).
Thus, by creating their three letter symbols, the CRAs provide a guiding principle,
acting as a regulative mechanism in the global political economy (Sinclair 1994).
This is the structural type of power discussed above; the power to affect behavior
not directly, through coercion, but by framing the rules of contact in a way that
deviation from that standard could be costly -in any sense of the word. More spe-
cifically, in the case of the (American) CRAs the main argument is that behind their
valuations is a firm belief in the market system that puts investors’ interests above
those of society. Thus, States that want to maintain a good rating grade must re-
arrange public policies to be compatible with Neo-Liberal standards (Sinclair, 1994;
Bruner & Abdelal, 2005; Sinclair, 2005). For example, minimize welfare States, in-
troduce privatizations or delegate some of their authority to independent institu-
tions as is the case with central banks.
The main assumptions behind this view, specifically, the conjecture that rating
grades reflect preferences over certain policies, is well supported by empirical stud-
ies. Chapter 3 in this dissertation shows, that, in a sensitivity analysis performed
on most previous studies dealing with the determinants of sovereign ratings, vari-
ables such as central bank independence, and regulatory quality8, are among the
most robust correlates of the ratings. Nevertheless, the way in which the Construct-
ivist approach has been used so far overlooks the reciprocal case. That is, while the
agencies are expected to create a framework that alters the interests and behaviors
8 Defined by the World Bank as “the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations that permit and promote private sector development”
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of States, the agencies’ interests and identity are taken for granted.
Some authors have acknowledged that the agencies’ views on policies are in-
fluenced by the fact that they operate mostly from within the U.S. (Abdelal, 2005;
Sinclair 2005). Nevertheless, turning the research question to its head, creates sev-
eral complications. If ratings reflect the general culture within which they operate,
and that culture (i.e., Neo-Liberalism) has been around longer than sovereign rat-
ings have, a logical conclusion is that the character of the ratings, and as I argue in
Chapter 5 their very existence, is a consequence at least as much as a driver of Neo-
Liberal ideology. If so, the “mental framework” they promote is not entirely new
and their role might be exaggerated.
To summarize, the Constructivist approach gives an account of the agencies’
power as a structural one. The agencies are seen as creating a “mental framework
of rating orthodoxy” (Sinclair 2005) thus setting the standards for investment and
policy decisions. While the main assumptions are supported by empirical studies,
this line of thinking begs the question of where did the agencies receive their views
on what constitutes creditworthiness. If they are just reproducing mental structures
already found in their environment then their structural power does not seem as
unique. Thus, to better understand the ratings we need to put them in the center
of our attention and analyze their interests and identity. An Institutional approach
can do just that.
2.4 An Institutional View of Globalization and Credit
Rating Agencies
Social scientists across different disciplines by now all agree that “Institutions mat-
ter”. Nevertheless, they do not always agree on what “Institutions” mean, which of
them matter, and when they do, how they matter. Institutionalism influenced all
major branches of social science like economics, political science and sociology but
in very different ways (more on this below). It is also present in the Globalization
debate, predominantly in the Phenomenological Approaches described above, but
also through Liberalism. Nevertheless, the way Institutionalism is used in these ap-
proaches is eclectic. Those pieces of Institutionalism most relevant to each world-
view were adopted, and the rest were ignored. In this subsection I do the exact
opposite.
Rational choice scholars accept that Institutions, in terms of “formal constraints”,
matter (cf., Hall & Taylor, 1996). Furthermore, I discussed above how Sociological
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Institutionalists argue that Institutions matter in terms of cultural and cognitive
ways. Why should we ignore the full range of Institutional effects, something
already shown to be valid, just to accommodate particular worldviews? If some
physicians confirmed that a certain substance has a causal effect on the course of a
disease, should they try to understand this effect at its fullest extend or argue about
their ontological and epistemological views? Should they investigate, in a holistic
way, how the different components of the drug work in interaction to achieve res-
ults, or focus on the one ingredient that their lab patented in the past? Arguably,
drawing a parallel between natural and social sciences is an ontological challenge
in itself. To be fair, I do not believe that cutting through worldviews is necessarily
better than using theories in an eclectic way. But if there is anything to learn about
Globalization from the study of Institutions then this has to take into account all
of the possible ways in which “Institutions matter”. Especially since, as I describe
below, these ways are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary.
The actor-based approach adopted in this dissertation is essentially an account
of how actors such as Credit Rating Agencies and local Institutional environments,
create what we call Globalization. This is done by either creating or extending
the Institutional context within which they are embedded to the global level, thus
enabling (or constrainInstitutionaling) transactions, and standardizing behaviors.
The Institutional approach described above maps this proposition into the research
questions taken up in later chapters.
2.4.1 The Three Pillars of Institutions
Most of the studies that survey how Institutionalism informs social sciences do so
by adopting a disciplinary approach9. In this subsection I adopt the approach of
Scott (2008) that provides a taxonomy of Institutions based not on disciplinary dis-
tinction, but rather on the attributes that different Institutional types have and the
distinctive ways in which they are theorized to influence behavior. In particular,
Scott finds that Institutions are relevant to social scientists in three none mutually
exclusive ways. What he calls the Three Pillars of Institutional Analysis; The Regu-
lative, Normative, and Cultural/Cognitive Dimensions of Institutions.
The most common way in which Institutions are deemed relevant is their regu-
lative function: “Institutions constrain and regularize behavior” (Scott, 2008, p. 60).
In this view, Institutions are viewed as establishing rules for all to follow, monit-
oring these rules, and when needed, enforcing them. This reflects Liberal views
9 Two highly cited reviews of the subject are DiMaggio and Powel (1991) and Hall and Taylor (1996)
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described above relevant to the way Economists and many Political Scientists view
Institutions. The power of this conception of Institutions lies on coercion. Since the
most likely source of (legal) coercion is the State, its political structure, and ability
to provide a framework of effective enforcement is of paramount importance.
The other way in which Institutions are conceptualized is as normative rules. In
this conception, Institutions are made up of values (ideas of what is preferred or de-
sirable) and norms (specifications of how things should be done), which “introduce
a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life” (Scott, 2008, p.
64). Thus normative systems impose constraints on social behavior but at the same
time empower and enable social action. This conception is close to the Constructiv-
ist approach described earlier. Regarding human behavior, these approaches tend
to favor a logic of “appropriateness” rather than a logic of “consequences”. Agents
do not react to certain situation by thinking “What’s the optimal thing to do in this
situation?” but rather by saying “What am I supposed to do, given my role, in a
situation like this?” Unlike regulative aspects that are backed up by coercion, the
normative aspect of Institutions is enforced by “peer pressure” and fears of ostra-
cism.
Finally, the third dimension of Institutions is connected to culture /cognitive pro-
cesses and is the one that primarily informs the Sociological Institutional approach.
Authors influenced by this view, content that actors understand the world through
“a collection of internalized symbolic representations of the world” (Scott, 2008,
p. 67). These symbols affect the meaning that actors give to situations or actions,
and in accordance, their responses to these situations. In addition, cultural systems
shape individual beliefs at multiple levels; from creating common understanding
between members of the same community to the promotion of preferred ways of
organizing economic and political systems at the international level. In summary,
common systems of believe and world interpretation, affect behavior, by acting as
templates for actors and scripts for action. The type of influence these Institutions
exert on agents is not coercive, as in the regulative case, or normative, rather they
define the identities and interests of actors and accordingly their behavior.
2.4.2 Research Questions
How can this taxonomy of Institutional effects be applied to the Globalization de-
bate and how would its results differ from earlier approaches? To answer this ques-
tion, we must focus on the constitutive parts of Globalization; its actors. Globaliz-
ation, as conceptualized in this thesis, is not just an abstract process. It is the end
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result of the interaction of multiple actors that surpasses national borders. Eco-
nomic flows do not happen automatically. They follow from the decision of firms
and investors to take part in a mutually beneficial transaction. It is equally import-
ant to acknowledge that while economic activity involves some border crossing,
the carriers of this activity are still positioned within national jurisdictions. Every
multinational corporation has headquarters, and every investor has a home loc-
ated, even for the time being, on this planet. As Sassen (2000) contends, economic
activity is concentrated disproportionally in global cities, and as such, within a na-
tional territory. “if an event takes place in a national territory it is a national event,
whether a business transaction or a judiciary decision.” (2000, p. 372). As such, the
behavior of the agents of Globalization is regulated by formal rules, and is shaped
by norms and cultural traits existing within the national territory of their base of
operation.
This opens the door for all the dimensions of Institutional influence to play a
part in the outcome of Economic Globalization. Markets are not perfect friction-
less entities neither at the local nor at the global level. The rise of technology may
decrease costs and enable information to flow more efficiently, as Liberalists pro-
pose, but that doesn’t mean that there aren’t other transaction costs involved. The
capacity of States to enforce contracts and provide effective governance is well doc-
umented and is one of the reasons that most volumes of trade take place between
high-Income countries (e.g., Anderson & Marcouiller, 2002). The same goes for
foreign direct investment flows (e.g., Busse & Hefeker, 2007). That is, countries
failing to provide an adequate institutional environment, the Regulative dimension
of Institutions, are left out of the “globalized” world. Furthermore, governments
can impede integration to the world economy by imposing restrictions on foreign
entry limitations, capital repatriation and land ownership. Globalization may not
be sweeping away national-autonomy.
The nation-state, is not only important because it provides the power structure
upon which global order can be based, as Realist content, nor just as a bureaucratic
vehicle that will oversee the importation and adaptation of global organizational
structures, like Sociological Institutionalists believe. But because it provides the
legal regulative framework within which (international) economic activity is em-
bedded. As described earlier, Globalization in this dissertation is conceptualized as
the increase of (mostly economic) transactions across State borders. For these trans-
actions to take place and be beneficial to all parties involved, there needs to be an
adequate Institutional framework that reduces transaction and production costs so
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that transactions can be beneficial. In the case of long-distance trade, for example,
these costs are associated with agency or the enforcement of contracts in “alien”
countries (D. . North, 1991). The greater lesson of New Institutional Economics, is
that transactions can only flourish in States where there is a degree of governmental
organization sufficient to guarantee the enforcement of contracts (cf. D. C. North,
1990; D. . North, 1991). Since Globalization presupposes a legal environment, it is a
process endogenous to the State leading to the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Economic Globalization is positively correlated to the States’ capacity to
provide a regulative environment (what I call in this dissertation State Sovereignty)
One would then expect, that, ceteris paribus, an increase in State capacity will en-
able States to foster their economic integration, thus experience an increase in their
economic flows. This argument runs against the Liberals’ arguments and parallel
to that of Realists’.
The Institutional approach can also be applied to the Credit Rating Agencies. In
particular there are three questions that need elaboration. First, the way in which
these actor contribute towards the creation of a Global Institutional environment
conducive to transnational economic activity. Second, the way in which these or-
ganizations are embedded within local structures, and third the tension that arises
from their operation in the Global economy. In the literature, the first question has
received considerable attention. The third question has only been touched upon
while there is not much at all about the second one. CRAs are often considered
“supra-national” organizations acting on a global sphere, and more or less inde-
pendently from any State. For that reason, most of the research is focused on the
challenge that CRAs might present for national economies and not the influence
that these economies might have on the agencies. Some authors briefly hinted that
since the agencies operate from within some States, they can become carriers of
the formal and informal standards of those States (Sassen, 2000). In the case of the
American rating agencies it is believed that their valuation of risk is biased because
they apply Neo-Liberal ideologies to their definition of creditworthiness (Sinclair
2005).
Nevertheless, there is no description of why and how this contamination of the
rating standards takes place. Why would the agencies deviate from an accurate
rating prediction only to accommodate a certain ideology? The answer to these
questions is given by the Normative and the Cultural/Cognitive pillars of Institutions.
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As Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 340) write “Institutional rules function as myths which
organizations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival
prospects”. Applying this proposition to the case of the CRAs implies that the agen-
cies’ ratings would adopt and reflect the norms surrounding investor culture in
their home States in an effort to legitimize their output. This does not have to lead
to better ratings in the sense of greater accuracy. Norms are so greatly institutional-
ized that they are “taken for granted as legitimate, apart from evaluations of their
impact on work outcomes.” (Meyer and Rowan 1977, p.344). Both Moody’s and
Standard and Poor’s were established in the U.S. in the very early 20th century and
spent the greatest time of their operations providing ratings for the U.S. market.
Their international ratings started picking up only after the later part of the 70’s
and were recognized as internationally influential only within the late 90’s during
the Asian Crisis (G. Larraı´n et al., 1997; Reisen & Von Maltzan, 1999). Thus, for
most of their career they produced rating data targeted for U.S. investors and an ef-
fort to legitimize those data towards their home market, rather than any arbitrarily
defined concept of creditworthiness makes good sense.
Parallel to the adoption of norms, another way in which rating outputs might
be affected by existing Institutional structures is through cognitive processes. Rat-
ings are ultimately produced by humans. Analysts are involved in every step of the
construction of ratings. These analysts’ understanding of “risk” is certainly influ-
enced by what their peers and predecessors have defined as common practice. The
component of ratings based on subjective judgment is a significant part of the total
rating. In fact looking at the purely quantitative part of the ratings only predicts
a preliminary rating that can be adjusted from one to three notches after (subject-
ive) analyst corrections (Moody’s, 2013; Standard & Poor’s, 2013). One can argue
that the decision of which variables should be included in the quantitative part of
the ratings is in itself subjective and open to interpretation. Thus institutionalized
rules, can shape the outcome of the rating process by providing the “script of ac-
tion” for the raters involved. The agencies are thus embedded in the institutional
environment of their home countries. At the same time, the contribute towards the
creation of Normative and Cognitive mental frameworks around the world by set-
ting a standard for investors to follow. Three proposition, each analyzed in their
own Chapter in this thesis summarize the actor-center approach taken here:
Proposition 2: CRAs contribute toward the creation of a Global Framework conducive
to international economic integration.
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Proposition 3: The determinants of Sovereign Bond Ratings will reflect the institutional
environment of the agencies’ home economies.
Proposition 4: Rating Agencies will not have an independent effect on national policy
autonomy.
Propositions 2 and 3 follow naturally from the discussion above. Proposition 4,
on the other hand, is an extension. As I discussed in previous sections, the agen-
cies are seen as a potential threat to the political autonomy of national-states. One
reason for that is because they are theorized to promote a consensus around which
public policies are considered “acceptable” by international investors. Neverthe-
less, following the discussion in this subsection, if the agencies internalize and re-
produce a normative view of public policy already in existence, and shared by a
great majority of the world’s economies, their effect on domestic policy seems less
guaranteed.
To summarize, this subsection has described an Institutional approach to Glob-
alization that encompasses all the dimensions of Institutional influence. The over-
arching claim is that economic Globalization is the outcome of the actions of eco-
nomic agents. These agents interact within national territories and are thus embed-
ded to the regulative, normative and cultural particularities of their environments,
by extension, so is the outcome of their interactions; Globalization. The following
chapters in this dissertation provide empirical support for these proposition. An
overview of these chapters follows.
2.5 A Road Map of this Thesis
The chapters in this dissertation are organized in two parts starting with a focus
on Credit Rating Agencies and followed by the more general relationship between
Globalization and State Sovereignty. Chapter 3 is an investigation of the content of
sovereign bond ratings. In short, it tries to answer the question of “what’s in a rat-
ing?” Skeptics treat the agencies as another mechanism that promotes Neo-Liberal
consensus right along other institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the
World Bank. This view is based on the firm belief, on behalf of some researchers,
that sovereign ratings are heavily influences by political factors of rated countries,
at least as much, as they are influenced by economic fundamentals.
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Nevertheless, the empirical record is not that clear. Many factors have been
proposed as possible predictors of ratings, and results are often contradictory. The
absence of a standardized approach, mostly due to an absence of a guiding the-
ory, makes it hard to compare results across studies. In Chapter 3, I use the Insti-
tutional approach discussed above to argue that the U.S. based ratings, Moody’s
and Standard and Poor’s contribute to the (re)production of an Institutional en-
vironment supportive of Globalization by including in their valuations variables
that reflect market oriented views of public policy. Following that, I examine the
empirical literature, gathering all variables that were previously found to be signi-
ficant predictors of the ratings. Subsequently, I test the sensitivity of these variables
against all possible statistical specifications using Extreme Bounds Analysis. The
main finding in this chapter is that a number of policy related variables correlate to
the ratings as robustly as economic fundamentals. In doing so, I provide evidence
on how CRAs promote Globalization.
Using an Institutional argument, Chapter 4 conceptualizes rating agencies as
organizations embedded in their home countries’ socio-political environment. I ar-
gue that their ratings are not an objective valuation of relative default probability,
but reflect the risk that investors, originating from the agencies’ home countries,
face when investing abroad. To tests this hypothesis I use differences between US-
based Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s sovereign ratings against Chinese-based
Dagong’s ratings. I show that while the ratings by the two U.S. agencies are con-
sistent with each other, both of them deviate significantly from ratings by Dagong.
Furthermore, I show that the strongest driver behind these differences is political
proximity to the rating agency’s home country, trumping effects due to standard
proximity measures such as institutional or cultural distance. I argue that CRAs
produce risk valuations most suitable to their home country investors. Thus this
chapter further demonstrates how national diversity among agencies can have an
effect on their risk valuations.
Do Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) affect national policy? Chapter 5 critically
examines claims of a possible convergence to Neo-Liberal standards induced by
sovereign bond ratings. By arguing that the role of the agencies in the global polit-
ical economy has been exaggerated, it contends that the CRAs are not expected
to have a direct causal effect on domestic political and economic reforms. Using
a sample that covers the complete population of rated countries, it is shown that
there is a robust trend towards deregulation and reform along Neo-Liberal stand-
ards. Nevertheless, sovereign bond ratings are not directly related to this process.
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Lower rated countries, or those more intensely downgraded, do not differ signific-
antly in their pattern of policy reform from the highly rated countries. This result
holds for such policy domains as regulation of credit, labor and business, access to
sound money, legal structure and security of property rights, and the size of the
public sector. I thus conclude that the role of the CRAs as potential instigators of
domestic reform is limited and should be examined within the general turn to the
Neo-Liberal consensus. Thus the ratings are not an independent threat to political
autonomy.
The second part of the dissertation deals with State Sovereignty and economic
Globalization; why is the State believed to be withering away? Is it losing its signi-
ficance in world politics or is it still the main actor that sets the framework within
which other actors coordinate their efforts? The results from the three chapters on
CRA, point to the significance of the institutional environment. Chapter 6 starts
with a conceptualization of Sovereignty that relies heavily on Krasner’s (Krasner,
1999b) four dimensions of Sovereignty. These dimensions identify the basic func-
tions each sovereign State performs at varying degrees. Examples are the ability
to enter international treaties, defend against other States, and control internal and
external forces that can potentially affect the State’s effectiveness. Based on this
conceptualization, a composite index is produced consisting of variables relating
to the empirical manifestation of the four dimensions identified. Countries are
then ranked according to their scores and a preliminary analysis is conducted to
describe the dynamics in the data. The chapter also compares the index with three
other measures of “Stateness” already in existence as a robustness check noting
their similarities, but also the potential advantages of the new index.
In Chapter 7, I turn to the debate on economic Globalization and Sovereignty.
The chapter reviews the main arguments and notices that theoretical argumenta-
tion provides equal support to a positive as well as negative relationship between
the two variables. Using the actor-centered approach of this dissertation and the
index of State Sovereignty developed in Chapter 6, I test whether part of the vari-
ation in the index can be explained by the most commonly used index of economic
Globalization, among other control variables. In particular, I focus on the sign and
statistical significance the Globalization variable receives, but also test whether its
information precedes that of the State Sovereignty index using Granger causality
tests. The results of this chapter support that the correlation between the two vari-
ables is positive. Those countries that score higher on the State Sovereignty index
are also the ones with higher levels of economic integration. In addition, statistic-
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ally speaking, causality is much more likely to run from State Sovereignty to eco-
nomic Globalization rather than the other way round. In fact, the latter result is not
supported in any of the estimations. Finally, there is evidence that increases in Sov-
ereignty scores are positively correlated with Globalization score. Those countries
that experienced an increase in their State capacity also experienced an increase in
their economic flows. Based on these results i argue that local Institutional struc-
tures are the bedrock upon which Globalization rests.
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Advances in technology and increasing liberalization of capital flows are considered
to be among certain major challenges of modern states that affect their ability to
autonomously pursue national policies (Sassen, 1996; Garrett, 1998; Drezner, 2001).
These developments are, in part, a result of the operation of non-state actors whose
ability to direct capital flows have afforded them great structural power and have,
therefore, been perceived as new loci of authority. Traditionally, the multinational
firm has received the greatest attention in this debate (Vernon, 1971). Nevertheless,
over the last two decades, the world witnessed the increasing importance of a new
group of organizations, the Credit Rating Agencies (CRA). Their sovereign bonds
ratings appear to affect the cost that rated countries face when borrowing (Cantor
& Packer, 1996), the amount of foreign direct investments and bank inflows (Janicki
& Wunnava, 2004; Kim & Wu, 2011), the development of their financial sector (Kim
& Wu, 2008), and the domestic stock market (Brooks et al., 2004).
This chapter’s aims is to show how actors like the CRAs can contribute towards
the creation of a Globalized economic system by reflecting in their operations (and
in this case the sovereign bond ratings) normative judgments. To do so, an Institu-
tional explanation of the rating process employed by the two influential U.S. based
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CRAs, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, is provided followed by an assessment
of the explanatory power that variables pertaining to political, economic, and insti-
tutional characteristics of the rated countries have over the ratings. An increasing
number of studies support that, beyond an estimate of the relative probability of
default, the ratings mirror preferences toward market oriented policies (Sinclair,
1994; Murphy, 2000; Kerwer, 2002; Bruner & Abdelal, 2005; Sinclair, 2005). This
view elevates ratings from a mere reflection of “creditworthiness” to a direct in-
terference with national policy. Recommendations to policy makers, especially in
developing countries, to adopt market oriented policies in order to improve their
ratings are not uncommon (Biglaiser & DeRouen Jr, 2007; Biglaiser & Staats, 2012).
These views, however, are based on empirical finding that are often contradictory.
Do different policy profiles affect rating assessments?
An expanding literature has proposed, thus far, approximately 30 variables as
significant possible explanatory variables of the ratings. Some of these studies re-
cognize the importance of Institutional factors while others focus solely on vari-
ables reflecting economic fundamentals. The significance of many of the variables
employed throughout the literature depends upon the specification and samples
employed. This perplexity is partly due to the absence of a guiding theory upon
which to base estimation strategy. This chapter begins with a discussion of the
ratings process as described by the two American agencies. Following that, an In-
stitututionalist approach to the rating process is offered drawing from the field of
World Polity Theory (e.g., Meyer et al., 1997; Meyer, 2000). It is theorized that the
CRAs’ valuations will reflect norms supporting an open global economic system. In
particular, those variables that reflect market oriented policies in the public sector
are considered the most robust predictors of the credit ratings.
Following a comprehensive review of previous empirical studies, a simultan-
eous assessment of the robustness of all variables previously found to be significant
predictors of the ratings is offered utilizing Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA)1.More
than 8000 regressions are conducted for every variable, testing its sensitivity to
varying specifications and samples. As a result, an overarching lesson is extrac-
ted from the empirical literature on sovereign bond ratings. In addition, a number
of new, relevant variables are introduced. A prime example is the degree of central
bank independence.
Results suggest a simple, yet compelling, conclusion. Variables signaling the
degree to which governments are constrained in favor of the market are among the
1 As proposed by Sala-i-Martin (1997)
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most robust ones. For example, variables such as the independence of the central
bank (previously not considered in this literature), the absence of restrictions to
economic flows and market friendly policies are ascertained to be more robustly
correlated with the ratings than foreign reserves, fiscal and current account deficits.
It is concluded that the sovereign ratings of the two U.S companies do appear to
accommodate market oriented views in the fashion that the Institutional approach
predicts.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 discusses the rationale be-
hind the rating process as described by the two U.S. CRAs. Following that it offers
a different rational based on a reading of this process informed by Institutionalist
argumentation. Section 3 reviews the quantitative and certain qualitative research
conducted thus far and focuses on the variables that have emerged as being sig-
nificant in this debate. Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and methods employed
as well as present the results of the sensitivity analysis. The last section inserts the
results into the literature and concludes by providing a discussion of their implica-
tions.
3.2 Determinants of Sovereign Credit Ratings
3.2.1 Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s Rating Process
The rating process used by the two U.S. based CRAs is very similar. Both agencies’
ratings are based on an evaluation of a number of factors reflecting the economic
and political conditions of the rated countries. In particular these factors pertain to
characteristic of the economic, institutional, monetary, and fiscal environment that
reflect the ability, but also the willingness, of the rated sovereign to repay its debt.
For each factor, the agencies produce a score combining publicly available informa-
tion with their own subjective valuation. When put together, this score provides an
indicative rating level that is subject to possible adjustments if additional relevant
factors warrant such a change. The five factors used during this process are op-
erationalized as composite indicators made out of individual variables drawn by
internationally available datasets.
The variables included in these indicators, according to the agencies opinion,
reflect the capacity of the rated sovereign to foster economic growth and prosper-
ity (Moody’s, 2013; Standard & Poor’s, 2013). Starting with the economic indicators,
standard variables such as income level, economic growth prospects, and the size of
the economy are used as proxies of a state’s relative ability to generate revenue and
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thus service its debt obligations. Economies that are competitive, diversified, and
have growth potentials score higher in this indicator. The second indicator used
by both agencies measures institutional strength. This is defined as an institutional
environment that can sustain economic growth, allows for the delivery of sustain-
able public finances and the absorption of economic and political shocks. Such an
environment, according to the agencies, is one associated to the independence of
the states bureaucracy from political pressures, the existence of a legal framework
that enforces property rights and ensures commercial transaction can take place
uninterrupted, and the transparency and accountability of institutions including
anything from accurate statistical information about state finances to the lack of
corruption and political instability. It furthermore, includes the ability of a govern-
ment to maintain “prudent policy making” (Standard & Poor’s, 2013, p. 30) and
enforce reforms that might mean short term cuts of state expenditure and the raise
of taxation.
The monetary strength indicator captures such concepts as the independence of
monetary policy from political influence, inflation levels and the flexibility of mon-
etary policy and exchange regime. Countries with an independent central bank
that keep low inflation rates, and a flexible exchange regime receive higher scores
in this indicator. Finally, the fiscal strength indicator focuses primarily on the health
of government finances and records the debt burden of the economy together with
the ability to service and sustain that debt. In all the above indicators, small vari-
ations exist in the way in which the two agencies operationlize them, but the end
result is very similar with the two ratings having a correlation very close to one.
In summary, the rating process for both agencies is based on a number of quant-
itative and qualitative assessments that aim at reflecting the degree to which polit-
ical and economic particularities of each country are conducive to economic growth
(thus enabling the sovereign to service its debt) and apply checks and balances on
the executives (thus restraining them from defaulting on a serviceable debt). Never-
theless, as the CRAs frequently remind the reader of their reports, these valuations
are “opinions” and do not in any way constitute “statements of fact or recommend-
ations to purchase, sell, or hold any securities”. Since decisions of which variables
to include in the rating process depend on the opinion of the CRAs, a better un-
derstanding of the rating process can be attained by analyzing the origin of these
opinions
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3.2.2 An Institutional Explanation of the Ratings Process
Institutionists have developed an analytical frame for interpreting global struc-
tures, processes and relations that stresses the existence of a global cultural frame-
work (e.g, Meyer et al., 1997; Meyer, 2000). This framework consists of rules, norms
and cognitive devises that constitute and influence actors identities and behavior.
At the same time, by incorporating and promoting these Institutional structures,
the actors in the world system reify these frameworks by reproducing and instilling
them into national context (Boli & Thomas, 1997). Empirical evidence on this is-
sue has shown that indeed such actors as NGOs have played an important role
in spreading norms that are though to be global in nature within their respective
territories (cf. Risse, 2007b).
With regard to CRAs the evidence is not as compelling. From a theoretical per-
spective, Sinclair (2005) offers a broad framework, something he labels the agencies
“mental framework”, which the agencies abide to and reflect within their valu-
ations. Ratings by the two U.S-based CRAs are believed to reflect certain prefer-
ences toward a US model of financial orthodoxy emphasizing policies promoting
openness of the economy, protection of property rights and a separation of the fin-
ancial sector from politics (Sinclair, 1994; Murphy, 2000; Kerwer, 2002; Bruner &
Abdelal, 2005). Nevertheless, these norms are also in line with the general trend to-
wards Globalization and are not just U.S-specific. From this perspective, the agen-
cies are a devise that re-enforces the global framework supporting Globalization
by rewarding, with a higher rating, policies that can sustain a Globalized economic
system.
This mental framework can be re-framed along the lines of the Institutional
framework introduced in Chapter 2. The agencies’ valuations promote an ensemble
of regulative and normative Institutional rules that either directly, or indirectly
through cognitive processes, contribute towards an Institutional environment that
promotes Globalization. In particular, market oriented norms and culture affect
their valuation of sovereign risk through the agencies’ understanding of the “will-
ingness to repay”. Moody’s states that, when investigating the institutional envir-
onment of the rated country, the interest is on the level at which political social
and legal institutions constrain the executive’s willingness (and ability) to repay its
debt: “the stronger the institutions, the greater the constraint” (Moody’s, 2008, p.
8). Standard and Poor’s states that what matters is the respect toward the interests
of the creditors rather than the domination of the public sector (Standard & Poor’s,
2008). The public sector is identified as being prone to “policy errors”, therefore, a
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normative stand that requires market based constrain on the scope of public policy
is supported.
A market oriented view emphasizing limited political control over the economy,
especially the financial sector, motivates the agencies’ valuations. Thus a number
of regulative rules, for example, the establishment of a set of checks and balances
that promote the ability to separate society from state finances or policies will be
appreciated by the CRAs, and could be promoted as a global standard through
their rating functions. The “willingness to repay” could be rephrased as the “abil-
ity to not repay”; the more constraint on the executive body, the more probable it
becomes to avoid “sudden and adverse changes” (Moody’s, 2008, p. 8). At the cog-
nitive level, in line with Sinclair’s (2005) argument, the agencies’ perspective could
contribute towards an understanding that shapes the way in which agents perceive
and react to different situations. Different cultural backgrounds can alter cognitive
processes providing the “software” with which the (collective) mind of the agents
operates (Scott, 2008). This view complements the normative ways in which CRAs
contribute towards the creation of a Institutional structure supporting a Globalized
economic system. It stresses the creation of a mental framework that contributes
towards a one-size-fits-all view on what is acceptable public policy.
In summary, an Institutional account of the rating process predicts that the rat-
ings would go beyond being a reflection of the mere economic strength of the rated
country. In particular, it predicts that the ratings will reflect those Institutional fea-
tures that are most relevant and conducive to the Liberal economic order within
which the agencies developed. Existing empirical findings on the issue are never-
theless not as straightforward.
3.3 Empirical Studies on the Determinants of Sover-
eign Ratings
3.3.1 Economic Fundamentals (economic risk)
In the past decade, several studies investigated the content of sovereign bond rat-
ings. Table 3.6 in the Appendix summarizes nineteen earlier studies providing in-
formation on which variables were found to be significant, and the samples em-
ployed. The literature can be summarized by focusing on the economic determin-
ants of ratings as being preoccupied with those variables that measure the ability
of a sovereign to honor its debt obligations. Candidate variables for this aspect are,
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naturally, those measuring the indebtedness of a government, i.e., debt levels, as
well as those measuring wealth such as GDP per capita or GDP growth.
Beginning with the first study by Cantor and Packer (1996) this literature argues
that a significant number of the ratings can be explained by employing six factors
pertaining to economic fundamentals, specifically, per capita income, GDP growth,
inflation, external debt, level of economic development, government debt, external
reserves and previous occurrences of default. These factors can account for more
than 90 percent of credit rating variation. Further research essentially confirmed
these results but cast some doubt on their universality. Economic variables are only
one element of the ratings, and their significance seems to vary over the years and
with the level of economic development. Economic variables are more significant
for less developed countries where determinants of income per capita and inflation
are the most relevant (Afonso, 2003; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005).
Other macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, have also been utilized. In-
flation is generally seen as a flag for ”structural problems” in government’s fin-
ances. Fiscal and external balances are two additional variables deemed as sig-
nificant determinants of the ratings in some studies (Ferri et al., 1999) but not in
others (Cantor & Packer, 1996). Furthermore, the depth and efficiency of a coun-
try’s financial system (operationalized as the ratio of domestic credit to GDP) has
also been ascertained as a significant determinant (Alexe et al., 2003). Table 3.6 in
the Appendix summarizes nineteen earlier studies providing information on which
variables were found to be significant, and the samples employed. In regard to
methodology, various techniques have been employed. Panel data, cross country
OLS, and ordered response models have been used in a number of studies; albeit,
two studies have demonstrated that results are not excessively affected by the use
of different methodologies (Afonso et al., 2011; Afonso, 2003).
3.3.2 Policy and political factors (political risk)
Issues become somewhat more complicated where political factors are concerned.
Scholars attempt to capture a state’s willingness, rather than ability, to repay its debt
with these variables. This willingness is not directly measurable and can only be
proxied. This ancillary layer of complexity is, arguably, what acquiesces for various
interpretations and ”worldviews”. Researchers have recognized that an extensive
number of the rating scores reflect certain subjective judgments from the perspect-
ive of the agencies (Ferri et al., 1999; Bruner & Abdelal, 2005; Sinclair, 2005). Indeed,
the agencies themselves note that there is an abundance of qualitative input in the
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ratings, and only solely investigating economic variables cannot provide adequate
evidence of the ability and willingness to repay (Bruner & Abdelal, 2005, p. 198).
The number of papers focusing on the political determinant of ratings is not as
voluminous as their more economically oriented counterparts. Regime type and
executive ideology are two variables that have been explored but have not been
deemed significant in most cases (Archer et al., 2007; Biglaiser & DeRouen Jr, 2007),
though judgment has not yet been finalized regarding this subject (Beaulieua1 et
al., 2012). Other relevant variables include the levels of (perceived) corruption em-
ployed to proxy the quality of governance (Mellios & Paget-Blanc, 2006) as well as
other institutional variables including the strength of the legal system and the rule
of law (Biglaiser and Staats, 2012). In addition, indicators from the World Bank
such as the Government Effectiveness Indicator (affirming, among other things,
the independence of civil service from political pressure and the credibility of the
government commitment to its policies) are ascertained to be significant through-
out (Afonso et al., 2011). Finally, employing a sample of Latin American countries,
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) find trade reforms to be robustly correlated to higher
ratings while other proxies of so-called neo-liberalism (or financial orthodoxy) are
not significant.
3.3.3 A Reappraisal and Hypotheses
In summary, empirical studies of sovereign bond ratings have individually con-
firmed most of the claims done by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. One draw-
back though is that there can be no overarching lesson drawn from these studies as
the methodological approaches, samples used, and variables included in the estim-
ations vary considerably. Variables found significant in one study are sometimes
found insignificant in others. Unlike previous studies which attempted to select
those variables that more closely reproduce the ratings or focus on the significance
of one particular variable, the empirical approach of this chapter concentrates on
the sensitivity of earlier results whereby interest lies in corroborating the statistical
significance of the effect of an explanatory variable under various combinations of
other control variables.
I thus aim at extracting an overarching lesson from the empirical literature on
sovereign bond ratings. Furthermore, I include some previously untested variables
in the sensitivity analysis since they have been mentioned by the agencies as de-
terminants of their ratings but have not been tested subsequently by independent
research. The empirical section is based around two Propositions:
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Proposition 1: If the Agencies View is correct, then the ratings should exhibit a strong
correlation only with variables that reflect the economic robustness of a country’s economy.
Proposition 2: If the Institutional View is correct, then the ratings will correlate with
Institutional variables pertaining to the maintenance and promotion of a Globalized Eco-
nomic System as well as economic fundamentals.
The first proposition, essentially states that variables reflecting purely policy
choices should not have any explanatory power over the ratings once all relevant
indicators of economic robustness are present. The information in the ratings is
thus a prediction of the relative default probability, and nothing else. Contrary, the
Institutional view supports that the explanatory power of Institutional variables
will be high even after controlling for all relevant economic indicators.
Which are these Institutional Variables then? Apart from all those variables
found to be significant in previous studies (more on this below) i add a number of
variables that belong to this category. In accordance with the “constraint on public
sector” view the degree of central bank independence is proposed. Delegation of
monetary power to an independent authority is a signal of credible commitment
that renders policy choices more predictable by separating monetary policy from
politics. The measure of the turnover rate of central bank governors (in a time
interval of ten years) is used as this variable has been previously employed as a
proxy for the extent of political interference with the central bank (Keefer & Stasav-
age, 2003; Klomp & de Haan, 2010). Second, the degree of the freedom of press is
utilized as it assists with the identification and correction of policy errors (Standard
& Poor’s, 2008).
Several policy indexes are also used from the Index of Economic Freedom pro-
duced by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. Of particular im-
portance are the variables that measure fiscal freedom (i.e. taxation related policies),
government spending, business freedom (the degree of regulation at doing busi-
ness), financial freedom (banking system regulations) and investment freedom (reg-
ulation of both internal and external flows of capital). A more detailed description
of these variables is depicted in Table 3.1 below. Finally, the Regulatory Quality in-
dex produced by the World Bank is employed which affirms perceptions regarding
the degree to which the economy is regulated by the government. As mentioned
earlier, the public sector is perceived as being prone to errors and should not dom-
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inate the economy2. The next section presents the data and methods used in the
empirical section of this chapter.
3.4 Data and Methods
Since the focus is on the sensitivity of all previous results in this line of research I
employ Extreme Bounds Analysis3, a method used extensively in political economy
(e.g. (J.-E. Sturm et al., 2005; Dreher, Sturm & De Haan, 2008)). To perform EBA,
the following general type regression is conducted:
Ratingsi,t = βxXi,t−1 + βM Mi,t−1 + βDDi,t−1 + ei,t
where the rating is explained by a set of variables M identified in the literature
as the most robust determinants of ratings (more on this below) while D contains
all other variables that have been deemed more or less significant. All variables
are presented in Table 3.1 below. Vector X contains the variable of interest that was
selected each time from the pool of all possible regressors. For every X, a regression
is performed containing the M variables (every time), year specific effects, and all
possible combinations of the variables in D taken in groups of three as controls. All
control variables are lagged a year in order to mitigate endogeneity. Cumulatively,
4060 different regressions are performed for each variable. The original extreme
bounds test (Leamer, 1983) for variable X investigates whether the upper bound
(βX plus two standard deviations) and the lower bound (βX minus two standard
deviations) retain the same sign, whereby, the variable is considered as a robust
predictor of the bond ratings.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) denotes that this is a hard test for many variables and pro-
poses examining the entire distribution of βX rather than focusing on its extreme
values. After performing all regressions for all variables, I report, for each of them,
the average βX (the partial correlation of the variable with the ratings), the aver-
age standard error, and the proportion of times this variable is significant at the 5
percent level. To conclude whether the variable is a robust predictor of the ratings,
the Cumulative Distribution Function of βX at point zero (CDF (0)) is calculated for
2 This measure overlaps considerably with the indicators from the Heritage Foundation. It is included,
nevertheless, on the basis that previous research has pointed to the fact that analysts at the main CRAs
regularly consult the World Bank indicators. See Biglaiser and Staats (2012).
3 As proposed by Sala-i-Martin (1997).
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Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independ-
ence from political pressures, the quality of policy formu-
lation and implementation, and the credibility of the gov-
ernment’s commitment to such policies.
Kaufmann et al
(2008)












Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations
that permit and promote private sector development.
Kaufmann et al
(2008)
Debt(% GDP) Debt over GDP in percent Jaimovich and
Panizza (2009)




GDP per Capita GDP per capita constant 2000 US dollars World Bank,
G.D.F.
Rule of Law Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence.
Kaufmann et al
(2008)




Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final
consumption expenditure (total consumption).
World Bank,
G.D.F.
Fiscal Freedom Is a measure of the tax burden imposed by government. It
includes both the direct tax burden in terms of the top tax
rates on individual and corporate incomes and the overall






Index measuring the degree of Hidden Import Barriers,
Mean Tariff Rate, Taxes on International Trade (percent of






Refers to financial resources provided to the private sector
such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities,
and trade credits and other accounts receivable that estab-
lish a claim for repayment.
World Bank,
G.D.F.
Election Year An indicator variable coding whether there was an exec-
utive election in this year.
Beck et al (2001)
Government
Spending
This component considers the level of government ex-
penditures as a percentage of GDP. Government expendit-









Measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including domestic violence and terrorism
Kaufmann et al
(2008)
Export Growth Annual growth rate of exports of goods and services based on
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000
U.S. dollars. Exports of goods and services represent the value






Investment Share of GDP (%) Heston et al
(2009)
Default An indicator variables taking the value of 1 if a country has been




Corruption The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption
as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public
and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
Transparency
International
Property Rights It measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private
property rights and the degree to which its government enforces
those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property
will be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the ju-
diciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the





Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, and
other revenues such as fines, fees, rent, and income from prop-




Deficit Cash surplus or deficit is revenue (including grants) minus ex-





An indicator coding whether the party of the executives’ orient-
ation with respect to economic policy is Left (i.e. for parties that
are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-
wing.)
Beck et al (2001)
Business Free-
dom
A quantitative measure of the ability to start, operate, and close a
business that represents the overall burden of regulation as well
as the efficiency of government in the regulatory process. The
business freedom score for each country is a number between 0
and 100, with 100 equaling the freest business environment.
Heritage
Foundation
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The Index scores an economy’s financial freedom by looking into
the following five broad areas. The extent of government reg-
ulation of financial services, the degree of state intervention in
banks and other financial firms through direct and indirect own-
ership, the extent of financial and capital market development,




Press Freedom The press freedom index is computed by adding four (three)
component ratings: Laws and regulations, Political pressures
and controls,Economic Influences and Repressive actions (the
latter is since 2004 not assessed as a separate component, see be-
low). The scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).
Freedom House




Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods, ser-
vices, net income, and net current transfers.
World Bank,
G.D.F.
Reserves Total reserves comprise holdings of monetary gold, special draw-
ing rights, reserves of IMF members held by the IMF, and hold-
ings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary author-
ities. The gold component of these reserves is valued at year
end (December 31) London prices. This item shows reserves ex-
pressed in terms of the number of months of imports of goods





The Index evaluates a variety of restrictions typically imposed
on investment such as National treatment of foreign investment,
Restrictions on land ownership, Sectoral investment restrictions,
Expropriation of investments without fair compensation, Foreign
exchange and Capital controls.
Heritage
Foundation
Political Rights Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political
process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives
in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political
parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have
a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the
electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the
years.
Freedom House
Inflation Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the
annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer
of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed
or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres




every regression and averaged over all regressions. This is, essentially, a measure-
ment of the concentration of the distribution of the coefficient on either side of zero
(i.e. I present the CDF (0) when most of the distribution lies below zero and 1-CDF
(0) when the distribution is concentrated above zero). Thus CDF (0) always lies
between 0,5 and 1. If the CDF (0) statistic is above 0.95, the variable is considered a
robust correlate.
The estimation strategy is based on OLS applied to pooled time series and time
averaged cross-sectional data. This is motivated by emphasizing that the ratings
are a relative measure of default probability and is meant to be an ordered ranking
of country risk (Moody’s, 2008; Standard & Poor’s, 2008). Using fixed effects estim-
ation would disregard the essential portion of the variables’ variation (i.e. between
country variation), and it has been considered as non-informative in this debate
(Afonso 2003). In addition, random effects estimation is, at times, inconsistent due
to the correlation of the country effects with the regressors. Ideally, OLS on time
averaged data would be the preferred approach since it affirms the essential com-
ponent of the variation across countries, and in addition it can be argued that it
subtracts business cycle effects from the data. Its main drawback is that the sample
is reduced to a simple cross section and to the Standard & Poor’s data, certain re-
gressions are based on samples as minimal as approximately 40 observations. For
that reason, pooled time series are also employed to increase the data span. Never-
theless, the results do not significantly vary as is presented in the next section.
Regarding the data, an attempt is made to obtain the broadest and most com-
prehensive attainable sample of ratings as well as control variables. The ratings are
abstracted directly from publications of the rating firms and encompass inform-
ation from 1980-2010 for Moody’s and 1980-2003 for Standard & Poor’s. The in-
formation is indicated for a varying number of countries as more are added each
year. Thus, the sample varies with different specifications depending on data avail-
ability4. When using time averaged data, the interval 2000-2006 is employed for
Moody’s and 2000-2003 for Standard & Poor’s, concentrating on the latest possible
samples in order to attain a reasonable number of countries but stop prior to the
year 2007 when the first clouds of the financial crisis occurred. Finally, ratings are
recoded as a numerical variable ranging from 0 (Default) to 21(AAA or Aaa)5.
As my M variables, that is, the variables included as controls in every regression
I choose GDP per capita and inflation. These variables enjoy some agreement with
4 This is also the reason why the unweighted CDF(0) is reported following, among others, Sturm and
de Haan (2001).
5 As in, among others, Cantor and Parker (1996).
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regard to their significance in this debate (Afonso 2003; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick
2005). Before turning to the results I present in Table 3.2 correlations at the bivariate
level as a first step towards understanding their determinants. Interestingly, what
I find is that the ratings correlate much more to variables pertaining to political
factors and constraints on public sector than they do with most variables reflect-
ing economic fundamentals. For economy of space I present the ten variables with
higher correlation coefficients for both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s ratings. A
complete correlations table can be found in the Appendix.
Table 3.2. Top Ten Correlates of the Rating
Variables Moody’s Variables Standard and Poor’s
Government Effectiveness 0,9 Government Effectiveness 0,9149
Rule of Law 0,8935 Rule of Law 0,914
Regulatory Quality 0,8562 Corruption Perceptions 0,8495
Corruption Perceptions 0,8543 Regulatory Quality 0,8436
GDP pc 0,8277 GDP pc 0,8324
Property Rights 0,7643 Political Stability 0,8023
Political Stability 0,7176 Property Rights 0,7979
Economic Flows Restrictions 0,7142 Economic Flows Restrictions 0,7314
Business Freedom 0,6004 Government Spending -0,5672
Press Freedom -0,5771 Press Freedom -0,5875
The only economic variable that appears in the top ten is GDP per capita (in
logs). The World Bank indicators, containing information on the regulatory en-
vironment of the rated countries, dominate the ranking as they receive four out
of the ten entries in the table (Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Regulatory
Quality and Political Stability). This is not surprising as analysts from the agen-
cies have confirmed that they consult these indicators (Biglaiser and Staats, 2012).
The other variables pertain to economic policies (Property Rights, Economic Flows
Restrictions and Government Spending) or reflect normative aspects (Press Free-
dom, Corruption Perceptions). These correlations are indicative of the content of
the ratings in two ways. First, they hint toward the ”piggybacking” hypothesis
indicating that the ratings rely heavily on other already published indicators (Bha-
tia, 2002) and, furthermore, there is some evidence that economic fundamentals are
just one of the components of sovereign bond ratings. This evidence supports the
Institutional view of the ratings process. Acknowledging the limitations of simple




The outcomes of the analysis are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 whereby the vari-
ables that passed the CDF (0) test are depicted. The Appendix indicates the out-
comes of all variables that were found not to be robust. As previously described,
the average beta (Beta Aver.) in column two depicts the partial correlation of that
particular variable with the ratings. Column three demonstrates the average stand-
ard error (St. Error ) while columns four and five depict the proportion of times the
variable is significant (Sign % ) and the cumulative distribution test (CDF(0)). The
final two columns describe the number of average observations (Obs Aver.) and the
average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF Aver.) as a check for multicoliniarity.
Table 3.3. EBA Results for Moody’s Ratings
Variable Beta St. Error Sign % CDF(0) Obs VIF
(Aver.) (Aver.) (Aver.) (Aver.)
Government Effectiveness 3,37 0,24 100 1,00 566 7,22
External Debt -0,01 0 100 1,00 397 1,32
Central Bank Independence -6,03 0,73 100 1,00 658 1,4
Regulatory Quality 3,14 0,25 100 1,00 567 4,96
Debt(% GDP) -0,02 0 98 0,998 554 1,14
GDP 0,42 0,08 97 0,997 439 1,16
Rule of Law 2,84 0,23 99 0,995 567 6,62
Growth 0,11 0,02 95 0,994 743 1,22
Domestic Savings 0,06 0,01 93 0,988 735 1,38
Fiscal Freedom -0,05 0,01 92 0,985 694 1,54
Restrictions 0,06 0,01 96 0,977 730 2,34
Domestic Credit 0,01 0 82 0,956 731 1,63
Note: ’Beta (Aver.)’ and ’St. Error (Aver.)’ give the average coefficient and the standard error,
respectively over all regressions. ’Sign %’ indicates the percentage of total regressions in which the
variable is statistically significant at the five percent level. ’CDF(0)’ depicts the result of the CDF
test. Values higher than 0,9 indicate a robust association to the dependent variable. ’Obs (Aver.)’
describes the average number of observations and ’VIF (Aver.)’ the average Variance Inflation Factor
over all regressions
Beginning with Moody’s, the results do not vary significantly from those presen-
ted when simple correlations are used. Again, policy variables constitute the bulk
of the variables that are robustly correlated with the ratings. With the exception of
the Political Stability Index, all other World Bank indicators pass the CDF test, fur-
ther confirming the reliance of the ratings on these measures. Since GDP per capita
is included in every regression, it is arguable that the effect of these indicators is
over and above their correlation with a country’s development level. Government
Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality -two variables essentially affirming percep-
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tions of the degree of independence of the civil and public service from political
pressures, the degree of market friendliness of policy formulation and the credib-
ility of the government’s commitment to such policies are among the most robust
variables. Rule of Law is also a robust variable affirming perceptions regarding,
among others, the quality of contract enforcement and property rights. Higher
scores on these variables result in higher ratings. Finally, the number of times these
variables are statistically significant (100 per cent) further supports their promin-
ence.
Another group of variables affirming policies is obvious. Central Bank Inde-
pendence is a very robust variable. The delegation of monetary power to an in-
dependence agency is something desirable for the rating agencies. This is true
while controlling for inflation levels throughout the estimations. Restrictions on
economic flows are equally important in this debate, as consistently argued by
many scholars (Murphy 2000; Kerwer 2002; Bruner and Abdelal 2005; Biglaiser
and DeRouen Jr 2007) and can generate a decrease in rating scores. Employing the
degree at which government restricts these flows rather than openness levels, it is
reiterated that it is attitudes (i.e. policies) toward openness that are of consequence.
Finally, Fiscal Freedom as measured by top marginal tax on personal and corporate
income as well as total tax burden as percentage of GDP is a robust predictor and
receives a negative sign. Countries with higher taxes (hence lower values of the
index) achieve higher rating scores. On a theoretical premise, this result appears
counter intuitive to the ”constrained public sector” view of the ratings; one explan-
ation is that Scandinavian and Central European states are both among the highest
ranked and higher taxing.
What about economic fundamentals? The level of indebtedness is a significant
determinant, as expected, related to lower ratings. In addition, growth of GDP per
capita and the size of the economy (GDP levels) are correlated with higher ratings.
Growth suggests that a country’s existing debt burden will become easier to man-
age over time (Cantor & Packer, 1996) while larger countries are thought to be more
diversified in terms of currencies (Borio & Packer, 2004). In general, the size of the
economy has not received much attention in this debate. Finally, domestic credit
(employed as a proxy for the depth and efficiency of the country’s financial system)
and domestic savings (employed as a measurement of the structure of the economy
as well as a measure of the growth potential of the economy), are both significant
determinants.
Concerning the Standard and Poor’s ratings, results are essentially the same.
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Table 3.4. EBA Results for Standard and Poor’s Ratings
Variable Beta St. Error Sign % CDF(0) Obs VIF
(Aver.) (Aver.) (Aver.) (Aver.)
Government Effectiveness 3,01 0,41 100 1,00 168 7,47
Rule of Law 2,99 0,39 99 0,999 168 6,63
External Debt -0,01 0 98 0,997 153 1,28
Central Bank Independence -4,36 0,95 97 0,994 305 1,34
Regulatory Quality 2,32 0,48 93 0,993 168 4,27
Domestic Credit 0,01 0 86 0,983 323 2,02
Domestic Savings 0,06 0,02 84 0,98 326 1,32
Political Stability 1,47 0,33 84 0,98 168 3,07
Growth 0,12 0,04 74 0,976 329 1,2
Economic Flows Restrictions 0,05 0,01 88 0,969 328 3,93
Debt(% GDP) -0,02 0 78 0,965 312 1,17
GDP level 0,31 0,1 76 0,962 304 1,21
Note: ’Beta (Aver.)’ and ’St. Error (Aver.)’ give the average coefficient and the standard error, re-
spectively over all regressions. ’Sign %’ indicates the percentage of total regressions in which the
variable is statistically significant at the five percent level. CDF(0) depicts the result of the CDF test.
Values higher than 0,9 indicate a robust association to the dependent variable. ’Obs (Aver.)’ describes
the average number of observations and ’VIF (Aver.)’ the average Variance Inflation Factor over all
regressions
The main difference is that Political Stability is now a robust predictor while Fiscal
Freedom is not. Finally, subjecting GDP per capita and Inflation to the same pro-
cedure, I find that they are highly robust for both agencies with values of CDF (0)
close to 1. An interesting observation for both agencies is that such variables as
Deficit, Current Account Balance and Reserves are not robust predictors. This is
contradictory to certain previous studies (Ferri et al. 1999; Afonso et al. 2011) but
not all (Cantor and Packer 1996). Furthermore, variables relating to financial and
investment freedom do not attain significant levels, either, which could be a con-
sequence of overlapping information between these variables and those produced
by the World Bank.
3.5.2 Averaged Data
Results only minimally change in regard to averaged data. Instead of presenting
which variables were determined significant for each agency, results are summar-
ized in Table 3.5. Particularly, the occurrences where a variable was determined
to be robust was noted in the analysis through various samples and agencies. In
regard to economic fundamentals, there is a distinction between two groups. Vari-
ables measuring the indebtedness of a country (External Debt, Debt(% GDP) ) and
those characterizing the economy’s development, size and growth (GDP per capita,
GDP levels and GDP Growth, respectively) are found to be robust in at least three
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out of four settings. Domestic savings and credit are not found to be significant
when averaged data are utilized.
Examining the robust variables measuring the willingness to repay, they are
again separated into two sub-groups. The first of them is comprised of the World
Bank indicators, in particular, those that affirm perception regarding the independ-
ence of civil service from political pressure and the credibility of the government
commitment to private-sector-friendly policies (Government Effectiveness, Regu-
latory Quality) as well as the strength of the court system and the enforcement of
contracts and property rights (Rule of Law). The second group is Central Bank In-
dependence and Restrictions on Economic Flows. These results provide a much
clearer support for the Institutional Proposition of this chapter. In particular, these
variables reflect those regulative and normative configurations that support the
functioning of a Global economic System. The first group affirms the degree to
which the institutional environment constrains the government from interfering
with the economy (i.e. de jure constraint) while the second group of variables af-
firms the degree to which the government is actually yielding control over the eco-
nomy and individuals (i.e. de facto constrain).
The level of inflation is another very robust variable passing the CDF(0) test in
every setting. Regardless of whether we see this variable as either an ”economic
fundamental” or simply an indicator signaling the government’s preferences over
monetary policy, it is a very relevant variable for the ratings.
3.5.3 Further Robustness Checks
As a final test, regressions are performed on the 4 main political variables (the
World Bank indicators) on GDP per capita and EBA is performed on the residuals
from these regressions. Thus I only use that part of the variance in these political
variables that is due to differences in the levels of economic development (for a
similar approach see Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al., 2007). This is connected to my main ar-
gument in the theoretical section, namely, that the institutional variables will have
an effect on sovereign ratings beyond and above their effect on economic funda-
mentals. Results do not change, and all indicators receive high scores again on the
CDF(0) statistic6. The main conclusion remains valid. Institutional variables are
strong predictors of rating grades.
6 Results are available upon request.
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Table 3.5. Summary of EBA Results
Moody’s Standard and Poor’s
Variable Pooled Averages Pooled Averages
OLS (2000-2006) OLS (2000-2003)
Economic Risk (Ability to Repay)
GDP per capita x x x x
Inflation x x x x
External Debt x x x x
Debt(% GDP) x x x x
Growth x x x
GDP x x x
Domestic Savings x x
Domestic Credit x x







Political Risk (Willingness to Repay)
Government Effectiveness x x x x
Central Bank Independence x x x x
Regulatory Quality x x x x
Fiscal Freedom x x x x
Economic Flows Restrictions x x x x
Rule of Law x x x x
Government Spending x x
Property Rights x x









Note: This table summarizes the results of EBA analysis through different samples.
Each column refers to the particular sample, and each line to a specific variable. An ”x”
indicates that the variable at hand passes the CDF(0) test in that particular set up.
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3.6 Conclusions and Discussion
Credit Rating Agencies are thought to be a catalytic force in the global economy.
Several authors expressed the view that, through their structural power, these agen-
cies could act as “agents of convergence” and stimulate certain policy choices on
behalf of states that strive to achieve positive ratings (Sinclair, 1994; Datz, 2004; Elk-
houry, 2009). Whether this convergence is, in fact, occurring and is indeed driven
by the agencies’ operations is an issue taken up in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.
This chapter offered a first step toward this direction by providing certain evidence
that the necessary condition for considering the agencies as potential agents of con-
vergence is satisfied. Specifically, it is demonstrated that sovereign bond ratings are
highly correlated with certain policies.
In particular, institutional environments that are market friendly and constrain
the public sector as well as policies that separate politics from the economy are
rewarded with higher ratings by credit rating agencies which is in contrast with
the prevailing notion (at least in the quantitative segment of this debate) that eco-
nomic fundamentals are the driving force behind rating assessments. Until recently,
policies and political variables were not considered as significant determinants of
the ratings (Biglaiser & Staats, 2012). Results in this chapter suggest that, when dif-
ferences in specifications in terms of both variables and the included countries are
taken into consideration, variables reflecting market oriented policies are among
the most robust determinants of sovereign bond ratings for the two U.S. based rat-
ing agencies.
This result support the second proposition of this dissertation, that Globaliza-
tion is embedded within a system of institutional structures (re)produced by transna-
tional actor’s such as CRAs. It was shown that U.S rating agencies reflected in their
valuations market oriented norms regarding public policy. This result is also in
agreement with existing studies on CRAs (cf., Sinclair, 2005). Nevertheless, existing
studies do not give a satisfactory account of how these agencies, apart from being
Global players, are themselves embedded within the Institutional frameworks of
their home countries. This subject is taken up in the next chapter where I compare
the ratings of U.S and Chinese rating agencies.
Appendix
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Table 3.6. Previous Studies on the Determinants of Sovereign Bond Ratings
Study Variables Found Significant Sample Size
Canton and
Parker (1996)
GDP per capita, GDP growth, Inflation, External Debt, Level of











Liu and J. E.
Stiglitz (1999)
Real GDP growth, Budget deficit, Current account balance, De-




Afonso (2003) GDP per capita,External Debt, Level of Economic Development,






GDP per capita, GDP growth, Government Debt, Government






Debt-to-GDP ratio, Reserves-to-GDP, Debt-to-exports ratio, Infla-







Changes in GDP per capita, GDP Growth, Government Debt,
Government Balance, Government Effectiveness, External Debt,






Export Growth, Domestic Savings, Inflation, Debt, Foreign Re-















Corruption ,Inflation, Fiscal Balance, External Balance, External







GDP per capita, Government Income, Real Exchange Rate
















GDP per capita, Inflation, GDP Growth, Corruption, Political
risk, Years since foreign currency default, Frequency of high in-
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Table 3.6. Previous Studies on the Determinants of Sovereign Bond Ratings (Con-
tinued)
Study Variables Found Significant Sample Size
Canuto, dos
Santos (2004)





Ratio of Domestic Credit to GDP, GDP per Capita, Debt/GDP,
Political Stability, Government Effectiveness
Cross-Section,
69 countries
Hu et al (2001) Total Debt of exports, Debt Rescheduling History, Exports







Trade, GDP Growth, External Debt, Inflation, Rule of Law, Ju-













Table 3.7. Not robust variables for Moody’s ratings
Variable Beta St. Error Sign % CDF(0) Obs VIF
(Aver.) (Aver.) (Aver.) (Aver.)
Election Year -0,61 0,28 60 0,931 743 1,06
Government Spending -0,02 0,01 79 0,91 694 1,91
Political Stability 0,88 0,17 80 0,9 567 2,49
Export Growth 0,02 0,01 40 0,897 716 1,19
Investment (% GDP) 0,04 0,01 69 0,883 705 1,46
Default -0,77 0,39 55 0,878 743 1,12
Corruption 0,54 0,09 88 0,839 627 5,83
Property Rights 0,04 0,01 82 0,834 617 3,67
Government Revenue 0,03 0,01 63 0,808 525 1,77
Deficit 0,04 0,03 41 0,776 541 1,28
Executive Ideology 0,29 0,19 46 0,721 732 1,08
Business Freedom 0,01 0,01 58 0,687 694 1,98
Financial Freedom 0,01 0,01 50 0,685 694 1,47
Press Freedom -0,01 0,01 71 0,643 716 2,38
Exchange Rate 0 0 23 0,634 706 1,11
Current Account Balance 0 0,01 48 0,608 735 1,35
Reserves -0,02 0,03 53 0,531 732 1,17
Investment Freedom 0 0,01 52 0,526 694 1,43
Political Rights 0,01 0,07 63 0,516 742 1,98
Note: ’Beta (Aver.)’ and ’St. Error (Aver.)’ give the average coefficient and the standard error,
respectively over all regressions. ’Sign %’ indicates the percentage of total regressions in which
the variable is statistically significant at the five percent level. ’CDF(0)’ depicts the result of the
CDF test. Values higher than 0,9 indicate a robust association to the dependent variable. ’Obs
(Aver.)’ describes the average number of observations and ’VIF (Aver.)’ the average Variance
Inflation Factor over all regressions
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Table 3.8. Not robust variables for Standard and Poor’s ratings
Variable Beta St. Error Sign % CDF(0) Obs VIF
(Aver.) (Aver.) (Aver.) (Aver.)
Property Rights 0,05 0,01 81 0,928 298 3,3
Fiscal Freedom -0,04 0,01 78 0,919 288 1,54
Investment (% GDP) 0,06 0,02 65 0,907 329 1,66
Election Year -0,6 0,42 27 0,867 329 1,06
Government Spending -0,02 0,01 68 0,863 288 2,05
Government Revenue 0,04 0,02 54 0,85 208 2,04
Exchange Rate 0 0 51 0,836 329 1,17
Corruption 0,41 0,14 77 0,819 241 5,64
Deficit 0,06 0,05 34 0,802 214 1,35
Investment Freedom -0,02 0,01 36 0,798 288 1,19
Export Growth 0,02 0,02 35 0,783 322 1,25
Business Freedom 0,01 0,01 18 0,769 288 1,77
Press Freedom -0,01 0,01 45 0,703 306 2,31
Financial Freedom 0,01 0,01 34 0,698 288 1,44
Executive Ideology 0,24 0,28 30 0,69 320 1,16
Political Rights -0,07 0,1 30 0,648 328 2,08
Reserves -0,03 0,05 37 0,604 321 1,14
Current Account Balance -0,01 0,02 21 0,578 324 1,37
Note: ’Beta (Aver.)’ and ’St. Error (Aver.)’ give the average coefficient and the standard error,
respectively over all regressions. ’Sign %’ indicates the percentage of total regressions in which
the variable is statistically significant at the five percent level. CDF(0) depicts the result of the
CDF test. Values higher than 0,9 indicate a robust association to the dependent variable. ’Obs
(Aver.)’ describes the average number of observations and ’VIF (Aver.)’ the average Variance
Inflation Factor over all regressions
Chapter 4




If anything, the recent global financial crisis and the ensuing debt crisis highlight
the vital role that credit rating agencies such as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s play
in the financial system. As a signal of creditworthiness, these agencies’ ratings
critically determine companies’ access to finance and the capital market. Likewise,
sovereign credit ratings are a hugely important determinant of the interest that a
country has to pay on its international debts and of the highest credit rating that a
domestic firm is able to obtain (Reinhart, 2002; Ferri & Liu, 2003; Durbin & Ng, 2005;
Kiff et al., 2012). In many countries, rating agencies’ assessments have even made
it into laws, mandating certain types of (institutional) investors only to invest in
investment grade bonds (Sinclair, 2005; IMF, 2010; Gaillar, 2011; Staikouras, 2012).
CRAs thus have enormous power1.
However, an enduring question -one that has also gained considerable mo-
mentum in the wake of the world-wide financial collapse- is whether the risk as-
sessments of rating agencies are really up to their task. The US Financial Crisis
1 As journalist and bestseller author Thomas Friedman wrote in 1995: “we live again in a two-
superpower world. There is the U.S. and there is Moody’s. The U.S. can destroy a coun-
try by leveling it with bombs; Moody’s can destroy a country by downgrading its bonds.” (see
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/22/opinion/foreign-affairs-don-t-mess-with-moody-s.html).
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Inquiry Commission, for one, identified selected rating agencies as “essential cogs
in the wheel of financial destruction” and “key enablers of the financial meltdown”
(FCIC, 2011; Economist, 2013). In similar fashion, several European prime minis-
ters have criticized extant rating agencies and called for a new, publicly funded
European agency that would do a better job rating European sovereigns (Buergin
& Tweed, 2011; Buergin, 2011; Association, 2011). These critiques resonate with a
deeper and more long-standing concern whether rating agencies are truly global or
whether their credit ratings, specifically of sovereign states, are biased, possibly to
serve certain interests (Sinclair, 1994, 2005; Paudyn, 2012).
This chapter provides a theoretical framework and evidence supporting the fact
that valuations of the big rating agencies are not truly global in their character.
Applying an Institutional approach to organizational structures (Meyer & Rowan,
1977; DiMaggio et al., 1991; Scott, 2008), I conceptualize rating agencies as organ-
izations embedded in their wider socio-political environment, rather than supra-
national entities. I theorize that rating agencies align their interests with those of
their home country investors in order to gain legitimacy for their risk valuations.
Furthermore, I discuss how regulative and cultural distances between home and
rated country can have an alternative impact on rating valuations through their
effect on information flows, causing rating valuations among nationally diverse
agencies to diverge. Thus, I arrive at two hypotheses arguing, that, ratings among
agencies based in different countries will have systematic differences, and compare
it to the standard view that treats ratings as objective valuations of relative default
probability.
To tests these hypotheses I use differences between US-based Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s sovereign ratings against Chinese-based Dagong’s ratings to ex-
amine whether their valuation of sovereign credit risk differs in a systematic non-
random way. Using a sample made up of countries that received a rating from all
three agencies from 2010 (the year Dagong produced its first report) to 2012, I show
that while the ratings by the two U.S. agencies are consistent with each other, both
of them deviate significantly from ratings by Dagong. In particular, it is shown,
that, Western high income countries, receive on average a one notch higher valu-
ation by the U.S. agencies as compared to Dagong’s ratings. All other regions of
the world receive valuations of up to 3 notches lower by the U.S agencies. Fur-
thermore, I show that the strongest predictor of these differences is the political
proximity to the rating agency’s home country, trumping effects due to standard
proximity measures such as regulative or cultural distance. I interpret this find-
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ing as supporting the Institutional Embeddedness hypothesis. In particular, since
political proximity has been shown to increase investment by lowering investor risk
(Little & Leblang, 2004; Jones & Kane, 2007; Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007), I argue that
the agencies produce risk valuations most suitable to their home country investors.
These results remain robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables and
alternative operationalization of political proximity.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section develops and
compares three different views on the nature of rating agencies. Section 3 explains
the methodology and presents the data used to test the different hypotheses as well
as the results. The final section concludes.
4.2 Perspectives on Sovereign Ratings
4.2.1 The Global Perspective
Sovereign ratings are an assessment of central governments’ creditworthiness. It
involves a consideration of the ability and willingness to honor debt obligations
to their fullest by the rated government. The world ratings market is dominated
by two U.S. based rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, covering up
to 80 per cent of it. While traditionally focused on their domestic market, the two
agencies expanded their ratings to a number of OECD members in the mid 70’s.
With more countries joining the global capital market after the 90’s, the big two
agencies cover today approximately 120 national economies. These ratings have a
significant effect on the borrowing terms of rated economies as investors react to
their changes (Kiff et al., 2012).
The global impact that U.S. ratings enjoy is an indication that investors around
the world take them as an objective and unbiased estimation of relative default
risk. Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s have continuously published reports ex-
plaining the general aspects of their methodology lending credibility to this view
(Moody’s, 2013; Standard & Poor’s, 2013). The two agencies have established a
standardized methodology that is applied to each sovereign in a consistent man-
ner using the same procedures and input variables. Specifically, they focus on five
broad categories of variables. Institutional and economic strength, fiscal and mon-
etary robustness as well as susceptibility to event risks that are out of the ordinary
(e.g. natural disasters or probability of war). These dimensions come together to
give a first estimate of the foreign rating. This estimate might later be adjusted one
to three notches if additional considerations pertaining to country-specific factors
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apply.
What gives the ratings their global appeal is the use of rigorous methods and
objective quantitative indicators retrieved from credible international institutions
like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. It was shown early on
that the ratings can be explained by looking at a handful of basic economic indicat-
ors (Cantor & Packer, 1996). Specifically, per capita income, GDP growth, inflation,
external debt, level of economic development, and default history are believed to
explain about 90% of the ratings variance. It is thus believed that the ratings pro-
duced by the big two firms are essentially a sufficient statistic that can be applied
consistently throughout the world. This opinion has been prominent in the debate
regarding the creation of a European credit ratings agency (Association, 2011). This
view can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 : If the Global Perspective is correct, Sovereign Bond Ratings are objective
measures of relative default probability and can be applied universally.
4.2.2 The Institutional Perspective
It has been long argued that the rating agencies can become carries of particular reg-
ulative and institutional arrangements of their host state (Sassen, 1999). Regarding
the U.S. agencies it is believed that their rating decisions are heavily influenced by
a market focused ideology (Sinclair, 2005). However, these assertions are taken for
granted and there has been no systematic effort to either test them or ground them
in a theoretical approach. If the agencies depend on the accuracy of their ratings to
ensure their survival, it makes little sense that they would deviate from an accurate
prediction for ideological purposes alone. Particularly, since their income comes
from the issuers of the rating rather than the users.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that U.S. ratings tend to underestimate the cred-
itworthiness of foreign private firms as compared to local rating agencies. Packer
(2002) offers evidence that Japanese firms were rated systematically lower from
U.S. rating agencies as compared to local ones. In a sample of 157 corporations,
only 4 of them received a higher rating from the local agencies while on average
U.S. ratings were more than two notches lower. Beyond the firm level not much
similar work is done for sovereign ratings despite the fact that the latter create a
ceiling that determines the maximum creditworthiness for domestic firms (Ferri &
Liu, 2003; Durbin & Ng, 2005; Cowan et al., 2007).
One way to explain the disagreement among agencies is to use the concept of In-
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stitutional Embeddedness (e.g. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008). Thus far in the
literature, the CRAs are pictured as organizations that operate at a supra-national
level. This decoupling of the agencies from the world of nation-states imposes a
view that treats their risk valuations as independent from the wider socio-political
environment within which the agencies operate. Nevertheless, Institutional Eco-
nomists (e.g. Williamson, 2000) and Economic Sociologists (Granovetter, 1985) have
long argued that economic activity is embedded in the social and political particu-
larities in which economic agents find themselves operating. I argue that embed-
ding the agencies in the socio-political environment within which they operate can
shed light as to why ratings are different among different national agencies.
Sociological Institutionalism, as it emerged within organizational studies (cf.,
DiMaggio et al., 1991), provides a framework that sheds light on how the insti-
tutional environment can change the interests and identities (and thus behavior)
of the organizations operating within. What is meant here by institutional environ-
ment, is the norms and values that constitute the “way things are done”, and define
the goals and legitimate means available to achieving desired ends (cf., Scott, 2008,
p. 64-68). Institutions in this sense have a constitutive effect on the organizations
operating within them. That is, organizations incorporate rationalized institutional
rules in their structure in order to become isomorphic to the surrounding envir-
onment and enhance their survival prospects (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In the case
of the rating agencies, this means, that, as organizations that struggle for survival,
the agencies can align their interests to those of the investors in their home envir-
onment, gaining legitimacy that will foster their survival prospects independent of
the efficacy of these results.
Nevertheless, the question that remains is , do these agencies really have a
“home”? As argued latter a lot of the discussion about the agencies picture them
as global players without particular affiliation to any country. Contrary to that, it
is argued that they operate in a national environment where their main purpose is
still to gain legitimacy in the eyes of local stakeholders. Historically, Moody’s and
Standard and Poor’s appeared in the U.S. market in order to satisfy the local de-
mand for railway projects ratings (Sinclair, 2005). Their international ratings gained
particular significance only after the later part of the 20th century. Thus, their valu-
ation of risk with regard to investment in different countries is likely to be influ-
enced by a partial view that emphasizes the risk of U.S. investors. Furthermore,
some authors have argued that the agencies market market is not natural but given
to them by the incorporation of their ratings in formal regulations (e.g. Staikouras,
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2012). The promotion of these organizations by the U.S. to a quasi-official author-
ity is another factor that would promote the alignment of interests between them.
Thus, what follows from this discussion is the following proposition:
Proposition 2 : If the Institutional Perspective is correct, Sovereign Bond Ratings reflect
the socio-political embeddedness of the agencies that produce them, and are an objective
measures of relative default probability relevant to users from within the agencies environ-
ment.
4.2.3 The Bounded Rationality Perspective
The Global perspective on sovereign ratings, discussed above, assumes a well in-
formed rational agency that produces objective and universally applicable rating
valuations. Contrary, the Institutional approach assumes agencies that are subject-
ively rational, meaning their rationality is defined by the interests and identities
their social environment affords them. It is possible to think of a middle ground
between the two. In this case, the ratings are still an objective, rational valuation of
risk, but bottlenecks in the flow of information impede the accuracy of the predic-
tion resulting in a type of measurement error. This is based on the fact that ratings
are essentially a product of information processing. Any bottlenecks that might im-
pede information flows can have an effect in the rating process resulting in a less
accurate rating. Given the risk aversion that rating agencies might exhibit about a
falsely high rating, we could assume that lack of information could almost certainly
result in a lower rating.
Several factors can lead to loss of information. Regulative similarities between
countries, have been shown to reduce information asymmetries and result in more
trade and economic flows (Anderson & Marcouiller, 2002; Anderson & Van Win-
coop, 2004; De Groot et al., 2004). A similar effect can be expected when looking
at cultural differences. Diverse cultures use different norms and codes (Rogers &
Bhowmik, 1970) and use different organizational structures (Bloom et al., 2012) cre-
ating bottlenecks that diminish the effectiveness of communication between trans-
acting parties. Cultural distance has been shown to lead to smaller loans and higher
interests rates by international syndicated bank (Giannetti & Yafeh, 2012) while cul-
tural proximity has been found to mitigate information asymmetry particularly for
firms coming from emerging countries (Du et al., 2013). Thus it is argued that in
the case of sovereign ratings, similar regulative and cultural structures between
rated and headquarter environment, will , all other factors equal, help acquire and
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process relevant information more effectively thus allowing for a more accurate
assessments. Thus, while this view predicts differences among sovereign ratings
produced by nationally diverse agencies, it supports that these differences are due
to information asymmetry.
Proposition 3: I the Bounded Rationality Perspective is correct, Sovereign Bond Ratings
are an objective valuation of relative default probability, but impediments to information
flow may cause systematic bias.
Both the Bounded Rational and the Institutional view of sovereign ratings differ-
ent from the Global view because they emphasize the qualitative component of
the ratings. While part of the ratings is quantitative, a significant amount of it
involves qualitative judgment (Moody’s, 2013; Standard & Poor’s, 2013). Areas
such as institutional strength, central bank independence, and geopolitical risk,
elements including in the assessment process by the big two rating agencies, are
factors that cannot solely be described by quantitative measures. Several other ad-
justment factors, based on confidential information, or country specific risk factors,
alter the ratings implied by the purely quantitative part the Global perspective con-
centrates on. Thus socio-political relations and institutional similarities that the
agencies’ home countries have with the ones rated can affect the rating judgment
either through creating informational unevenness or by allowing a different inter-
pretation of situations that are seemingly similar.
4.2.4 Hypotheses
Testing the Institutional view requires the comparison of sovereign ratings coming
from different home countries. For that I use the ratings produced by the Hong
Kong based rating agency, Dagong. It emerged in 2010 as a new agency with the
view of offering a new global rating scheme able to compete with that of the U.S.
based agencies. Since its appearance Dagong has expanded its coverage to about 70
countries in 2012. In broad lines Dagong uses a similar rating approach to the U.S.
agencies. Ratings are produced following an assessment of the economic funda-
mental and the robustness of the institutional and political environment. However,
there is a different view on what is considered robust institutional environment.
For Dagong, the ability of the government to steer and maintain growth is a ma-
jor concern while for the U.S. agencies market constraints rather than government
control is judged as a sign of institutional health (Dagong, 2013; Moody’s, 2013;
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Standard & Poor’s, 2013).
Comparing the ratings of Dagong and the U.S. agencies allows me to uncover
the extent to which ratings are influenced by idiosyncratic judgments that are spe-
cific to each agencies socio-political environment. In particular, the effect of eco-
nomic fundamentals can be pursed out from the rating assessment, since they are
equal for all three agencies, and attribute any difference in the rating grades to the
qualitative part involving relative institutional and political factors. In particular I
take a two-step approach. First, I ask whether there is a systematic, non-random,
difference between the ratings of the three agencies. Second, based on the theoret-
ical discussion I propose two explanatory variables for that difference.
The Institutional Embeddedness approach supports that rating agencies will
align their risk valuations with that of their home investors to gain legitimacy and
enhance their survival. In order to test this view, Institutional Embeddedness needs
to be operationalize in a way that allows to compare the relative risk factors for U.S.
and Chinese investors. I proxy the degree of Institutional Embeddedness using a
measure of the political affinity of each rated country to the agencies’ home coun-
tries. Political relations between two countries could be a mediating factor when
stakeholders of the investing countries face difficulties in the target country. One
such incidence took place in 2003 when the U.S. government announced the seizure
of 1.4 billion dollars’ worth of Iraqi financial assets held in U.S. banks2. Research
has shown that investment often “follows the flag”. Troop deployment by the U.S.
has often promoted a safer investment ground for U.S. firms and investors (Little &
Leblang, 2004; Jones & Kane, 2007; Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007). I use the percentage
of the UN Security Council voting that fall in line with the agencies’ home countries
to measure the intensity of ties between the stakeholders’ government and that of
the country of investment.
To capture the Bounded Rational hypothesis I construct measures of institu-
tional and cultural distance. This way I aim at capturing the difficulty of inform-
ation flow between host and rated countries. As the institutional and cultural dis-
tance between these countries grows, there will be less information to be used, or an
increased difficulty in analyzing the available information, thus it is expected that
the rating agencies will issue a more conservative rating, ceteris paribus. As I am
trying to explain the difference between U.S. and Chinese ratings, it is important
for all the measures (including that of political affiliation) to be measured in a rel-
ative way. That is, each country’s relative distance is constructed as the difference
2 “U.S. announces it will seize Iraqi assets”, PBS, March 20, 2003.
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between its distance to the U.S. and China. In line with the propositions described
above I draw the next three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: If rating agencies produce a globally applicable rating scheme, no system-
atic differences should be evident among U.S. and Chinese based agencies.
Hypothesis 2: If ratings are primarily assessing investment risk from the agency’s local
stakeholders perspective (Institutional Embeddedness), there is a systematic difference ex-
plained by the degree of relative political connection between host and rated countries.
Greater relative political distance will lead to a higher difference among the ratings.
Hypothesis 3: If ratings are affected by informational bottlenecks stemming from regulative
and cultural differences (Bounded Rationality), there is a systematic difference explained by
the institutional and cultural distance of the host and rated countries.
In the next section I present the empirical approach discussing issues of estimation
and data gathering.
4.3 Methodology and Results
4.3.1 Methodology
In order to test whether the ratings are global and assess the effect of regulative dis-
tance and political affinity on the ratings I use an empirical model that controls for
standard proximity measures. I include a measure of relative physical distance as
a possible impediment to information flow. Part of a country’s evaluation is done
by a visit from an analyst to discuss with the rated countries ministers of finance
or central bank governors (Bruner & Abdelal, 2005). As distance grows, so do the
costs of acquiring country specific information (Portes & Rey, 2005). In addition,
cultural similarities and business networks are likely to be affected by the physical
distance between countries. Another control variable is the relative difference of
import volumes among the rated countries and the home countries of the agen-
cies. This variable is meant to capture the density of economic relations between
home and rated countries. Another group of variables I include are controls of cul-
tural and legal similarities. Specifically, I include dummies that code whether rated
countries share common language or legal system with the United States or China.
Subsequently I introduce the main explanatory variables, Regulative Distance and
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Political Affinity. The full specification takes the following form:
(RUSI − RDgi ) = β0 + β1Regul.Distancei + β2Polit.A f f inityi + β3Phys.Disti
+ β4 Import.Disti + β5Common.LangUSi + β6Common.Lang
CHN
i
+ β7Common.LegalUSi + β8Common.Legal
CHN
i + ei
where i denotes the rated country. The dependent variable is the difference
between U.S and Chinese ratings (RUSI −RDgi ). Both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s
ratings will be used in subsequent testing. To calculate Physical Distance I use the
difference of each country’s distance to the U.S and China. Original distances are
taken from the Cepii dataset (Mayer & Zignago, 2011). Imports distance is the total
value of U.S imports minus the total value of Chinese imports and is measured in
U.S dollars3. The data are taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).
Our main predictor variables are relative Regulative Distance (Regul.Distance)
and Political Affinity (Polit.A f f inity). To measure regulative distance I use scores
on the six Worldwide Governance Indicators produced by Kaufmann et al (2010)
using the same methodology as in Linders et al (2005). Specifically, the institutional






Where Iki denotes the score of country i on the k′th dimension of Kaufmann et
al.’s Indicators, and Vk the variance of that dimension. In turn, stands for the score
of either US or China on the same dimension. After computing the two distances
I subtract the distance to China from the distance to the U.S. to form the relative
Regulative Distance for each country. The Political Affinity measure is taken from
Strezhnev and Voeten (2013) and is based on the roll-call votes in the UN General
Assembly for the years 2010-2012. I use scores on voting similarity for each country
to both U.S and China and take the difference as the measure of relative Political
Affinity.
Finally, the rating data are taken directly from the reports of the three rating
agencies. I follow common practice and change the alphanumeric code used by the
3 Ratios, rather than differences, are used in addition for both imports and physical distances. I report
only the differences here as the results remain unaffected.
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agencies to a simple linear scale within the interval of 1, depicting the few ratings
that fall below “B-”, to 17 the highest possible rating score; “AAA” (e.g., Afonso
et al., 2011). I choose those countries that receive a rating from all three agencies
between 2010 and 2012. This creates a sample of maximum 76 countries, never-
theless, this number varies with the control variables used in each regression. In
each estimation it is made sure that the same countries are included in specifica-
tions that test the same hypothesis across agencies. A detailed description of all
variables, including their sources, can be found in the Appendix.
4.3.2 Results
Are the ratings global?
As a first attempt to demonstrate the difference in ratings, Figure 4.1 depicts com-
parisons of kernel estimates for the distribution density functions among the three
agencies. Comparing Standard and Poor’s with Moody’s ratings, the two distri-
butions show a great similarity. They are both characterized by strong bimodal-
ity with most countries concentrating around grades 7 (the threshold for the non-
investment category) and 16. This bimodality is less pronounced in the case of
Dagong as counties center around grades 10 and 14. There is thus a considerably
difference in the middle of the distribution between the Global Rating Agencies
(GRAs) and Dagong that warrants further investigation.
In Table 4.1 it is tested whether the differences in ratings can be attributed to
non-random patterns. Motivated by the previous discussions on the systematic
underrating of Asian firms by GRAs as compared to local rating agencies I test
whether the differences in ratings are region specific. The dependent variables
at the first two columns are Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s differences with
Dagong’s ratings, respectively. The independent variables are dummies coding the
geographical region of the rated country where the reference category is High In-
come Western economies. Results indicate that all regions receive on average lower
ratings by both GRAs as compared to Dagong. The difference in some cases (as
Africa and Latin America) can be as high as 3 notches. These differences have con-
siderable economic significance as previous studies have shown that a one notch
downgrade for a non-investment country can mean up to 30% higher interest rates
(Kiff et al., 2012). One exception to these findings is Eastern European countries
that have on average the same rating difference as Western ones.
As a robustness check, column three presents the same test using the differ-
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Figure 4.1. Comparison of Distributions among the three Agencies
ence between Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings as the dependent vari-
able. Apart from Africa, geography is not a significant predictor of the differences4.
What’s more, and in contrast to the results in the other columns of this table, the
signs of the dummies’ coefficients are equally divided between negative and posit-
ive signs. Finally, the constant terms in the three regressions shows that, on average,
Dagong’s ratings for Western countries is one notch lower from that of the GRAs
while no significant difference exists between the later. This result leads to reject
Hypothesis 1, namely that the ratings are indeed global in character. The system-
atic bias of nationally diverse rating agencies across different regions is a sign that
this non-random pattern of rating differences is in need of an explanation. In the
next sub section I turn to the determinants of these differences.
4 The difference between Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s ratings in Africa is based on only two
African countries, namely Botswana and South Africa.
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Table 4.1. Rating Differences by Region
Difference Between the Ratings of
VARIABLES Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s and Standard & Poor’s and
Dagong Dagong Moody’s
Africa -1.825*** -3*** -1.175***
(0.379) (0.440) (0.144)
Middle East -0.805 -1.591*** -0.0163
(0.901) (0.549) (0.218)
East Asia -1.675*** -1.270*** 0.291
(0.412) (0.458) (0.190)
South Asia -1.741** -1.667** 0.0746
(0.697) (0.692) (0.112)
Latin -2.305*** -1.731*** 0.575*
(0.580) (0.488) (0.296)
East Europe -0.231 -0.375 -0.144
(0.554) (0.622) (0.237)
Constant 1.075*** 1*** -0.0746
(0.266) (0.252) (0.112)
Observations 204 197 197
Countries 79 76 76
R-squared 0.207 0.215 0.113
Cluster Robust standard errors in parentheses *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1
Determinants of Rating differences
Table 4.2 depicts the results from the basic model in which physical distance, insti-
tutional and cultural familiarities are included as explanatory variables. The mod-
els do not provide a good fit as indicated by the very low values of the Adjusted
R squared and F statistics. Physical distance in particular is not a good predictor
of the dependent variables in any of the estimations. Since most of the informa-
tion needed for the production of the ratings is available almost instantly through
public available databases (e.g. World Bank, IMF statistics), regardless of the rated
county’s position, this result is to be expected. In addition, greater economic rela-
tions do not translate in a different ratings score as captured by the different levels
of imports values. There is considerable evidence that cultural familiarity to China,
as captured by the common language dummy, leads to a difference of roughly two
notches between the valuations of Moody’s and Dagong. While common legal ori-
gin is not a statistically significant predictor of their rating difference.
In Table 4.3 I extend the analysis by introducing the main variables of the model.
The inclusion of Political Affinity in columns (1) and (5) indicates that the variable
is a significant predictor of the ratings difference. Higher relative affinity with the
U.S leads to a higher rating by the GRAs as compared to Dagong. In particular, the
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Table 4.2. Base Line Estimation of the Determinants of Rating Differences
Dependent Variable:
VARIABLES Standard & Poor’s and Dagong (Difference) Moody’s and Dagong (Difference)
Distance -1.88e-05 -1.82e-05 1.23e-05 1.02e-05 -6.88e-06 -1.23e-06 4.06e-05 3.73e-05
(2.92e-05) (3.24e-05) (3.02e-05) (3.41e-05) (3.40e-05) (3.67e-05) (3.25e-05) (3.54e-05)
Common Language CHN -0.619 -1.097* -0.678 -1.084** -1.539*** -1.221**
(0.509) (0.573) (0.576) (0.531) (0.492) (0.518)
Common Language US 0.598 0.634 1.299** 0.702 0.709 1.207***
(0.503) (0.558) (0.503) (0.430) (0.480) (0.424)
Imports Difference 1.25e-09 1.88e-09 4.28e-09 4.66e-09
(2.44e-09) (2.80e-09) (2.57e-09) (2.86e-09)
Common Legal Origin CHN 0.579 0.499
(0.597) (0.533)
Common Legal Origin US -0.715 -0.507
(0.545) (0.468)
Constant 0.180 0.102 0.0659 -0.0172 0.156 0.0793 0.0141 -0.0669
(0.198) (0.213) (0.202) (0.223) (0.216) (0.229) (0.207) (0.235)
Observations 197 197 184 184 197 197 184 184
Countries 76 76 71 71 76 76 71 71
R-squared 0.000 0.013 0.016 0.045 -0.005 0.031 0.067 0.071
F-test (p-value) 0.52 0.28 0.12 0.00 0.84 0.08 0.00 0.00
Cluster Robust standard errors in parentheses *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1
variable is highly significant and explains up to 27 per cent of the variation in the
dependent variables. The constant terms in both columns show that in the case of
perfect political affinity (i.e. when the variable takes the value of zero) U.S ratings
tend to be one notch higher than the Chinese. This result supports Hypothesis
2, namely, that political relations among rated countries and the agency’s home
country have an effect on the valuation of risk. This is in line with previous research
documenting the relevance of security for investment flows.
The inclusion of Regulative Distance in the second and sixth column produces
a comparable result. Higher regulative distance to the U.S relative to China leads
to a lower rating from the U.S agencies albeit its predictive power is considerably
less. This result supports Hypothesis 3 emphasizing the difficulty in informational
acquisition and assessment. When the regulative environment differs between the
agency’s home country and the one rated, the formation of a qualitative assessment
is more difficult for the raters involved. This could result in a home-bias like effect
where the countries more closely related to the raters receive a greater score than
those requiring more content specific expertise.
Including both variables simultaneously in columns (3) and (7) the predictive
power of Regulative Distance is lost for both agencies’ data. This result supports
Hypothesis 2 over 3. What I have called Institutional embeddedness -the agen-
cies adoption of a rating scheme that reflects home investors’ risk- is a stronger
predictor of the ratings differences than the between countries differences in regu-
lative structures, what I called the Bounded Rational approach. These results fur-
ther affirm the rejection of the first hypothesis about the global character of the
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ratings. When including the full set of control variables from Table 4.2 the main
result is unchanged. Political affinity is still the main predictor for both agencies al-
though Regulative Distance retains some marginal significance for Moody’s ratings
(p.value = 0.08). Regarding the control variables, as before, they do not achieve
reasonable significance levels apart for the common language dummy for China
in the regression using Moody’s data (p. = 0.097). Looking at the coefficients for
political affinity in the full models in columns (4) and (9), its estimated effect is quite
similar. Standardizing the voting variable while keeping the dependent variable in
its original metric it is seen that a one standard deviation in political agreement
towards the U.S, roughly a change from the voting patterns of Turkey to that of
Belgium or The Netherlands, results in a half notch higher ratings from the GRAs
as compared to Dagong.
Table 4.3. Political Proximity and Institutional Distance as Determinants of Rating Differences
Dependent Variable
VARIABLES Standard & Poor’s and Dagong (Difference) Moody’s and Dagong (Difference)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
UN Voting 2.510*** 2.455*** 1.977*** 2.894*** 2.638*** 1.830***
(0.516) (0.620) (0.701) (0.512) (0.587) (0.648)
Regulative Distance -0.180*** 0.00923 -0.0393 -0.237*** -0.0408 -0.124*
(0.0563) (0.0615) (0.0686) (0.0568) (0.0618) (0.0696)
Distance 3.10e-05 4.97e-05
(4.22e-05) (3.77e-05)
Common Language CHN -0.435 -0.964*
(0.671) (0.571)
Common Language US 0.562 0.492
(0.752) (0.647)
Imports Difference 3.44e-09 4.70e-09
(5.20e-09) (6.86e-09)
Common Legal Origin CHN 0.496 0.655
(0.656) (0.557)
Common Legal Origin US -0.447 -0.0748
(0.778) (0.672)
Constant 1.009*** 0.0897 1.090*** 0.788* 1.134*** 0.0134 1.089*** 0.526
(0.227) (0.206) (0.325) (0.424) (0.222) (0.208) (0.298) (0.405)
Observations 185 121 113 111 185 121 113 111
Countries 75 62 58 57 72 62 58 57
Adjusted R-squared 0.227 0.130 0.243 0.236 0.272 0.180 0.290 0.309
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cluster Robust standard errors in parentheses *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1
Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of the results I include in the full models Table 4.3 several
variables capturing factors that might bias the results. I include the (relevant) cul-
tural distance as an alternative measure of bounded rationality. Another reason
for including this variable is that cultural proximity increases voting coincidence
in the UN assembly (Dreher & Sturm, 2012). It is thus possible that the UN voting
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variable is capturing part of that effect as countries with similar culture to the U.S
or China vote more in line with these countries in the United Nations Assembly. A
further omitted variable is the income level of the rated country. Those countries
voting more in line with the U.S are also richer countries. The correlation between
GDP per capita and relative voting coincidence is 0.66. Voting patterns might be
again simply capturing this effect rather than testing my hypothesis. Finally, I also
include as further controls the exchange rate volatility for each country’s currency
to the U.S dollar and Chinese Yuan . Exchange rate volatility is regularly sited as
a major factor causing home bias in international investments (Fidora et al., 2007).
Furthermore, if the rating agencies are indeed locally embedded, exchange rate
volatility of the home currency should have a significant negative impact on a coun-
try’s rating.
Table 4.4 presents the results. From the newly added variables only the ex-
change rate volatility variables attain statistical significance when using Standard
and Poor’s and Dagong data. Previous results nevertheless remain unaffected. The
UN voting variable remains highly significant for the most part and falls to the
10 per cent level only once. Regulative Distance is again largely insignificant and
lends no support to Hypothesis 3.
Furthermore, in the Appendix I present Table 4.5 were I operationalize polit-
ical proximity to the U.S. using a dummy coding membership to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). Membership in NATO is a security agreement among
sovereign countries to form a system of collective defense aiding each other, by
means of military assistant, in case of an attack by an external party. It is thus equi-
valent to a defense treaty -the highest level of military commitment- between the
member countries and the U.S., but not China. Looking at Table 4.5, NATO mem-
bership is associated with an extra notch higher sovereign rating while controlling
for the control variables included in the main specification and Income levels. It
is concluded that earlier results are unaffected by the addition of relevant control
variables and alternative operationalization of political proximity.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Are credit ratings global and unbiased or do ratings reflect the interests of the agen-
cies’ home country investors? The issue of biased ratings, particularly of sovereign
credit ratings, has been around for quite some time. However, the debate has in-
tensified in recent years, following the global financial crisis and the ensuing debt
crisis. The People’s Republic of China actually founded its own agency, Dagong
(meaning “impartial and without prejudice”), in 1994. This chapter has sought to
uncover evidence showing whether credit ratings are biased or not. Drawing a
formal comparison between Dagong and the two most famous US-based agencies,
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, I find significant differences in sovereign credit
ratings between the latter two agencies and China-based Dagong. Credit ratings of
the two US-based agencies, however, are fully consistent with one another. Hence,
not only are there Sino-American differences in credit ratings, these differences also
do not appear to be due to random measurement error.
To explain the systematic nature of the rating differences found, I adapt the
concept of embeddedness, as found in the Institutional theory in organizational
sciences. I propose that a rating agency’s home country affects sovereign credit
ratings in two ways. The first effect derives from the proximity between the sover-
eign that is being rated and the agency’s home country. Geographic, cultural, and
regulative distances are known to hinder the flow of information, thus hampering
economic exchange. I argue that these various distances are likely to affect credit
ratings as well. Second, I hypothesize a more direct effect of embeddedness with
agencies serving the needs of domestic clients and hence taking a domestic per-
spective when grading sovereigns’ credit worthiness. Sovereigns’ political proxim-
ity to the rating agency’s home country turns out to be the strongest driver of rating
differences, which suggests that rating agencies’ risk assessments take into account
the political leverage that investors’ home countries have over the sovereign under
study. Standard proximity measures such as geographic and cultural distance also
cause differences in ratings between agencies from different home countries but
their influence is trumped by political proximity.
Results thus provide support both for this chapter’s theoretical arguments and
the first proposition of this dissertation. Together with the previous chapter, it has
been shown this far that rating agencies are affected by the norms of their home
country, and that, when comparing rating valuations from different countries, there
is a systematic difference. Thus, the agencies are embedded to their home-country
socio-economic environment and their valuations are partial. The next chapter
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deals with the second proposition of the dissertation. Particularly, it investigates
whether bond ratings coming from the American CRAs are responsible for a part
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Table 4.6. Variables Sources and Definitions
Variable Name Description Source
UN Voting The difference between the voting similarity scores for
each country with the U.S and China. Higher score de-
notes more similarity. Where voting similarity is an index
(0-1) computed using 3 category vote data (1 = “yes” or ap-
proval for an issue; 2 = abstain, 3 = “no” or disapproval for
an issue.) - Abstention is counted as half-agreement with




Regulative Distance Calculated applying Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index on the





Distance The difference between the (population weighted) dis-
tance of each country to the U.S. and China. (Own Cal-





















Dummy denoting common legal origin with the U.S. Mayer and Zign-
ago (2011)
Cultural Distance Calculated applying Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index on
Hofstede’s 9 Cultural Dimensions.
(Hofstede, 1984)
GDP per capita (log) Log of GDP per capita World Bank (2012)
Yuan Volatility The standard deviation of monthly exchange rate observa-





US Dollar Volatility The standard deviation of monthly exchange rate obser-







Hard up in a Clinch? Credit
Ratings and Policy Reform
5.1 Introduction
Sovereign Bond Ratings are an integral part of the global economy. Rating actions,
particularly downgrades, draw considerable attention from multiple sources. They
figure prominently in the news, affect bond markets, and often instigate comments
from state leaders1. The role and coverage of the ratings has greatly expanded
during the latter part of the 20th century. Both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s in-
creased their country coverage from approximately 30 to about 100 countries within
the period of 1990 to 2006. Almost all of the newly rated countries are emerging and
developing economies trying to tap international economic flows at a reasonable
borrowing cost. Acquiring high sovereign ratings is an important step towards this
goal (Kiff et al., 2012).
This expansion of the agencies’ coverage is treated with skepticism. Acknow-
ledging the political content of the ratings, some studies argue that rated economies
will be forced to implement policies in line with agencies’ prescriptions to improve
their relative standing in the rating scale (Kerwer, 2002; Bruner & Abdelal, 2005;
Sinclair, 2005). Thus, the agencies are seen as a mechanism through which Neo-
Liberal conceptions of public policy are disseminated. So far very little evidence
exists demonstrating a relationship between policy making and sovereign bond
ratings (Elkhoury, 2009). Can CRAs really affect domestic policy?
1 President’s Sarkozy comment to Le Monde regarding the loss of triple-A grade for France as a “polit-
ical” action is characteristic.
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The aim of this chapter is to begin a systematic exploration of the role of the
CRAs as instigators of political and economic reform. Several authors argue that
CRAS will put isomorphic pressures on rated countries either coercively -through
their ability to affect bond markets (Sinclair, 2005; Paudyn, 2012)- or through norm-
ative persuasion -through the construction of a consensus regarding “good” and
“bad” policy choices (Sinclair, 2005)-. This chapter critically examines both of these
views arguing that their premises are not a priori valid. In particular it is argued that
the CRAs’ market power, and importance in creating a liberal normative frame-
work is somewhat exaggerated. Market participants are only affected by CRA ac-
tions when they offer new information (Brooks et al., 2004; Kiff et al., 2012). Fur-
thermore, CRAs are only one of the devises, next to a number of academic funds,
and think tanks that collectively built the intellectual defense of the Neo-Liberal
turn since the late 70’s (Harvey, 2005).
A case is made beyond already existing case studies for a systematic empirical
assessment of the relationship between sovereign ratings (and their changes) and
economic and political reform. It is tested whether countries with lower initial rat-
ings or those downgraded more intensely experienced faster rates of liberalization
along four policy dimensions2. To this end, a comprehensive data set is used cov-
ering the majority of rated economies beginning with the first year they received
a rating. I find strong evidence of conditional convergence towards Neo-Liberal
policies along all of the policy variables, consistent with the Neo-Liberal turn of the
later part of the 20th century. Nevertheless, sovereign bond ratings are not found
to have an independent effect beyond this general trend towards deregulation. In
particular, neither the rating scores nor downgrading intensity are significantly as-
sociated with the speed of these reforms. Countries with lower ratings do not lib-
eralize faster. Furthermore, there is no evidence of “power yielding” as countries
that were downgraded more intensely do not differ significantly in their rate of
liberalization.
The chapter has the following structure. The next section presents the two
sides of this debate, one supporting an effect of CRAS on domestic policies, and
its counter arguments. Section 3 presents the data and empirical strategy while
section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Namely, (i) Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business, (ii) Access to Sound Money, (iii) Legal Struc-
ture and Security of Property Rights, and (iv) the size of the public sector as measured by the General
Government Final Consumption Expenditure.
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5.2 Theoretical Approaches
A trend of the late 20th century in the field of finance has been a turn to disinter-
mediated modes of lending (Sinclair, 1994; Leyshon & Thrift, 1998; Sinclair, 2005).
The traditional role of the banks as lenders is circumvented as borrowers in search
of cheap capital can turn directly to the global market. This decentralization of in-
vestment gave rise to problems of information asymmetry, and with it the need for
coordination. CRAs partly fill this void by providing an assessment of the credit-
worthiness of debt issuers, much like “signposts” directing internationally mobile
capital flows (Kerwer, 2002). This strategic position in the new global political eco-
nomy has gained them increased influence over the movements of private capital.
This influence is further reinforced by the use of the agencies’ output in official
regulatory schemes in the U.S and elsewhere (Bruner & Abdelal, 2005; Staikouras,
2012). Therefore, CRAs are promoted to gatekeepers of large amounts of capital,
and access to these investment sources often depends on rating scores.
This new role of the CRAs raises questions with regard to the methods, and
particularly the indicators, used in the production of their famous three character
symbols. While much of the inputs in the ratings process relate to fundamental eco-
nomic indicators, there is also a qualitative component that plays an important role
in the final outcome. Looking at a sample of Asian countries, Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz
(1999) find that this qualitative component of the ratings weighs heavier during
non-turbulent times and gets downplayed when extraordinary situations like eco-
nomic crises occur. What hides behind this qualitative component is ultimately
the controversy in this debate. It is believed that this component is highly influ-
enced by the raters’ perceptions of what constitutes good economic policies and is
informed by neo-liberal ideology. This “mental framework of rating orthodoxy”
(Sinclair 2005) stems from a Western, particularly U.S., understanding of what con-
stitutes acceptable fiscal and regulatory policy. Recent empirical studies, and the
results presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis, have shown that politics is as much
a part of the rating scores as economics. Beside the standard economic correlates
of the ratings such as per capita income, GDP growth, inflation and external debt
(Cantor & Packer, 1996; Afonso et al., 2011), variables pertaining to political charac-
teristics have some explanatory power over the ratings as well (Depken et al., n.d.;
Biglaiser & Staats, 2012).
Research on a systematic relation between sovereign ratings and policy forma-
tion is scarce (Elkhoury, 2009). Arguments on why ratings matter for policy are nev-
ertheless present given the robust correlation of the ratings to policy variables. In
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the long run, CRAs are theorized to contribute towards a global framework where
market forces put pressure on policy makers promoting convergence towards a
one-size-fits-all approach to politics (Sinclair, 1994, 2005). This view resembles the
reasoning behind the larger globalization debate, with one exception. CRAs, and
their ratings, are at the center of attention rather than capital or trade flows. This
section uses the framework introduced in Institutional Organizational Studies by
DiMaggio and W. Powell (1983) to separate these pressures into coercive, normat-
ive, and mimetic. After a discussion of the ways in which CRAs are thought to
pressure states into policy convergence, the following subsection provides some
counter arguments and culminates in the derivation of the hypotheses to be tested
in the empirical sections.
5.2.1 The Ratings Skeptics camp; Coercive, Normative and Mi-
metic Pressures.
Isomorphism is defined as a process that forces one unit in a population to resemble
other units that face the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983, p. 66). While originally developed to be applied at the organizational level of
the firm or sub-state agency, Knill (2005) and Holzinger and Knill (2005) introduced
the concept in the analysis of policy convergence at the state level. There are three
types of isomorphic pressures and they will be introduced as they apply to the
CRAs case. The first type of pressures, referred to as coercive isomorphism stress
how organizations are forced to adopt policies because they are sanctioned by other
organizations that are in control of critical resources. With regard to CRAs, one
approach sees the agencies as powerful players in the international capital markets
acting as gatekeepers to a large pool of investment capital capable of affecting the
cost of borrowing for rated countries. As such, lower ratings would put pressure on
governments to adopt market oriented policies (cf., Sinclair, 2005; Paudyn, 2012).
Particularly developing countries, and all those that rely on external capital flows
to finance their needs will be more vulnerable to these pressures (Datz, 2004).
Regarding the market influence of the ratings, one shared finding among stud-
ies dealing with the impact of sovereign credit ratings is that there is a significant
negative correlation between sovereign bond spreads and ratings. Lower ratings
correspond to higher spreads and thus higher costs of borrowing throughout the
literature. In their seminal paper, Canton and Parker (1996) find that rating agen-
cies’ opinions independently affect market spreads as rating announcements are
succeeded by spread movement in the expected direction 63 per cent of the times.
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This would imply that ratings lead rather than lag the market. The impact of rating
actions is greater when taken by Moody’s or when it is related to speculative-grade
(i.e., mostly developing) countries. Similarly, results in Gaillard (2009) support that
ratings are not pro-cyclical as they tend to be particularly stable in times of excess-
ively high and low spreads. More recently the connection between rating score and
cost of borrowing is confirmed (Kiff et al., 2012). A fair conclusion to be drawn
from this literature is that spreads and ratings are interdependent, therefore, rating
agencies have some potential to influence the market and exert pressure to market
participants.
Normative and mimetic pressures are also a possible channel through which CRAs
affect country policy. This approach maintains that rating agencies form percep-
tions of what constitutes “good” and “bad” policy. A “world view” is created, in
accordance with the “mental framework”, which draws upon Neo-Liberal ideas of
public policy. As they reduce the multidimensional question of creditworthiness
into a single alphanumerical symbol, CRAs provide a benchmark against which
investments are rationalized, thus shaping the perceptions of creditors and debtors
(Bruner & Abdelal, 2005; Sinclair, 2005). The difference off this mechanism from the
coercive pressures view is that ratings do not necessarily have to use their market
power. Instead, their power is structural. Deviations from the “mental framework”
will be treated as a crisis of creditworthiness by the agencies. Investors, will an-
ticipate rating actions, and will act beforehand causing the market as a whole to
respond. By creating a general framework of “good” and “bad” policies, CRAs
are seen as a ‘feature of developed country “government-at-a-distance” over de-
veloping countries’ (Sinclair, 1994, 2005, p. 147). As the normative prescription
of the ratings drive an increasing number of countries to behave accordingly mi-
metic pressures will cause the remaining countries to up take the implementation
of appropriate policies.
5.2.2 Counter Arguments
With the high publicity the CRAs received in recent years, their potential for influ-
ence is taken for granted, nevertheless, some skepticism about their unconditional
power is warranted. Much of the isomorphic pressures attributed to the agencies
depend on assumptions not a-priori valid. Firstly, the market influence of the CRAs
is taken for granted. This is not always true as reactions of the market to rating
actions show.
Despite the strong correlation between ratings and sovereign bond spreads de-
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scribed in the previous subsection, rating agencies are not omnipotent. Standard
& Poor’s and Fitch’s downgrades lead to a higher risk premium about 63% of the
times, while there is an equal chance of noticing a decrease rather than increase of
CDS spreads following a downgrade from Moody’s (Kiff et al., 2012). Outlook
and Watchlist changes are also relevant, but again there is no one-to-one relation-
ship. The market does not always agree that rating actions carry new information
(Brooks et al., 2004; Kiff et al., 2012). Often risk assessments by the two leading
rating agencies are preceded by an analogous change in the market’s assessment
of sovereign risk (G. Larraı´n et al., 1997; Reisen & Von Maltzan, 2002). The ratings
affect the market only when the latter is convinced they carry unique information.
Hence, downgrades might not be as effective in promoting policy decisions as is
commonly thought.
In addition, market participants, including CRAs, use their market power dif-
ferently on developed and developing countries. As Mosley (2003) shows, polit-
ical choices among developed and developing countries are evaluated differently
allowing for different degrees of freedom in policy making. For developed coun-
tries, the interest lies upon aggregate economic outcomes. Specifically, the levels of
inflation and government budget deficits. Other areas of government policies do
not concern financial market participants thus leaving governments of developed
countries with room for maneuver. In developing nations markets are believed to
exert pressure on a wider set of policy outcomes, but just like in developed nations,
the formulation of public policies reflects domestic as well as external pressures.
Finally, the coercive power of the agencies may not be as great as assumed, be-
cause the role of the agencies has been greatly exaggerated. The introduction of
sovereign bond ratings in not necessarily a disruptive innovation, in the sense that
it did not create a new market, or a new way in which transnational investment
is done. Financial disintermediation -the evasion of traditional modes of financing
(i.e., banks) in favor of more direct ones- has been driven by regulatory changes and
technological advances. Direct borrowing or lending without the inter-mediation
of banks, produces assets not recorded in the balance sheets of financial institu-
tions, giving these institutions the ability to escape the control of governments and
regulatory authorities (French & Leyshon, 2004). In addition, the role of the inter-
net as a platform that enables the flow of the information needed for a multilateral
activity such as disintermediated finance cannot be overstated. A prominent ex-
ample is Friedman’s (2006) electronic heard. In this broader picture, CRAs are just
a piece of the puzzle, and their role is to feel in the vacuum of information asym-
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metry arising by the process of disintermediation. Certainly, this process gives the
agencies a prominent role in the global economy, and in their turn, CRAs greatly
facilitate the process. Nevertheless, their bond ratings are arguably not a necessary
condition for the realization of disintermediated finance.
The role of the agencies has been perhaps greatly exaggerated with regard to
the normative pressures it can create on states, and the resulting mimetic behaviors.
Taking a long term perspective, it is easier to argue that, starting with the neo-
classical “counter-revolution” lead by intellectuals such as Friedrich Hayek and
Milton Freedman, a “mental framework” was put forward that gave reason to the
existence of the CRAs, rather than the reverse. In the new global economy that
emerged, CRAs are just one of the many organizations created to nurture and pro-
mote a neo-liberal consensus. Several of the ideas that belong to the CRAs’ “mental
framework”, such as the erroneous role of state interventions and regulations, and
the primacy of investors rights against other societal pressures (see Moody’s, 2008;
Standard & Poor’s, 2008) where already put forward in the Mont Pelerin Society
meeting in 1974.
During that meeting, a group of intellectuals lead by Friedrich Hayek, met to
mount an intellectual defense of the unregulated economy and private enterprise.
It did not take long until this new economic orthodoxy influenced policy in the
two prominent industrial states, namely United States and Britain, as evident in
the policies of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations. In addition, New York
investment banks began increasing their operations overseas, particularly lending
to foreign governments, and the US administration began a global promotion of
credit and financial markets liberalization (Harvey, 2005). It is at this time, that the
rating agencies started expanding their sovereign bond ratings to cover overseas
governments. Initially to a few OECD countries, but in time, a great number of
developing countries were also included. Parallel to these developments, a consid-
erable number of think tanks, international institutions, and funding schemes to
specific research programs were further reinforcing the turn to a neo-liberal con-
sensus (Harvey, 2005).
The role of the CRAs in promoting this consensus must be evaluated only within
the context of the greater shift of mindsets described above. The ideas promoted by
the agencies, have been put well in place beforehand, and faster, than the agencies
admitted new countries in their ratings. From this perspective, the high correla-
tion between rating grades and CDS spreads implies that the agencies and market
participants already share an understanding of what makes for “good” and “bad”
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policy at any particular moment. This understanding was not put forward solely
by the agencies, but by a conscious effort that involved planning, at the state level.
Additionally, the market seems to increasingly disagree with the agencies’ valu-
ation of risk. Kiff, Nowak and Schumacher (2012), regress CDS spreads, as a proxy
for market risk valuation, on sovereign bond ratings for each year from 2005 until
2010. While in 2005 the R-Squared statistic is consistent with earlier studies, and as
high as 0.93, in 2010 bond ratings could only explain 0.63 per cent of the variation
in CDS spreads. The market discriminates more among different risk profiles than
the CRAs.
In summary, theoretical argumentation can go in favor of both the ”Ratings
Skeptics ”’ and the ”‘Counter Argument”’ camps. It is therefore not a priori clear
whether one should expect an effect of sovereign bond ratings on policy making
either through their market or structural power, and empirical evidence is scarce.
One example of such research is Paudyn (2012) arguing that during the current
crises the agencies forced states into adopting austerity measures. Nevertheless,
more systematic empirical investigation is needed to establish a causal link, if any.
In the next section I present the data and methods used to answer address this gap.
5.3 Data and Methods
5.3.1 Rating Scores and Policy Variables
I use an extensive data set of sovereign bond ratings for the two major agencies
(Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s) that spans from the early 70’s until 2006, taken
from Afonso et al. (2011). I follow common practice and change the alphanumeric
code used by the agencies to a simple linear scale within the interval of 1 (depict-
ing the few ratings that fall below “B-”) to 17 (the highest possible rating score;
“AAA”).
To test the effect of credit ratings on domestic policy four indicators are used
taken from the Economic Freedom of the World Project produced by the Fraser in-
stitute (Gwartney et al., 2012). These indicators are chosen according to two criteria.
Their relevance to the rating assessment, as this follows from previous research on
the determinants of ratings, and their appearance in policy recommendations de-
livered by the agencies through their announcements. The first index used, labeled
Regulation, is a measure of the degree to which labor and capital markets, as well
as the general business environment is regulated. This index rates countries on a
great array of dimensions such as the private involvement in bank ownership and
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interest rate controls, laws restricting hiring and firing practices, in addition to the
existence of minimum wage and the amount of time and money it takes to start a
new limited-liability business, among others. A full description of the content of the
index is given in the Economic Freedom of the World Annual Reports3. Labor mar-
kets rigidities have been mentioned as concerns in reports of the CRAs after rating
events such as the French downgrade in January 2013. Furthermore, the business
environment, part of the Regulation index, draws upon World Bank variables that
have been shown to be important for the ratings in previous research.
The second index, labeled Sound Money, ranks countries according to their
score on dimensions regarding money growth, inflation and the easiness of own-
ing foreign currency bank accounts. Inflation is one of the most robust predictors
of rating scores, and figures prominently in almost all of the quantitative papers
dealing with rating levels. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggest that inflation-
ary policies are seen with great hostility from “bond vigilantes”, the players in the
debt security markets, forcing policy makers to incorporate these reactions in their
policy formulations (Sease & Mitchell, 6/November/1992). Since the ratings are
the primary vehicle through which these actions are judged it is hypothesized that
they can restrict the choice set of policy makers (Sinclair 1994).
One more index used from the same source is a measure of the Legal System and
Property right protection, labeled here as Legal Protection. This index examines the
countries’ ability to enforce contracts and secure property rights, the impartiality of
the courts and the effect of lawlessness on business activity, among other dimen-
sion. The importance of property rights and the well-functioning of the law are
recognized directly from the main rating agencies and have been found to be sig-
nificant determinants of ratings (Biglaiser and Staats 2012). It is also believed to
be one of the central elements of the “mental framework” of the agencies (Sinclair
1994, Murphy 2000, Kerwer 2002, Bruner and Abdelal 2005). All indexes taken from
the Economic Freedom project run from the value of 0 to 10 where higher values
indicate a more liberal stand with less restrictions and regulations. These scores run
from as early as 1970 for some countries available in 5 year intervals until the year
2000. Beyond that they are available yearly. To increase the sample size I linearly
interpolate the values within the five year intervals.
Finally, I use a measure of general government final consumption expendit-
ure as a percentage of GDP to proxy the size of government. This measure in-
cludes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services -
3 http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html. A brief description of all variables can be found in the
appendix.
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compensation of employees included-, together with most expenditure on national
defense and security. Although it has not been found to be a robust predictor of the
ratings it nevertheless reflects the degree of government activism in the economy
something seen as incompatible with the rating orthodoxy.
Figure 5.1 below depicts the evolution of the mean of these measures grouped
into investment and non-investment grade countries from 1970 until 2006 which is
the last year of the ratings data. A first observation is that non-investment countries
appear in the ratings from the mid 90’s on. Looking at the evolution of the indexes’
scores, there has been a clear trend towards more liberal policies with respect to
monetary issues (Sound Money) and regulation of labor, business, and banking
environment (Regulation). Particularly, non-investment countries have been catch-
ing up towards less regulation and lower levels of money production. This trend
picks up after the 1990 something that seems to coincide with increasing prolifer-
ation of international capital flows. With regard to Legal Protection there is less of
an obvious trend. Both categories of countries register a certain lowering in their
scores, particularly those in the non-investment category. Finally, investment grade
economies have not experienced much fluctuation in their average level of govern-
ment consumption while the other group has on average experience a significant
increase.
The descriptive analysis so far hints towards a process of increasing liberaliza-
tion that coincides with the proliferation of financial mobility. Furthermore, the in-
crease in government spending for the low rated countries hints of greater depend-
ence on financial markets. The move towards freer capital movements coupled
with increased reliance on markets for funding is what is hypothesized to give the
ratings great market and structural power. In particular, the ratings skeptics pre-
dict that economic orthodoxy -spread partly by bond ratings- will drive countries to
behave more in line with Neo-Liberal conceptions of public policy and regulation
in an effort to achieve higher ratings. For low rated countries, this move towards
deregulation will be even more pronounced as they need to climb the ratings lad-
der faster in order to compete for capital in the same markets as the higher rated
economies. The central question is whether bond ratings with their actions have,
indeed, contributed towards this trend. In particular, can this trend towards less
regulation be explained by the ratings scores and their changes? The hypotheses I
derive from the discussion above are the following:
Hypothesis 1: If the Ratings Skeptics are correct, CRAs have an independent effect on
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Figure 5.1. Evolutions of Policy Related Indexes by Investment Grade 1980-2006
domestic policy, and low rated countries will have quicker reforms than high rated coun-
tries, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 2: If the Counter Arguments are correct, CRAs will not have an effect on
domestic policy, ceteris paribus.
5.4 Estimation
To test the relationship between ratings and trends in the policy variables I resort
to a type of convergence regressions following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). For
each of the policy indexes I construct a variable in two steps. Initially, I identify
the first year each country appears in the rating tables of Moody’s and Standard
and Poor’s. For the majority of countries, this happens in the mid 90’s, albeit a
few developed countries have data all the way back to late 70’s. Subsequently, I
calculate the difference of the score on each policy index in 2006, and the score the
country had in the initial year of rating. In the case of government consumption
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I take the differences of the natural logarithm. The majority of countries in the
sample are developing economies, and the time interval covered by the data spans
the whole period they have been rated. I thus have an almost complete overview of
the population of rated countries. Subsequently, I run the following cross-sectional
regression for each policy index:
∆Policyi,(2006− StartYear) = b0 + b1Ratingi,(StartYear) + b2Downgrades/Yearsi
+ b3Policyi,(StartYear) + b4Controlsi,Averages(2006−StartYear) + ei
The main predictors are two. The initial rating for each country (Rating), and the
amount of times each country was downgraded divided by the number of years it
has been rated. The first variable is meant to capture the “convergence pressure”
effect of the ratings. That is, it is expected that if rating pressures are significant,
countries that started low on the scale, should have experienced higher degrees of
change in their policy scores towards more liberalized policy regimes (i.e., I expect
this coefficient to be negative). The second variable, the average time each country
was downgraded for the time it was included in the ratings, is meant to proxy
the amount of “power yielding” each country faced. It is reasonable to assume that
countries downgraded more intensively than others faced greater pressure. Sinclair
(2005) gives the example of Japan that withstood a number of downgrades until it
subscribed more closely to the agencies’ policy prescriptions. The coefficient on this
variable is expected to be positive if there is any “power yielding” taking place.
Furthermore, a number of control variables are included to separate the effect of
ratings from other confounding factors. A primary control is the initial value of the
dependent variables. This is done to test for conditional convergence in the data set
that is unrelated to the ratings process. Furthermore, measures of economic devel-
opment and trade openness are included, constructed as averages over the period
each country is rated. Wealthier countries are expected to have greater ability to
raise capital internally hence be less affected by their rating score. The openness
measure controls for the level of economic integration. I anticipate that more open
countries will also have chosen to have less regulation on other aspects of policy.
In addition, I include a series of regional dummies for Latin America and East Asia
and OECD following standard practice in the globalization literature (Rodrik, 1998;
Garrett, 2001). Next section presents the results.
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Baseline Estimations
Table 5.1 depicts the results for all dependent variables using Moody’s sovereign
bond ratings. In all regressions, there is strong evidence of conditional convergence,
as portrayed by the negative and highly significant estimate of the initial value of
each depended variable. Regarding the rating variables there is no such evidence.
The initial rating score is not a significant predictor of change in three out of four
equations. Furthermore, in the third equation (Legal Protection) there is evidence of
divergence. Countries that were initially highly rated experienced faster transition
towards the establishment of a market enhancing legal environment. In addition,
there is no effect of “power yielding” as measured by the effect of total downgrades.
Again, in the only regression that this variable is found significant it receives an op-
posite sign to the one expected. One explanation for this could be that countries that
did not implement policies in line with the dimensions highlighted by the Sound
Money index (low inflation and growth of money), have been downgraded more
often than the rest. If this is true, it provides further indication that ratings have not
affected domestic policy, as the more frequent downgrading did not stop national
governments carrying out their agenda.
Looking at the geographical variables, the dummy for Latin American econom-
ies receives some significance indicating lower speed of deregulation (i.e., change
in the Regulation index) and legal adjustments while the opposite is true for the
Sound Money index. Furthermore, countries historically more open to trade ex-
perienced faster reform in the first three indexes. The other variables receive some
sporadic significance as well, but no strong case can be made as to their ability
to explain the dependent variables. Finally, the R square statistic indicates a con-
siderably good fit for the reform indexes, but explains only about one third of the
variation in the public sector growth regression.
To check the sensitivity of the results, I perform the same estimations using rat-
ing data from Standard and Poor’s (S & P). While highly correlated with Moody’s
ratings, S & P’s actions are demonstrated to have a stronger effect on CDS spreads
and capital markets, hence one could hypothesize that “power yielding” could be
more effective when S & P data are considered. In addition, the new estimations
comprise of a different sample of countries. S & P’s grades cover a slightly lar-
ger number of countries, for different time spans. The results for S & P’s ratings
are depicted in Table 5.2. There is a notable increase in the number of countries
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Table 5.1. Moody’s Rating Scores and Downgrades as determinants of Reform and Govern-
ment Size
Dependent Variable:
VARIABLES ∆ Regulation ∆ Sound ∆ Legal ∆ Government
Money Protection Consumption
Rating ScoreStartYear -0.0325 0.0943* 0.159*** -0.0006
(0.028) (0.0478) (0.0321) (0.0082)
Downgrade Intensity 0.975 -6.245*** -1.369 -0.0758
(1.387) (1.975) (1.465) (0.226)
GDP pc (log) 0.179 -0.0968 0.231** 0.00506
(0.114) (0.163) (0.114) (0.0314)
Openness (log) 0.323* 0.384** 0.390*** -0.0447
(0.17) (0.187) (0.129) (0.0463)
OECD 0.343 0.690* 0.136 0.156**
(0.237) (0.356) (0.18) (0.0773)
Latin -0.528** 0.676** -0.856*** 0.044
(0.213) (0.288) (0.224) (0.0658)
East Asia 0.213 -0.483 -0.317 -0.0758
(0.323) (0.43) (0.273) (0.0832)
Sub S. Africa -0.0496 -0.0034 -0.753** 0.0783*
(0.189) (0.308) (0.364) (0.0404)
RegulationStart Year -0.576***
(0.0755)
Sound MoneyStart Year -0.925***
(0.051)
Legal ProtectionStart Year -0.969***
(0.0862)
Gov. ConsumptionStart Year(log) -0.325***
(0.069)
Constant 1.962* 6.174*** 1.215 0.994***
(1.034) (1.334) (0.869) (0.304)
Observations 88 86 86 95
R-squared 0.541 0.831 0.649 0.388
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1
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included in the estimations, and given that S & P rates about 100 countries, the
sample covers close to the total population of rated economies. Nevertheless, the
main conclusions drawn earlier still hold and there are great similarities between
the two estimations.
Table 5.2. Standard & Poor’s Rating Scores and Downgrades as determinants of Reform and
Government Size
Dependent Variable:
VARIABLES ∆ Regulation ∆ Sound ∆ Legal ∆ Government
Money Protection Consumption
Rating ScoreStartYear -0.0413 -0.0069 0.1 0.00411
(0.0287) (0.06) (0.0653) (0.0056)
Downgrade Intensity 0.0903 -1.911* -0.806 0.108
(1.372) (1.122) (1.089) (0.097)
GDP pc (log) 0.254** 0.334 0.272 -0.0024
(0.108) (0.213) (0.181) (0.026)
Openness (log) 0.189 0.238 0.231 -0.0153
(0.168) (0.213) (0.162) (0.0316)
OECD 0.217 0.739** 0.356 0.102**
(0.234) (0.352) (0.262) (0.0477)
Latin -0.603*** 0.219 -0.913*** -0.0049
(0.202) (0.419) (0.334) (0.0445)
East Asia -0.0059 -0.228 -0.286 -0.106
(0.252) (0.454) (0.314) (0.0654)
Sub S. Africa -0.283 0.0242 -0.205 -0.0088
(0.236) (0.358) (0.282) (0.0604)
RegulationStart Year -0.529***
(0.0568)
Sound MoneyStart Year -0.886***
(0.0627)
Legal ProtectionStart Year -0.811***
(0.0863)
Gov. ConsumptionStart Year(log) -0.257***
(0.0492)
Constant 1.763* 3.645*** 1.053 0.705***
(0.913) (1.352) (1.177) (0.242)
Observations 94 90 89 100
R-squared 0.547 0.786 0.615 0.349
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1
Once more, the evidence of conditional convergence is strong. More import-
antly, the rating variables behave as before. Particularly, the initial rating score is
not a significant predictor of three out of the four variables. Power yielding is also
not evident. Finally, the control variables’ behavior is not significantly different.
R-square values are very close to the ones achieved in the previous table. The main
difference is that Openness is not a significant predictor in this sample of countries.
Putting all results together so far, the Ratings Skeptics position is not supported by
any of the estimations.
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5.5.2 Non-Linearity
One of the main assumptions regarding CRAs’ market power is that investment
grade status is an important asset for rated economies. In emerging countries,
investment grade status is found to be associated with a 36 per cent decrease in
spreads (Jaramillo & Tejada, 2011). Furthermore, downgrades have a greater sig-
nificance when inflicted upon non investment grade economies (Cantor & Packer,
1996; Kiff et al., 2012). It follows that economies that are just above (below) the
investment grade boarder might face greater pressures to preserve (improve) their
rating score than those at the very ends of the rating scale. The approach used in
the preceding subsection cannot capture this non-linear effect. For that reason, I
extend the estimation strategy to account for the possibility of asymmetric effects.
In particular, since economies in the middle of the ratings scale could face greater
pressures, one would expect an inverse U-shaped relationship between initial rat-
ing values picking at the investment grade line. That is, countries in the middle
would deregulate more than others. Figure 5.2 below, presents the results after fit-
ting a quadratic equation using the Standard and Poor’s data. A vertical line is
also included in each scatterplot to mark the dividing line between the two invest-
ment grades. There is no evidence of a significant non-linear effect. This conclusion
holds for data taken from both agencies, as well as when all previous estimations
are repeated including the squared term of the initial rating, or the squared term of
downgrade intensity.
Another way to test for non-linear effects is to estimate each equation separately
for every investment category. I do so, initially focusing solely on countries that
have been in the (non-)investment category throughout their rating history, and
subsequently including countries that changed investment category. Results are
consistent with the preceding analysis. There is no consistent evidence that any of
the rating variables, whether initial values or downgrade intensity, can explain the
observed patterns of reforms, with one exception4. There is some robust evidence
that top graded countries have improved their institutional quality, as captured by
the Legal Environments index, more than low graded countries. This result does
not support the rating skeptics’ argument.
4 Results are available upon request.
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Figure 5.2. Evolutions of Policy Related Indexes by Investment Grade 1980-2006
5.5.3 Alternative Specifications
As a last robustness check I use the main sub indexes that make up the three Eco-
nomic Freedom Indexes used in earlier estimations as dependent variables. The
motivation behind this is that Ratings might have opposing effects to these differ-
ent sub indexes that may be dampened through the aggregation process. For this
reason I use the same estimation strategy as before and present the new results
in Table 5.3. In particular, I report the dependent variable used (sub-index) and
the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient for rating scores and down-
grade intensity. Empty cells signify that these variables did not reach the minimum
agreed upon significance level (p>0.10).
Results corroborate much of the earlier analysis. In particular the ratings are
again, and for the most part, not significant predictors of reform speed. When they
are significant the signs of the coefficients are the opposite from the ones expected
under the ratings skeptics’ hypothesis. Countries with initially higher ratings have
done more to control Inflation or improve their court system. Analogous results
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Table 5.3. Alternative Specifications
Moody’s Standard & Poor’s
Sub Index Rating Downgrade Rating Downgrade
Intensity Intensity
Judicial Independence (-)* (+)**
Impartial Courts (+)*
Military Inference
Integrity of the Legal System
Contract Enforcement No obs No obs No obs No obs
Restrictions on Sale of Property No obs No obs No obs No obs
Money Growth (+)**
Inflation Standard Deviation (+)***
Inflation Latest Year (+)* (-)*




Table 5.3 presents the results of regressions using the same control variables as in Tables 1 and 2 for each
sub-component in the three indexes used in previous Tables. The sign in parenthesis presents the sign of
the respective coefficient (rating or downgrade intensity), and its statistical significance, where ***, **, and *,
denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. No content means the variables where not significant. Robust
Standard Errors used in the majority of the regressions.
follow for the downgrade intensity variables. Putting all the results together I con-
clude that rating scores and their changes do not seem to have influenced the speed
of policy reforms. Hence the Ratings Skeptic argument seems unlikely.
5.6 Conclusion
Credit risk agencies are often viewed as non-state actors whose power over the
behavior of market participants elevated them to transnational centers of authority.
It is further assumed that the agencies perform a function of “governance without
government” that promotes reforms along several dimensions of public policy in
line with Neo-Liberal conceptions of minimal state and regulation. In this chapter,
I argued that when theorizing the importance of CRAs as instigators of economic
and political reform, researchers should consider the concurrent change of mindset
towards neo-liberalism that started in the late 1970s. Within this framework, the
role of the CRAs is limited to a contributor towards the neo-liberal trend rather
than an independent actor.
Using a sample that covers the majority of rated countries and for the whole
period these countries appeared in the ratings of the two most influential agencies,
I showed that there is no evidence that rating actions affect domestic policy directly
by using a number of policy indicators. Countries awarded lower credit ratings do
not tend to reform faster than higher rated economies. The growth of their public
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sector also does not significantly differ. Similarly, the downgrade intensity each
country experiences is not a significant predictor of reforms. On the contrary, there
is an occasional indication of the opposite relationship. Particularly, highly rated
countries created a market promoting legal framework by supporting the protec-
tion of property rights and enforcing contracts without facing rating pressures.
The results could be challenged along the lines of a relatively limited time span
for the non-investment countries. Most of them received a rating in the midst of
the 90’s. In my defense, I think that a 10 years span on average for these countries
should be enough to register an effect, if present. Especially since this time inter-
val coincides with increased proliferation of capital flows. In addition, as seen in
Figure 5.1, with the exception of the Regulation index, all other measures register a
flattening of the slope (i.e. slower or no trend towards Neo-Liberal reform) for both
categories of ratings. That is, the most intense period of reform was during the 90’s,
and it is captured by the sample. This adds more confidence to my conclusions.
These results provide direct support to Proposition 4 in this dissertation, namely
that the agencies did not have affect domestic policies around the world independ-
ently. The liberal framework to which the agencies have been contributing has been
shaping public policy throughout the Western world since the late 70’s. As such,
the CRAs have been a part of this greater turn to Neo-Liberalism rather than an
independent driving force. These results add to the wider literature on globaliz-
ation and its effects on domestic policy. In these debates the state is more often
than not portrayed as under attack, in retreat, or even obsolete (Sassen, 1996). A
recurrent theme in this debate is the creation of a climate of uncertainty about the
survival of basic institutions along which political life is traditionally organized
which is -again, more often than not- subsequently rejected when systematic re-
search assesses these hypotheses using real world data. As an example, Schulze
and Ursprung (Schulze & Ursprung, 1999, p. 54) survey the literature on the nexus
between economic globalization and the nation state and conclude that “. . . after
[we] cast the cool eye of econometric analysis on the phenomenon of global market
integration, we arrive at the conclusion that a doomsday view is not warranted”.
My analysis shows that in the case of the credit risk agencies the same conjecture
holds. The next two chapters proceed in the same spirit and try to apply “the cool
eye of econometrics” to the general Globalization debate. The focus changes from
the CRAs to the most prominent actor in International Politics; the State.
100 Chapter 5
Appendix
Table 5.4. Add caption
Variable Definition Source
Regulation Index measuring Regulation of Credit, Labor and Busi-
ness. Ranges from 0-10, higher values reflect less regula-
tion.
Gwartney and Lawson (2012)
Sound
Money
Index measuring Money growth, Standard deviation of in-
flation, Inflation: most recent year, Freedom to own for-
eign currency bank accounts. Ranges from 0-10, higher
values reflect less inflationary policies.
Gwartney and Lawson (2012)
Legal Pro-
tection
Index measuring Judicial independence Protection of
property rights Legal enforcement of contracts Military in-
terference in rule of law and politics among others. Ranges
from 0-10, higher values reflect greater law enforcement.




General government final consumption expenditure in-
cludes all government current expenditures for purchases
of goods and services (including compensation of employ-
ees). It also includes most expenditure on national defense
and security, but excludes government military expendit-
ures that are part of government capital formation. Ex-




GDP per capita constant 2000 US dollars World Bank (2012)
Openness Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and ser-




Records for each country the rating given by either
Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s the first year it appears in
the ratings. Own calculation based on historical data by
Afonso et al (2011)
Afonso et al (2011)
Downgrade
Intensity
Number of times that a country was downgraded either
by Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s divided by the num-
ber of years the country appears in the ratings. Multiple
downgrades per year are treated as one downgrade. Own
calculation based on historical data by Afonso et al (2011)
Afonso et al (2011)
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Sovereignty as a notion means different things to different people. Adding to the
complexity is the fact that scholars are increasingly coming to the agreement that
Sovereignty has been changing through time and should not be treated as fixed
or constant but as a variable (Thomson, 1995; Nagan & Hammer, 2004). From the
absolutist view of Hobbs and Bodin, where the sovereign had absolute, perpetual,
and indivisible control over its subjects and within his territory, we shifted to an un-
derstanding of Sovereignty based on the authority of the people. The UN Charter
brought a new understanding of Sovereignty based on a combination of authority
and legitimacy that is entrenched in the people’s expectations (Nagan & Hammer,
2004). Moreover, the global political order has changed. The world is organized
into a system whose building blocks are sovereign nation-states all of which are
legally equal. Therefore, we now speak of Sovereignty in terms of (nation) States
rather than monarchs or empires.
In the late 90’s Scholars from various fields were engaged in a discussion round
the issue debating its theoretical and empirical validity whose usefulness becomes
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ever more ambiguous in the era of Globalization. The main question in this line of
research is whether nation-state’s Sovereignty has been eroding, or being altered,
under the increased interdependency of States and the intrusion of a number of
non-State actors such as non-governmental organizations and international institu-
tions (for a review see Clark, 1999).
Previews research done by IR theorists and political scientists provided useful
insights that help answer this question, but at least two serious issues impede pro-
gress in this research program. One theoretical insight from the literature is that
the lack of unambiguous conclusions is partly the result of an absence of system-
atic empirical research on State Sovereignty (Thomson, 1995; Ghani et al., 2005).
Thomson states: “Before we can determine whether Sovereignty is being eroded,
consolidated, or something else, we mustbe able to operationalize it into measur-
able, if not quantifiable indicators” (Thomson, 1995, p. 213-14). Another issue is the
lack of a universally accepted definition of Sovereignty. Thus, as will be discussed
below, different conclusions in this debate are often reached solely due to different
uses of the term Sovereignty.
In this chapter I attempt to deal with these two issues as a first step towards
a quantitative approach to the relationship between State Sovereignty and Glob-
alization. First, I discuss the different uses of the term Sovereignty as it arises in
different research traditions. I argue that authors talking about a decline in Sov-
ereignty, are primarily interested in the capacity of the States to rule within their
territory. Following that, i apply the actor-centered approach of this dissertation
and propose to turn the question on its head. I theorize about the importance of
local Institutions as the building blocks of Globalization, and propose (here as well
as the next chapter), that we look at the organizational capacity of different States
in supporting such Institutions as an explanation for the observed pattern of Glob-
alization. Consequently, i argue, that abstract conception of Sovereignty, as seen in
most of the IR literature should be abandoned (at least in the discussion of Global-
ization), and a greater focus should be given to empirically amenable concepts of
Sovereignty such as each State’s organizational effectiveness in supporting regulat-
ory functions conducive to economic integration. Subsequently I discuss existing
measures of these concepts, capturing the regulatory capacity of States, and discuss
why they have not been used in the Globalization debate. This is primarily because
they lack a sufficient time span that such a discussion demands.
In this chapter I propose an empirically useful conceptualization of Sovereignty,
which I call “State Sovereignty”, based on Krasner’s (1999b) influential book, and
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propose the variables and methodology for the construction of a new index antag-
onizing those already in existence. The new index is available for 124 countries, and
up to 10 years for 104 of them. In the final subsections of this chapter, I compare
the index with existing ones and provide a preliminary analysis focusing on the
evolution of country scores. A consistent result is that scores are relatively stable
for most countries, and in fact, some of the weaker States have managed to increase
their scores, mostly due to the betterment of their governing capacity. Preliminary
results in this chapter thus prepare the stage for the next chapter, and show that
State Sovereignty is an enduring quality.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a disambiguation of the
term Sovereignty and discusses attempts to measure it. In section 3, I discuss a new
conceptualization of the term and propose the data and methodology to quantify
it. This section also provides the results of this procedure and preliminary analysis,
and ends with a comparison of the new index to existing ones. Section 4 concludes.
6.2 Sovereignty; Conceptualizations and Measurements
6.2.1 Sovereignty in Structural Approaches to Globalization
The term “Sovereignty” has been used with reference to very different things in
standard International Relations theory. It is sometimes taken to mean political
independence, while others equate it to (economic) autonomy. Historians, lawyers
and political scientists are more comfortable referring to Sovereignty as political
independence while political economists and sociologists find the second definition
to be more fitting to the questions they are trying to answer (Jackson, 1999a). These
differences in interpretation is one reason for the divergent opinions in the debate
on Globalization’s significance for the State.
For the most part, IR and Political Science scholars understand Sovereignty as
an institution or a judicial concept (Jackson, 1999b). It is a “rule” according to which
our system of a-little-over than 190 nation-states is grounded. Under this institu-
tion, each recognized nation-state is legally equal to all other States, and domestic
governments are the main authorities within their territorial jurisdiction, but also
the body representing the State outside that realm. Furthermore, in this conception,
Sovereignty is absolute (James, 1999). This does not equate to unlimited, rather
it implies that Sovereignty is indivisible, rooted to one governing body and it is
either present or absent. There are no degrees of Sovereignty. Any of the UN mem-
ber States is recognized as sovereign in this regard, but countries like Kosovo and
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Somaliland are not full members of the interstate system. Thus, under this view,
Sovereignty is a constitutive or foundational part of the system (Sørensen, 1999).
Translating this typology of Sovereignty in the Neo-Institutional framework of this
book, those scholars referring to it are treating the concept as an Institution that
operates at the normative level. Since there is no supra-national authority to en-
force Sovereignty at the international arena, Sovereignty is just a rule of behavior
that states (sometimes) abide to (cf., Werner & De Wilde, 2001). An “Organized
Hypocrisy” according to Krasner (1999b).
Next to this understanding of Sovereignty is one that relates to the regulative as-
pects of Sovereignty (ibid.). Examples are speeding limits, technical specifications
for imported products, and the procedures for visa issuance for incoming labour
force. One could also include here broader policy pursuits such as the level of
government spending or levels of taxation. In all of these cases, there is a clear de-
marcation of who is the sovereign, the extend of its territory, and the rules by which
it will engage in cooperation with the other sovereigns in the international arena on
regulatory issues. This notion of Sovereignty thus succeeds the constitutive part of
Sovereignty. This understanding of Sovereignty does not map exactly to the Neo-
Institutional framework. This is because, it involves matters of policy and political
preferences (Jackson, 1999b; Sørensen, 1999).
Bringing Globalization back in, it is easy to see that the puzzle of the current
state of Sovereignty is in fact not a puzzle at all. Those who preach an end, or
simply a change to the nature of Sovereignty, and the lagging of politics to econom-
ics (e.g., Roger, 1996), refer to the regulative aspects of Sovereignty. On the other
hand those supporting a continuation of the importance of Sovereignty are talking
about Sovereignty as a constitutive institution of the State system (e.g., Philpott,
1999; Sørensen, 1999; Werner & De Wilde, 2001). Both views have a point within
their understanding of Sovereignty.
Even more worrisome, is the fact that, in the few efforts that have been made to
arrive at a common ground with regard to the understanding of Sovereignty, ambi-
guity remains. Starting from Thomson (1995, p. 225) and thereafter Krasner (1999a;
2001), Sovereignty is conceptualized as both pertaining to control -something closely
related to the regulative aspects discussed earlier-, but also in terms of authority
meaning “rule making, [and] rule enforcement”. According to these two scholars,
States have managed to mobilize internationally in order to offset the loss of con-
trol (over flows, regulations, etc.) within their territories by entering international
agreements thus exercising their authority as sovereign members of the interna-
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tional State system. In addition, the concept of authority was extended to incor-
porate the decision of governments on which matters should be treated as political
or not. Therefore, enabling non-State actors to perform previously State controlled
activities does not necessarily mean a loss of authority. It could simply be inter-
preted as a “depolitization” of some State functions. Nevertheless, this view did
not convince other authors, which rushed to provide empirical accounts of how
non-State actors are becoming carriers of “real” authority (Strange, 1996; Beeson,
2003).
Both understandings discussed this far, the constitutive and regulative sides of
Sovereignty carry shortcomings that hinter their usefulness in an analysis of Glob-
alization. The first of the two concepts only makes sense at the structural level. It
holds no validity on its own right and thus it can not be observed for each state in-
dividually. Any conclusion drawn from this understanding thus applies only at an
aggregate level and as the next Chapter will discuss, this is highly problematic as
States are heterogeneous entities. The regulative concept, on the other hand, mixes
State attributes with State choices and is thus prone to produce spurious results and
lead to ambiguous interpretations. For example, is the advance of Globalization a
possible cause for the downsizing of the welfare state, or are they both driven by
a third factor, such as Liberal ideology. In the next subsection, I motivate an index
that applies to the State level, and does not mix State attributes with State choices.
6.2.2 Sovereignty in an actor-centered Approach.
One way, I argue, that this debate can move forward is to depart from a discus-
sion of Sovereignty, either as constitutive or regulatory, to the notion of empirical
sovereign statehood or as I will call it State Sovereignty. What I propose is not to ask
whether Globalization is canceling the institution of Sovereignty. No State lost its
membership to the “sovereign club” because it enabled trade flows. Neither won-
der whether regulatory or economic autonomy is compromised. Since as already
mentioned this is a mixed concept involving preferences. Instead, we should treat
different States as organizational structures and ask how their capacity to per-
form “those very basic functions for which the State as an institution was created”
(Strange, 1996, p. xii) contributes towards a structure that supports Globalization.
In Neo Institutional terms, to focus on the regulative capacity of each State. This
opens some new opportunities in this debate. First, several authors renounced the
possible effects of Globalization on Sovereignty arguing that the latter is an abso-
lute concept, i.e., you either enjoy full Sovereignty or not. It is believed that since
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it makes no sense to talk about degrees of Sovereignty it also has little meaning
to talk about its erosion under Globalization (Werner & De Wilde, 2001). Never-
theless, several scholars depict Sovereignty as not a fixed concept but as a variable
(Thomson, 1995; Nagan & Hammer, 2004). Unlike the legal/institutional idea of
Sovereignty, State Sovereignty (i.e. regulative capacity) is a more positive notion
allowing for varying degrees of success. The US or Finland for example are legally
as sovereign as Morocco or Somalia. Yet there should not be much disagreement
that the first two countries have a greater ability to control domestic developments,
defend themselves against third countries, or enter international agreements.
Second, this operationalization of Sovereignty allows for a purely positive ap-
proach to the debate, something that has been lacking so far. Several quantitative
indicators of “statehood” or “Sovereignty” exist that try to capture precisely the
concept of State Sovereignty discussed here, yet no effort has been made to use
them in the Globalization debate. One of the reasons is that they lack a consider-
able time span, and the question involved here (i.e., the relationship between Glob-
alization and Sovereignty) is one of change. One of the novelties introduced in this
chapter is the creation of an index of State Sovereignty that covers a reasonable time
span. Before describing this index I turn to a discussion of existing measures.
6.2.3 Measurements of State Sovereignty
Deeply rooted in fields that have for the most part not used quantitative techniques,
State Sovereignty has been treated as a qualitative aspect of States. Nevertheless,
a few attempts have been made to quantify this concept. Recognizing the multidi-
mensional nature of Sovereignty, all measurement efforts adopt a composite index
methodology and relevant variables are collected and then aggregated. The result-
ing indexes provide information for a considerable number of countries, but most
of them lack a considerable time span, if any at all. Three relevant indexes are dis-
cussed in this sub section. First, I present the Stateness index that is part of the
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (henceforth BTI). Second, the Stateness index
produced within the Political Atlas of the World project (Melville et al., 2010) re-
ferred to as PA. Finally, I present the Failed States index (henceforth FS) prepared
by the Fund for Peace.
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The BTI Stateness Index
This index is part of a wider project that seeks to provide policy makers and profes-
sionals in the development community with a knowledge base of factors leading
to success or failure in development and transformation. In doing so, it focuses on
the ability of policy makers to carry out reforms aiming at establishing constitu-
tional democratic rule and a socially responsible market economy (Stiftung, 2012).
It ranks 128 countries along two main dimensions; the state of their democracy
and market economy (Status Index), and their respective leadership’s management
performance (Management Index). As part of the Status Index, experts are asked
to answer a number of questions regarding “Stateness” defined as “ There is clarity
about the nation’s existence as a State with adequately established and differentiated power
structures”. More into detail, the specific questions are:
• To what extent does the State’s monopoly on the use of force cover the entire
territory of the country?
• To what extent do all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and
accept the nation-state as legitimate?
• To what extent are legal order and political institutions dened without inter-
ference by religious dogmas?
• To what extent do basic administrative structures exist?
These questions tackle the basic principles of State Sovereignty as they are cap-
tured by the monopoly of power, the broad recognition of the legitimacy of the
State, the separation of church and State, and finally the existence (but not the qual-
ity) of administrative structures. Methodologically, the index follows a simple pro-
cedure. Each country is rated on a scale of 0 to 10 for each question, and following
that, the Stateness index is produced by averaging the scores on the four questions
mentioned. In terms of frequency it is published biannually starting in 2003.
The PA Stateness Index
The Political Atlas of the World project is an effort to produce measurements to
facilitate the comparative study of global political systems. In doing so it ranks
countries based on several indicators, the most relevant being that of Stateness.
This index is an attempt to capture the degree at which States differ in their ability
to exercise their prerogatives of a sovereign. That is, their capacity to maintain their
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existence, sustain their independent development, and deal with both domestic
and external problems. It thus follows the same reasoning as the index produced
later in this chapter. Nevertheless, it is very different in its selection of relevant
variables and aggregation methodology. In particular it uses variables pertaining
both to the economic and political standing of the rated States. Starting with the
later, these variables are:
• Duration of sovereign Stateness.
• Internal conflicts: number of casualties, if any; area affected; impact on regime
stability.
• Foreign military presence/deployment in a country. Indicating a violation of
the States territorial Sovereignty.
• Share of ethnic majority in the country’s total population. As an indicator of
possible ethnic conflicts.
The first variable reflects what Krasner (1999b) refers to as International Legal
Sovereignty. It reflects the level of experience the State has in managing its domestic
affairs, the development of its political and social institutions, and the degree of
legitimacy the State enjoys both internally and externally. The second variable in-
dicates the State’s capacity to maintain its existence independently, and to exercise
its sovereign prerogatives, in particular, the use of violence. The third variable cap-
tures a violation of territorial Sovereignty as a foreign military base is an area in
which the host State has no authority over. Finally, ethnic fractionalization is used
as an indicator of the possibility of ethnic conflicts seen here as a threat to the coun-
try’s integrity. The other variables that make up this index are reflecting economic
fundamentals such as:
• Share of foreign aid in the country’s gross national income (GNI).
• External debt.
• Ratio of patent applications filed by residents and non-residents.
• National currency pegging regime.
Dependence on foreign aid is an indication that a State lacks the resources to
properly fulfill its domestic functions and maintain its existence. In addition, aid
recipients have to align their political agendas to donors’ conditionality. The inclu-
sion of External Debt follows the same reasoning. That is, highly indebted States
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are unable to meet their obligations (both internal and external) independently. The
patent ration of residents vs. non-residents is an indicator of the technological and
scientific capacity of the State taken to reflect its ability to create favorable economic
conditions. Finally, the pegging regime of the national currency is also used as an
indicator of the quality of Stateness. Monetary policy is traditionally considered as
one of the functions of sovereign States. Its abdication is a telling sign of inability
on behalf of the State. Methodologically, all indicators discussed above are com-
bined into one variable using Discriminant Analysis. The final Index is available
for 192 countries but it is available for only one point in time.
The Failed States Index
The failed States index is produced by the US based Think Tank Fund for Peace and
the Foreign Policy Magazine. The index ranks countries along three dimensions of
State vulnerability; social, economic and political. In total, the index is an aggreg-
ation of twelve indicators, pertaining to the dimensions mentioned above. This
index is quite unique in its methodology as it uses context analysis applied over
great amounts of automatically collected data. Daily, the think tank’s algorithms
scan several sources in the internet collecting relevant information. They are later
analyzed going through a multitude of stages to produce a score of 0 to 10 for all
12 indicators that are subsequently summed up to give the overall index. The most
relevant variables to State Sovereignty in this index are the following:
• Delegitimization of the State; measures the widespread loss of popular con-
fidence in State institutions and processes and massive and endemic corrup-
tion
• Deterioration Public Services; measures the disappearance of basic State func-
tions that serve the people
• Security Apparatus Operates as a ’State within a State’; codes armed resist-
ance to the governing authority or the emergence of an army within an army
• Rise of Fractionalized Elites; signifies the absence of legitimate leadership
widely accepted as representing the entire citizenry.
• External Intervention; measures humanitarian, economic and military inter-
ventions.
110 Chapter 6
Other variables that are part of the index are economic factors such as sharp
economic declines and income inequality and social indicators like demographic
pressures, forced population movements and long term brain drain. The index is
available yearly but its coverage varies by year. In 2005, the initial year of the index,
scores were calculated for 75 countries but later on its coverage expanded to include
up to 145 States.
All indexes presented thus far share some common characteristics. First, they all
strive to capture the degree to which sovereign governments have the capacity to
deal with issues related to sovereign statehood. Furthermore, they all recognize the
diverse nature of this concept and adopt much like the index proposed later in this
chapter a strategy to reduce the underlying dimensionality to a single construct.
Nevertheless, they diverge from my index in two significant ways. They include
different variables justified on intuitive rather than theoretical grounds, and they
use different aggregation methods. BTI averages the different dimensions, FA uses
an additive approach and PA resorts to Discriminant Analysis to derive appropriate
weights for each variable.
While well documented and composed of variables relevant to the discussion
on State Sovereignty, all three indexes have some major drawbacks if one wishes to
utilize them to analyze empirically the relationship between State Sovereignty and
economic Globalization. The BTI index is constructed using only countries that
have not yet achieved a fully consolidated democracy and market economy. As a
consequence, there are no data for what one might call the “Western World”. This
selection criterion is well suited for the primary function of this index, namely, the
monitoring of political and economic transition of developing countries. Unfortu-
nately, the same criterion renders the index highly problematic when ones aim is to
assess the relationship of Globalization and State Sovereignty. This is true for two
reasons. First, the later debate relates to all countries, not just developing ones. In
addition, Western countries are the ones with higher levels of both Globalization
and State Sovereignty, thus omitting them from the analysis would systematically
bias the results.
The PA index is available for only one year. Since Globalization is a dynamic
process, it can be argued that its relation to State Sovereignty is not adequately cap-
tured by the use of cross sectional data. Similarly, the FS index, while offering in-
formation on the widest possible number of countries its maximum span is 5 years
for 75 countries only. Other countries are included subsequently but as will become
apparent in the next chapter of this dissertation this time span does not allow for a
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thorough examination of the relation between the two central variables. Neverthe-
less, these indexes provide a good benchmark against which the index constructed
in this thesis can be compared and validated. The next subsection provides the
rational and presents the results of the main index.
6.3 A New Index of State Sovereignty
6.3.1 An Empirically Useful Conceptualization of State Sovereignty
An actors based approach to Sovereignty focuses on the capacity of the State to
establish rules for all to follow, monitor this rules, and it’s ability to enforce them
within it’s territory. Since the State is also a part of a greater international system,
the recognition of its regulatory rule making, and its ability to prevent others from
interfering is another dimension of this concept. A State is considered as de jure
sovereign if it is recognized by other States as the rule maker of the territory it rep-
resents and can enter international agreements (Krasner, 1999b). Mutual recogni-
tion among States bestows upon the parties involved the status of being sovereign
by renouncing any attempt to interfere with each others internal affairs. Recipro-
city is institutionalized through recognition of certain rights and duties (Barkin &
Cronin, 1994).
De facto Sovereignty, on the other hand is a much broader concept. Bierstecker
and Weber (1996, p. 2), describes this as ranging from a monopoly on legitimate
uses of domestic violence to meeting the economic needs of a citizenry’. While
useful as a description of this type of Sovereignty, it is still quite a general propos-
ition. To disaggregate it, I will incorporate some elements from (Krasner, 1999b)
and argue that de facto Sovereignty encompasses three out of the four notions of
Sovereignty as described by Krasner. Namely, Westphalian Sovereignty, Interde-
pendence Sovereignty and Domestic Sovereignty1.
Westphalian Sovereignty pertains to the exclusion of external actors from do-
mestic authority structures’ (Krasner, 1999b, p. 5). A State cannot be considered
sovereign if external actors have the right to intervene in its regulative decisions.
Domestic Sovereignty refers to the way political and public authority is organized
within a State, and whether the State is able to control development within its ter-
ritory (ibid, p. 11-12). Questions relevant to this dimension of Sovereignty are
whether the State can control crime or corruption, or whether it can efficiently col-
1 The forth type of Sovereignty, International Legal Sovereignty was mentioned in the discussion of de
jure Sovereignty
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lect taxes. Finally, Interdependence Sovereignty is about the ability of a government
to control flows coming in and out of the country from movements of people and
goods, to pollutants and ideas (ibid, p. 4). Figure 6.1 below presents all dimen-
sions and the way they are connected. Another way to categorize these dimensions
would be between Internal and External Sovereignty. The former refers to the re-
lation of the sovereign/governing body with society, and marks the absoluteness
of its authority within its territory. The latter refers to the absolute authority of
the State externally (Held, 1989). The first two dimensions of Sovereignty capture
external aspects while the last two internal. These are the building blocks of the
index.
Figure 6.1. Conceptualization of State Sovereignty
6.3.2 Data and Methodology
Table 6.1 presents the dimensions of Sovereignty, as determined in the previous
section, and connects them to particular variables. International legal Sovereignty
is concerned with the recognition of a country and its ability to enter international
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treaties as an equal player. Thus, a country’s membership in International Organ-
izations, is a straightforward measure of this notion of Sovereignty..
Table 6.1. Variables and Sources
Dimensions Variables Source
(i) International Legal Sovereignty
IO memberships COW
(ii) Westphalian Sovereignty
Composite Indicator of National Capability COW
(iii) Interdependency Sovereignty
Openness related Control Own Estimates
(iv) Domestic Sovereignty
Political Stability World Bank
Corruption Freedom House
Effectiveness Center for Systemic Peace
Legitimacy Center for Systemic Peace
Westphalian Sovereignty reflects whether an external actor has the right or abil-
ity to impose its will over and above the legitimate rulers of the country. It is hard
to find a good measure for this aspect of Sovereignty. Using information on direct
interventions, coded in the form of a dummy variable would be a good option, but
given that the other variables in the index are continuous it would be problematic
to use in a principal components setting. To overcome this problem I will focus on
a country’s ability to exclude other States from interfering, which is analogous to
its Material Capabilities. Krasner states “Foreign actors, usually the rulers of other
States, can use their material capabilities to dictate or coerce changes in the author-
ity structures of a target” (Krasner 1999b, p. 20), implying that States with great
material capabilities will be more difficult to influence and hence have a greater
ability to retain their internal affairs unaffected by external actors. The Composite
Indicator of National Capability, developed by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972)
and Singer (1987) within the Correlates of War project is one of the most widely
used indexes in political science and is used as a measure of hard power. It contains
information on military expenditure and personnel, consumption of energy, urban
and total population and iron and steel production and it is used in this chapter as
a proxy for the Westphalian dimension of Sovereignty.
The domestic aspects of Sovereignty is less problematic to measure. Political
stability and the absence of corruption are straightforward measures and I employ
two of the most widely used indicators. I also include measures of government le-
gitimacy and effectiveness provided by the Center for Systemic peace. These meas-
urements provide information on the political, economic, social and security level
of legitimacy and effectiveness of a number of countries drawing from the experi-
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ence of creating the Polity IV index.
Interdependence Sovereignty is another difficult concept to measure. Ideally,
the variables used should reflect the ability of a government to control its flows, or
for that matter, the effects that these flows have on its functioning. It can be argued
that using data on actual trade flows (or restrictions thereof) is not an accurate
assessment of this concept. What is reflected in those data is the government’s
preference towards the level of regulation and not its ability to control it. In order
to develop an adequate measure for this a different rationale must be followed.
According to the main body of theory on interdependence research, high levels of
openness suggest a loss in the ability to control developments within a country. “If
a State cannot regulate what passes across its borders, it will not be able to control
what happens within them.” (Krasner 1999b, p. 13). In other words, a certain level
of openness implies a certain level of control of domestic aspects (e.g. levels of
corruption). Differences between the expected level of control, given a certain level
of openness, and the one realized would be an accurate measure of the ability to
manage the outcomes of increased flows.
I choose to focus on corruption, as the internal dimension most affected by
openness as a significant number of studies already support a relationship between
the two variables (cf., Wei, 2000; F. Larraı´n et al., 2000; Gatti, 2004). To produce the
measure of Interdependence Sovereignty I regress the levels of corruption within a
country on three different measures of openness; Freedom to Trade Internation-
ally, International Capital Market Controls and Taxes on International Trade all
provided by Gwartney and Lawson (2009). The residual from that regression rep-
resents the gap between the observed and predicted corruption score, for each
country, and it is used as a measure of their ability to control these flows. A positive
value indicates a greater ability to control the effects of openness than expected and
vice versa. The results for the regression are presented in the appendix.
Once all variables of the index are collected, they are rescaled to a range of
zero to ten where a higher value indicates a higher degree of Sovereignty. In the
next step, the variables are aggregated following the methodology used in Dreher,
Gaston, and Martens (2006) KOF Index of Globalization, and Nicoletti, Scarpetta,
and Boylaud (2000) analyzing indicators of product market regulation. In order to
deal with ambiguity stemming from the use of subjective weights, I use principal
components analysis to produce objective weights. Hence, the way the variables
are weighted corrects for overlapping information between them2. I proceed as
2 See for example the Handbook On Constructing Composite Indicators (OECD 2008) pp: 89-91
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in Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000) and assign to each variables a weight
analogous to the variance, in that variable, explained by the component on which
it receives the higher loading. Then aggregate the resulting components weighted
by the variance they each explain in the total dataset. The weights for all variables
and components are presented in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2. Weights for Variables and Components
Component Variables Weight






(ii) External Sovereignty (0.26)
International Organizations 0,3
Material Capabilities 0,61
An initial observation is that all variables receive roughly the same weight. This
is confirmed by the correlation between the composite index presented here and
one constructed using equal weights3. Furthermore, two principal components
were extracted that capture different dimensions of Sovereignty. This is because,
under principal components analysis, variables exhibiting high correlation will be
grouped under the same component. Hence, variables pertaining to Interdepend-
ence and Domestic Sovereignty were grouped together forming the Internal Sov-
ereignty Component while membership in IO’s and material capabilities (i.e. hard
power) are grouped together under External Sovereignty Component.
The decision to extract two distinct components is furthermore supported by
Horn’s (1965) parallel analysis, one of the most robust technique of deciding com-
ponents numbers (Zwick & Velicer, 1986; Glorfeld, 1995). In this procedure, the
variance explained by the factors retained in the sample is compared against the
variance of components extracted by randomly created data. If the variance of the
non-random data components is higher than the one from the random data, the
component is extracted. Figure 6.4, presented in the appendix, indicates that in my
case the first two components contain significant information. Finally, data-based
techniques, such as principal components analysis, have their weaknesses. Sensit-
ivity to specification and data quality could be driving the results. To control for
3 That correlation is very close to 1. Results are available upon request
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that, the robustness of the index is checked extensively excluding different vari-
ables (or combinations) from the estimation. The resulting indexes are all similar
with correlations very close to one4. Next section discuss the results of the index.
6.3.3 Results
Full results of the index are presented in Table 6.5 in the appendix in the form of a
country level ranking. The raking includes 125 countries with varying time spams.
To ease exposition, in this subsection I use a balanced subset of 104 countries that
received a score on the index for 10 years each5. Table 6.3 presented below shows
the ten first and last countries in the ranking of these 104 countries. In the third
column the 10 year averaged country score is depicted6. The U.S. has the highest
score, amounting to 7.8 and it is followed by countries that are generally seen scor-
ing high on other governance indexes, as would be expected. On the other hand, in
the lowest position come countries mostly from sub Saharan Africa, such as Sierra
Leone and Burundi with scores lower than 2. Change in the score of the index is
perhaps more interesting than the score itself. Column 4 depicts the change of the
score for each country (in percentages) and column 5 and 6 decompose this change
to the two constitutive dimensions of the index. Most of the change in the data can
be attributed to changes in the first component extracted connected to control or
the internal aspects of Sovereignty. Countries in the lower ranks have scored great
improvement in their score particularly through the betterment of Internal State
capacities.
The final column indicates the qualitative7 change in the variable of trans border
control. There is a special interest in that variable since, as stated earlier, according
to some interdependence theorists, we would expect most of the signs to be negat-
ive, as the effect of Globalization would be to worsen international flows control.
Here 50 out of 104 countries have positive signs casting some initial skepticism on
the claim that States cannot handle the increase in transnational flows.
4 Results are available upon request
5 Since much of the analysis here is based on averages within categories an unbalanced panel would
lead to changes in averages due to the changing number of countries in the sample. In the next chapter,
when this index is used to assess the relationship between Globalization and Sovereignty I use all avail-
able countries
6 The index ranges from zero to ten due to the normalization of the data prior to the weighting proced-
ure.
7 I present only the sign of the resulting change in this variable rather than the actual magnitude. The
reason for that is that if I choose to calculate that change relatively to the overall change, (i.e. how much
that variable contributed to the overall change in the index) the numbers would be quite small for most
of the countries.
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Table 6.3. Table containing the first and last countries of the ranking
Rank Country Score Total Change Internal change External Change Flows Control Change
1 United States 7,82 -9,8 -10,7 0,9 -
2 Finland 7,36 4,92 4,59 0,33 +
3 Japan 7,24 -12,44 -11,36 -1,07 -
4 Sweden 7,21 3,41 3,17 0,24 +
5 Netherlands 7,2 -2,37 -2,3 -0,06 +
6 Germany 7,14 -2,09 -1,55 -0,54 +
7 Canada 7,13 -1,42 -1,4 -0,02 +
8 Switzerland 7,02 1,43 1,34 0,09 +
9 Norway 7,01 1,37 1,22 0,15 +
10 France 6,98 -8,43 -8,14 -0,29 -
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... .....
95 Uganda 2,66 -19,11 -19,14 0,03 -
96 Cameroon 2,58 35,22 35,43 -0,21 +
97 Niger 2,54 15,02 15 0,02 +
98 Nepal 2,35 -17,28 -18,74 1,46 +
99 Nigeria 2,31 -31,86 -32,39 0,54 -
100 Congo, Rep. 2,13 -4,43 -4,88 0,45 +
101 Myanmar 2 10,69 8,63 2,06 +
102 Chad 1,63 -3,94 -3,96 0,02 +
103 Burundi 1,51 75,91 74,33 1,58 +
104 Sierra Leone 1,43 104,27 102,54 1,73 +
Next, I assess the relationship between the score on the Sovereignty index and
its change. Under the assumption of an omnipotent Globalization, no such rela-
tionship should exist. All countries should be equally affected by the phenomenon
regardless of their State capacity. A useful analogy is Feldstein and Horioka (Feld-
stein & Horioka, 1980). Just as saving rates and investment would not be correlated
under the assumption of perfect capital mobility, Sovereignty should not be per-
sistent. To test this, I plot the absolute value of change (column four in the previous
table) against the average Sovereignty score for each country (column three). There
is an obvious negative correlation between the two variables. That is, regardless of
the direction of change (positive or negative), weaker States experienced more of
it, as one would expect, than stronger ones. The t-test reported in the figure is high
enough to confirm the significance of this correlation.
This is a further indication that Sovereignty is a persistent variable, if States
were really left to the mercy of Globalization, there should be no correlation between
State strength and change thereof. Of course, at this point we could assume that the
two outliers, Burundi and Sierra Leonne, are driving these results. For that reason
I present the same scatter plot only this time excluding the two countries from the
sample. The main conclusion is unaffected.
To get a better picture of how countries are distributed within the index I ag-
gregate the State Sovereignty scores using three grouping variables; Income cat-
egory, Material Power and the region of the country. Information on what coun-
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Figure 6.2. Scatterplot of average Sovereignty and absolute Change, full Sample
and outliers excluded
tries are included within the different groups is given in the appendix. Figure 6.4
presents the average score within different income categories, as they are defined
by the World Bank, based on per capita GDP of the latest year in the data set. Scores
for the high income countries are significantly higher than those of the other cat-
egories. Moreover, the overall score on the Sovereignty index has been reason-
ably stable for the high and medium-high income countries. Low income countries
where the only countries that gained on the overall score, while the medium-low
income countries have been fluctuating around the same mean.
Subsequently, I calculate the average score on the index for three different groups
of countries based on their score on the Composite Indicator of National Capabil-
ity. Since this indicator is part of the State Sovereignty index, the focus is on the
evolution of the score among the different groups rather than the score itself. States
with high and medium level material capabilities experienced an increase in their
Sovereignty score until the year 2000 and after that experienced either a continued
decrease (medium level countries) or an initial decrease followed by a fluctuation
around a fixed point (high level countries). Weaker States, experienced more or less
the same increase until 2000 followed by a small drop in 2001 however after that
they experienced a constant increase in their score. Nevertheless, given the con-
dense scaling of the graph, the distances between the three groups are very small.
For example, between weak and powerful countries there is a roughly 0.7 points
difference on a 1-10 scale (i.e. about 7 per cent).
Finally, the last figure compares Sovereignty scores between different geograph-
ical regions. Visually, one can distinguish between three different clusters of re-
gions. Western and East Asian countries have the highest scores on the index while
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the opposite is true for African and South Asian countries scoring half as much in
the index. The rest of the countries cluster in the area between the two extremes
with a score ranging from 4 to 5. What is again obvious is that there is not much
noticeable fluctuation for the different groups.
Figure 6.3. Sovereignty score by a) Income Category, b) Material Capabilities, and
c) Region
To sum up the results thus far, then the picture seen is not as grim as portrayed
by some scholars. The majority of the countries experienced a small or medium
increase in their levels of State Sovereignty (with Sierra Leone and Burundi scor-
ing the highest change) attributed mostly to their increased capacity to effectively
govern their territories. Those countries undergoing a decline in their score - in
this sample 43 out of 104 - are on average registering much smaller change. With
the exception of Nigeria, all other countries in this category lose fewer than 20 per
cent of their score with the majority being under 10 per cent. Table 6.4 sums up
the trends in score change by income group. On average, the trend has been an
increase in Sovereignty rather than a decline. High income countries have been
rather stable as a category also the medium income countries have experienced a
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small and positive percentage of change. On the other hand, low income have on
the average experienced a much higher increase in their scores and just like for the
other categories, improvements in the effectiveness of their governance, the first
component of the index, have been the main drivers of this change.
Table 6.4. Average Score Change by Income Category
Income Category Score Change Internal Sovereignty External Sovereignty Flows Control Change Number Of Countries
High 0,81 0,31 0,5 + 41
Medium High 6,44 5,2 1,25 + 35
Medium Low 5,71 4,88 0,83 - 23
Low 25,67 24,68 1 + 5
6.3.4 Comparison with existing Indexes
As an external validation, I compare the index to the three existing indexes de-
scribed in the previous subsection. Since time spans are very different among the
indexes I compare their time averaged values. Figure 6.4 below presents the relev-
ant scatter plots. There is a positive and significant correlation of my index with
all other indexes. The correlation coefficients range between 0.76 for the BTI index,
0.75for the PA index and 0.92 for the State failure index.
It thus seems that all indexes capture some similar aspects but they also differ
in some ways. For that reason in the next chapter I present the correlation between
my preferred measure of economic Globalization and each of these indexes as a
robustness check. Nevertheless, as stated earlier the index calculated in this chapter
provides the greatest coverage in terms of time span and so it is the main index used
in the next chapter.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter addressed the challenge of calculating an adequate measure of State
Sovereignty in order to address the gap between theoretical and empirical research
on the subject. State Sovereignty was defined as the regulative capacity of a State.
In particular, its ability to provide and enforce rules internally while being unaf-
fected and recognized as the sole authority by other States. Methodologically, the
approach was based on principal components analysis where a priori identified
variables are aggregated into a composite index. The sample covers 124, but the
preliminary results here were concentrated on 104 countries over a period of 10
years. Results indicate that high income/western countries enjoy a greater degree
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Figure 6.4. Scatterplots between all indexes of Stateness
of Sovereignty compared with the rest of the world. Furthermore, the scores are rel-
atively stable for the majority of the countries although a few low income/material
capabilities countries seem to have gained marginally in their overall score.
Regarding within-country change in scores, most of the variation can be attrib-
uted to internal aspects of Sovereignty (e.g. corruption, political stability and gov-
ernment effectiveness) for all countries in the sample. In addition, the ability of
States to manage transnational trade flows has not been deteriorating to the point
that some scholars have proposed. Almost half of the countries in the sample have
registered a positive change in this aspect of Sovereignty. In the next chapter, the
calculated index is used to investigate how States create the Institutional frame-
work within which Globalization is embedded.
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Table 6.5. Predicted Corruption
VARIABLES Corruption
Freedom to Trade 8,919***
(10,732)
Intern. Capital Market Control 1,688***
(6,086)






Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Please note, all variables were linearly inter-
polated (for 1996-2000) before the estimation
Figure 6.5. Parallel Analysis
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Table 6.6. Index Ranking By Country
Rank Country Score Total Change Internal change External Change Flows Control Change
1 United States 7,82 -9,8 -10,7 0,9 -
2 Finland 7,36 4,92 4,59 0,33 +
3 Japan 7,24 -12,44 -11,36 -1,07 -
4 Sweden 7,21 3,41 3,17 0,24 +
5 Netherlands 7,2 -2,37 -2,3 -0,06 +
6 Germany 7,14 -2,09 -1,55 -0,54 +
7 Canada 7,13 -1,42 -1,4 -0,02 +
8 Switzerland 7,02 1,43 1,34 0,09 +
9 Norway 7,01 1,37 1,22 0,15 +
10 France 6,98 -8,43 -8,14 -0,29 -
11 Austria 6,95 -2,04 -2,2 0,16 +
12 United Kingdom 6,91 -2,96 -3,62 0,66 +
13 Denmark 6,9 1,69 1,21 0,48 +
14 New Zealand 6,88 3,42 2,88 0,53 +
15 Belgium 6,86 -5,43 -5,19 -0,24 -
16 Australia 6,81 6,79 6,3 0,48 +
17 Ireland 6,66 11,05 10,34 0,71 +
18 Portugal 6,63 -1,26 -1,88 0,62 +
19 Spain 6,53 4,46 3,96 0,5 +
20 Singapore 6,51 2 1,65 0,36 +
21 Italy 6,34 -8,05 -8,43 0,37 -
22 Chile 6,05 19,19 18,82 0,37 +
23 United Arab Emirates 6,04 -5,6 -6,04 0,44
24 Slovenia 6,01 7,91 6,01 1,9 +
25 Hungary 5,95 5,08 4,26 0,82 -
26 Korea, Rep. 5,91 1,85 1,18 0,67 -
27 Greece 5,89 1,36 0,88 0,49 +
28 Uruguay 5,81 3,56 2,94 0,62 +
29 Poland 5,76 -2,48 -3,19 0,71 -
30 Cyprus 5,75 -1,29 -1,83 0,53 -
31 Costa Rica 5,73 6,26 5,05 1,21 +
32 Czech Republic 5,65 6,05 5,64 0,42 +
33 Estonia 5,63 15,66 13,87 1,8 +
34 Oman 5,61 1,63 0,49 1,14 -
35 Kuwait 5,55 -5,38 -5,45 0,07 -
36 Bahrain 5,53 -5,47 -5,91 0,44 -
37 Argentina 5,39 -9,91 -10,42 0,51 -
38 Slovak Republic 5,3 3,56 1,86 1,71 -
39 Lithuania 5,22 18,97 16,47 2,5 +
40 Malaysia 5,2 -1,15 -1,64 0,48 -
41 China 5,18 14,4 6,06 8,34 -
42 Trinidad and Tobago 5,04 -5,64 -6,35 0,71 -
43 Botswana 5,01 9,33 8,35 0,99 +
44 Latvia 4,97 30,67 28,41 2,26 +
45 Brazil 4,93 7,27 6,01 1,26 -
46 Thailand 4,88 -19,38 -19,68 0,31 -
47 Jamaica 4,88 -9,11 -9,61 0,49 -
48 Croatia 4,86 8,95 6,77 2,18 -
49 Mexico 4,85 11,65 10,32 1,33 -
50 Tunisia 4,81 1,34 1,21 0,13 -
51 Bulgaria 4,74 23,91 22,72 1,19 +
52 Namibia 4,7 -6,63 -8,39 1,76 -
53 Morocco 4,69 7,09 6,84 0,25 -
54 Panama 4,52 7,73 6,33 1,4 -
55 Romania 4,45 1,09 0,84 0,25 -
56 Dominican Republic 4,41 6,35 4,55 1,8 -
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Table 6.6. Index Ranking By Country
Rank Country Score Total Change Internal change External Change Flows Control Change
57 Jordan 4,41 18,95 17,44 1,51 +
58 El Salvador 4,38 1,81 0,98 0,83 -
59 Gabon 4,37 0,12 0,56 -0,44 -
60 Fiji 4,27 -3 -3,82 0,82 +
61 Israel 4,22 10,03 9,69 0,34 +
62 Ghana 4,15 -8,51 -8,52 0 -
63 Russian Federation 4,04 -2,01 -0,06 -1,95 -
64 Turkey 4,01 5,68 5,56 0,12 -
65 Senegal 3,87 -2,49 -2,5 0,01 -
66 Egypt, Arab Rep. 3,86 -8,09 -7,99 -0,11 -
67 South Africa 3,85 17,29 14,21 3,07 -
68 Albania 3,73 18,7 17,58 1,12 +
69 Venezuela, RB 3,71 -1,15 -1,81 0,66 +
70 Honduras 3,71 3,76 2,57 1,19 -
71 Bolivia 3,68 -7,59 -9,67 2,08 -
72 India 3,65 35,72 32,47 3,25 +
73 Guyana 3,61 -1,73 -2,54 0,81 -
74 Benin 3,6 -15,63 -16,37 0,74 -
75 Ecuador 3,53 -12,36 -13,46 1,1 -
76 Sri Lanka 3,43 -4,18 -4,97 0,79 -
77 Madagascar 3,43 17,3 16,74 0,56 -
78 Peru 3,42 20,94 19,43 1,51 +
79 Syrian Arab Republic 3,39 29,94 30,04 -0,1 +
80 Malawi 3,37 2,63 3 -0,37 +
81 Philippines 3,34 4,88 3,38 1,5 +
82 Tanzania 3,34 9,45 8,69 0,76 -
83 Guatemala 3,22 8,9 7,42 1,48 -
84 Nicaragua 3,21 38,32 36,8 1,52 +
85 Kenya 3,16 -10,61 -11,83 1,22 -
86 Algeria 3,03 -1,63 -3,2 1,57 -
87 Pakistan 2,96 -17,57 -18,62 1,04 -
88 Colombia 2,95 23,37 20,42 2,95 +
89 Mali 2,94 18,34 17,51 0,83 +
90 Zimbabwe 2,93 -18,13 -18,48 0,35 +
91 Indonesia 2,89 19,12 18,52 0,6 -
92 Iran, Islamic Rep. 2,69 19,45 17,72 1,73 +
93 Haiti 2,68 -9,64 -10,51 0,88 -
94 Bangladesh 2,67 31,73 30,03 1,69 -
95 Uganda 2,66 -19,11 -19,14 0,03 -
96 Cameroon 2,58 35,22 35,43 -0,21 +
97 Niger 2,54 15,02 15 0,02 +
98 Nepal 2,35 -17,28 -18,74 1,46 +
99 Nigeria 2,31 -31,86 -32,39 0,54 -
100 Congo, Rep. 2,13 -4,43 -4,88 0,45 +
101 Myanmar 2 10,69 8,63 2,06 +
102 Chad 1,63 -3,94 -3,96 0,02 +
103 Burundi 1,51 75,91 74,33 1,58 +
104 Sierra Leone 1,43 104,27 102,54 1,73 +
Table 6.8. Correlations




Effectiveness 0.7367 0.6927 1.000
Legitimacy 0.7704 0.6336 0.8021 1.000
IOs 0.2943 0.4544 0.3899 0.3081 1.000
Material Capabilities 0.0287 0.1033 0.0958 0.1150 0.2378 1.000
Control 0.4989 0.8180 0.3968 0.3377 0.1983 0.0569 1.000
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Table 6.9. Countries By Income Category
High Income Medium High Medium Low Low
Argentina Lithuania Albania Panama Bangladesh Myanmar
Australia Malaysia Algeria Peru Bolivia Burundi
Austria Oman Botswana Philippines Cameroon Madagascar
Bahrain Netherlands Brazil Romania Chad Niger
Belgium New Zealand Bulgaria Russian Fed. Congo, Rep. Tanzania
Canada Norway Sri Lanka South Africa Benin
Chile Poland China Thailand Ghana
Croatia Portugal Colombia Tunisia Guyana
Cyprus Singapore Costa Rica Turkey Haiti
Czech Rep. Slovak Rep. Dominican Rep. Egypt, Arab Rep. Honduras
Denmark Slovenia Ecuador Uruguay India
Estonia Spain El Salvador Venezuela, RB Kenya
Finland Sweden Fiji Malawi
France Switzerland Gabon Mali
Germany Trinidad and Tobago Guatemala Nepal
Greece United Arab Emirates Indonesia Romania Nicaragua
Hungary United Kingdom Iran, Islamic Rep. Russian Fed. Nigeria
Ireland United States Jamaica South Africa Pakistan
Israel Jordan Thailand Senegal
Italy Latvia Tunisia Sierra Leone
Japan Mexico Turkey Zimbabwe
Korea,Rep. Morocco Egypt, Arab Rep. Syrian Arab Rep.
Kuwait Namibia Uruguay Uganda
Table 6.10. Countries By National Capabilities
High Medium Low
Algeria Malaysia Austria Oman Albania Nicaragua
Argentina Mexico Bolivia Nepal Bahrain Niger
Australia Morocco Bulgaria New Zealand Botswana Panama
Bangladesh Netherlands Cameroon Norway Burundi Sierra Leone
Belgium Nigeria Sri Lanka Peru Congo, Rep. Slovenia
Brazil Pakistan Chad Portugal Costa Rica Trinidad and Tobago
Myanmar Philippines Croatia Senegal Cyprus Uruguay
Canada Poland Czech Rep. Slovak Rep. Benin Nicaragua
Chile Romania Denmark Zimbabwe Estonia Niger
China Russian Dominican Rep. Sweden Fiji Panama
Colombia Singapore Ecuador Switzerland Gabon Sierra Leone
France South Africa El Salvador United Arab Emirates Guyana Slovenia
Germany Spain Finland Tunisia Haiti Trinidad and Tobago
Greece Syrian AR Ghana Uganda Honduras Uruguay
India Thailand Guatemala Tanzania Jamaica
Indonesia Turkey Hungary Latvia
Iran Egypt AR Ireland Lithuania
Israel U.K. Jordan New Zealand Malawi
Italy U.S. Kenya Norway Mali
Japan Venezuela Kuwait Peru Namibia
Korea, Rep. Madagascar Portugal
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Table 6.11. Countries By Region
Western East. Europ. Latin Am. Arab Africa East East Asia South Asia Caribbean Pacific
Australia Albania Argentina Algeria Botswana China Myanmar Bangladesh Guyana Fiji
Austria Bulgaria Bolivia Bahrain Burundi Japan Indonesia Sri Lanka Haiti
Belgium Croatia Brazil Iran, Islamic Rep. Cameroon Korea, Rep. Malaysia India Jamaica
Canada Czech Rep. Chile Israel Chad Philippines Nepal Trinidad and Tobago
Cyprus Estonia Colombia Jordan Congo, Rep. Singapore Pakistan Caribbean
Denmark Hungary CostaRica Kuwait Benin Thailand South Asia Guyana
Finland Latvia Dominican Rep. Morocco Gabon Bangladesh Haiti
France Lithuania Ecuador Oman Ghana Sri Lanka Jamaica
Germany Poland El Salvador Syrian Arab Rep. Kenya India Trinidad and Tobago
Greece Romania Guatemala United Arab Emirates Madagascar Nepal Caribbean
Ireland Russian Fed. Honduras Tunisia Malawi Pakistan Guyana
Italy Slovak Republic Mexico Turkey Mali Haiti
Netherlands Slovenia Nicaragua Egypt, Arab Rep. Namibia Jamaica
New Zealand Panama Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Norway Peru Nigeria
Portugal Uruguay Senegal





Table 6.12. Variables used in the index construction and validation
Variables Definitions Source
IO memberships Codes information about membership in intergovernmental organiza-







Contains annual values for total population, urban population, iron and
steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and milit-
ary expenditure of all State members, currently from 1816-2007. The
widely-used Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) index is
based on these six variables.
Singer et al (1972)
Openness related
Control
Is the residual from a regression of three openness related variables on
corruption and proxies the ability of a State to control the effects of in-
ternational flows.
Own Estimates
Political Stability Measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power
will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or
violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.
Kaufmann et al
(2008)
Corruption This factor relies on Transparency International’s Corruption Percep-













Codes the operational existence of a separate polity, or polities, com-
prising substantial territory and population within the recognized bor-
ders of the State and over which the coded polity exercises no effective
authority (effective authority may be participatory or coercive)
Marshall and Jag-
gers (2002)
Internal Conflict Conflicts occurring between the government of a State and internal op-





The mean value of the ICRG variables Corruption, Law and Order and





Rule of Law Measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by therules of society. These include perceptions of the
Kaufmann et al
(2008)
incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary,
and the enforceability of contracts.
Regulatory Quality Measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price
controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the








Ever since the 80’s academics and popular commentators alike have noticed and
commented upon the rapid increase with which national economies are becom-
ing more and more interconnected. Reservations have been expressed that this
rapid transformation of the economic scenery is taking place on the expense of the
established political system as non-State actors are becoming progressively more
prominent players in the international arena. In particular, Globalization is said
to challenge the very existence of the nation-state. This belief is mostly based on
observations of increased flows that ultimately lead to a policy competition among
nation-states decreasing the choices available to policy makers.
A great deal of research has been conducted on the subject by a diverse set of
social scientists. According to several authors, increased mobility of goods, capital,
as well as information is making it harder for the State to control developments
within its territory and, to some extent, exercise its authority. Interestingly, an equi-
valent number of equally competent -but less pessimistic- researchers offered sev-
eral reasons why this may not be the case. Theoretical argumentation, fundamental
and insightful as it might be, has not yielded a decisive answer on whether pess-
imism or optimism is the most appropriate position in this debate. Are we really
witnessing the end of the nation-state? This Gordian knot is far from untangled.
In this chapter I revisit this debate in two ways. First, I discuss critically the
standard Liberal and Realist theoretical approaches. I argue that they both concep-
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tualize “the State” and “the markets” in a very abstract way that renders the two
concepts mutually exclusive. To that I juxtapose an Institutional approach where
the level of economic integration of each country depends on its capacity to regulate
and enforce rules conducive to economic transactions. Secondly, and for the first
time in this debate, I test two hypotheses -one derived from the Liberal perspective
and the other from the Institutional perspective- using quantitative techniques. As
argued elsewhere, there is a notable absence of quantitative approaches in this de-
bate (Thomson, 1995). In this chapter I use the index of State Sovereignty calculated
in the previous chapter in order to provide some quantitative evidence on the exist-
ence, and direction of the relationship, between Globalization and Sovereignty. The
focus is on the importance of local Institutions as a precondition for Globalization.
To answer these questions I follow the approach of Campos and Nugent (2002)
and Jong-A-Pin (2009), among others. Using a Granger causality framework, res-
ults support a causal link running from Sovereignty to Globalization as more plaus-
ible rather than the opposite direction. Furthermore, since Globalization is a pro-
cess, rather than a static phenomenon, I also test this relationship using changes
rather than levels as motivated in Garrett (2001). Allowing for simultaneity between
Globalization and Sovereignty, I arrive at results corroborating those of the Granger
test. Thus, States are not in retreat. Economic Globalization presupposes the exist-
ence of a supportive institutional framework and States, among other organizations
contribute towards the creation and enforcement of this framework.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of
the main theoretical approaches in the literature, and adds an Institutional view. It
also states the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents the data used and sections
4 and 5 are devoted to the description of the empirical approach and presentation
of results. Section 6 concludes.
7.2 Literature Review
7.2.1 The Liberal View: Losing Control?
The Globalization debate is a dialog between believers in the power of the “mar-
kets” and the power of “the State”. Alternatively, it is a debate between scholars
influenced by Liberalism and Realism. In this subsection I review the main argu-
ments of the former. As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, Liberals
are preoccupied with the effects that Globalization has on the importance of the na-
tional State as the main form of economic and political organization. In this view,
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Globalization is conceptualized as the increase in economic interdependence and
the rise of non-State actors as de facto loci of authority. Furthermore, Globalization
is seen as an exogenous force, naturally arising from the advance of technologies
that empower non-State actors and enable further (economic) integration.
Perhaps the most widely read book on this matter is Friedman (2006) where the
author puts forth his ’Golden Straightjacket’ hypothesis. According to this view,
once a government opens up to the world “two things tend to happen: your eco-
nomy grows and your politics shrinks. Once your country puts on the Golden
Straitjacket, its political choices get reduced to Pepsi or Coke”. (2006, p. 87).
Already, through the 70’s and early 80’s, a group of scholars belonging to the liberal
interdependence theory criticized the centrality of the State in international affairs.
Their view was that the State is increasingly becoming less able to control flows
of all kinds (e.g., people, information, money) as new technological advancements
enable non- or sub-State actors to circumvent the nation’s control seems (Thomson,
1995). Recent writings agree with this view and further point out that there is a con-
tinuous delegation of powers from the State to non-State actors or the market, and
a spread of new norms such as human rights that are directly connected to Glob-
alization and dispute Sovereignty (Jayasuriya, 2002; Beeson, 2003). Sassen (1996)
explains how the rise of transnational institutions and regimes, such as multina-
tional corporations and credit-rating agencies, emerged as independent sources of
authority. These global players shift Sovereignty from its center, the State, and in
certain cases -for instance export processing zones- denationalize territories1.
Most of this argument is based on evidence showing how non-State actors are
challenging traditional State functions. Ohmae (1995) argues that the nation-state
is becoming obsolete because it is no longer the optimal unit for organizing eco-
nomic activity. In his view, the birth of nation-states was the result of bourgeois’
desire to provide a stable organizational structure for industrial production. With
the advance of Globalization (i.e. economic integration), owing to advances in in-
formation technology, local firms need no more attach themselves to their State.
They can “plug-in” to the global and regional markets for the necessary inputs of
production. All that States can do about that is render their territories unattractive
by trying to regulate them. Strange (1996) reenforces this notion. If firms are im-
portant enough to decide “who-gets-what” in the world economy, which functions
are left for the nation-state to perform? The same argumentation applies to other
1 Nevertheless, she notices that it is not a zero-sum game between States and Globalization, nor are the
two concepts mutually exclusive. In that sense, while she illustrates one of the main point of Liberalism
she is not a liberalist her self.
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non-State actors like NGO’s as mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis.
In summary, technology empowers transnational economic activity. Non-State
actors’ activities surpass national borders and gain so much importance that they
can now redirect the policy choices of their home nation-states. Thus, the later
retreat and the scope and ability to provide effective government is diminishing.
7.2.2 The Realist Respond: Where we Ever Fully in Control?
On the antipode, one finds a group of researchers who believe that nation-states
are not to be extinct any time soon. Although most of the writers in this group
do recognize that Globalization imposes a challenge to the State the main critique
to the previous group is focused on two points. The first point is that the belief
that the State is facing unprecedented challenges is historically myopic. Only by
referring to -or creating a- mythical era where the States were omnipotent can the
critic of Sovereignty erosion be valid (P. Q. Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Krasner, 2001;
Wolf, 2001). The argument here is that Globalization has reached similar and by
some standards even greater levels in the past. Consequently, the attack on Sov-
ereignty through interdependence and large flows between States is nothing new.
Thus, follows the conclusion, that, if nation States managed to survive that -at least
qualitatively- similar challenge, why shouldn’t it overcome the one it faces now?
Economic historians have written extensively on the subject (O’Rourke & Wil-
liamson, 2000; Bordo et al., 2005) and the main consensus is that not only Global-
ization is nothing new as evident from the movement of people, commodities and
money in previews eras, but drawing from the lesson of the interwar period it can
also be reversible should the politics of the States wish it to be. The idea that Glob-
alization is a consequence of State activity rather than a force exogenous to it is not
new in this debate (Thomson, 1995) and it is supported by recent empirical studies
that conclude that Globalization has political limits (Acemoglu & Yared, 2010). In
this view, an increasingly globalized economy reflects nothing more than the chan-
ging role and policy choices of States. Cohen (2001) argues that the international
organizations and policies put in effect after the post-1945 Western economic alli-
ance marked a change of the main purposes of the State that reflected a shift from
the idea that the State was there to provide protection against economic competi-
tion and risk to the active promotion of economic Globalization. With the global
economy depending on and being controlled by the State and its multilateral insti-
tutions and agreements, Cohen argues that Sovereignty and the State will be with
us in a decisive way.
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The second critique on the erosion of Sovereignty is that several scholars have
taken Sovereignty to mean just the effective control of the State on a number of
its functions and that is wrong on two accounts. On the one hand, there is again
a historical reason. Never did the State have ultimate control over its affairs, and
therefore we cannot claim that it has been eroding (Thomson, 1995). And on the
other hand, Sovereignty is more than control, it is also about authority. The ques-
tion according, to Thomson, is whether ultimate political authority has been taken
away from the State. In some sense, authority has been increasing through inter-
national cooperation as a measure against the loss of control by individual States
(Krasner, 1999b). The States identity is rooted in authority and this is unchanged by
any loss of effective control. Adopting an understanding of Sovereignty as encom-
passing both “State authority” and “State control”, Axford (1995, p. 136-7) contents
that Sovereignty is not about how much control (read: effective governance) one
State possess over internal affairs, but rather, whether it has the right to exercise its
functions without interference by other States (or, one might add, non-State actors).
Thus, to summarize the Realist position, States never had ultimate control over
their territories. The challenges of modern Globalization are not necessarily greater
than those of earlier stages of Globalization. Hence, so long as States possess ulti-
mate authority over their territories, they will remain the basic players in the inter-
national system.
7.2.3 An Institutionalist Account: Reading between the lines.
Despite their great differences, both the Liberal and Realist perspectives share a ba-
sic assumption. They conceptualize “the State” and “the markets” as abstract con-
ceptual units of analysis, rather than empirically relevant entities. This mentality of
the “Great Divide” between the “internal” and “external” realms (cf. Clark, 1999),
masks a great deal of heterogeneity among States in terms of their structure and
capabilities. Even more so, it treats both State strength and economic integration
as dichotomous indicators, rather than variables. Some States can govern their ter-
ritories more efficiently than others. In addition, some States are more globalized,
meaning that their economies are more open to economic flows. This heterogeneity
can be problematic for both theories.
In particular, since the Liberals see Globalization as a zero-sum game between
“the State” and “the market”, they predict that increases in the level of economic
integration lead to losses of governing capacity for all States involved. There cannot
be anything but a negative relationship between the two, more so since the Liber-
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als’ focus is on the de facto functioning of the State. As non-State actors take over
traditional functions of the State the latter should be loosing it’s effectiveness, and,
by extrapolation, it’s very legitimacy. Yet, a simple look at the data tells us that the
most globalized (in any meaning of the term) States are also those with the best
scores on any governance indicator.
For Realists on the other hand, all that matters is that there exists a hegemonic
State that provides the will (and muscle) to promote a global climate conducive to
trade and finance. Nevertheless this does not guaranty that all other States in the
system, particularly those with weak institutional structures, will integrate or be-
nefit from the system. Hence, the Realists have a point only if we equate “the State”
with the hegemon of the system, and disregard all other State entities in it. Con-
cluding that “the State” is doing well only by observing the hegemon States would
be as tedious as any conclusion drawn by focusing only on the developments that
are taking place in failing States.
To make better sense of this debate, it is useful to stop treating the internal and
external realms as mutually exclusive and allow for interaction between the two.
Any activity, no matter how global, takes place one way or another within some
national territory. As such, for the global to materialist there must be a support-
ing framework working at the local level. States do not just retreat in the face of
Globalization but they participate in it by setting up the framework that encour-
ages economic integration (Sassen, 2000). Even prominent spokesmen of Realism
acknowledge that Globalization presupposes States that are capable of providing
effective government (Krasner, 2004).
The main proposition of this dissertation is that Globalization is not an ab-
stract phenomenon that happens somewhere “out there”, as is often conceptual-
ized. Rather, it is the aggregate of the interaction between agents whose activities
cross national boarders. Examples are trade of good and capital flows. These agents
need to organize their activities around an exchange that takes place beyond their
home base, and might involve interaction with unfamiliar partners in large foreign
(i.e., anonymous) markets. As such, a good amount of information is needed to
ensure these transactions will take place and will be beneficial for all in order to
give incentives to the agents to continue interacting.
Institutional structures, conceptualized here as the rules of the games, can min-
imize the informational costs of doing business abroad and provide the right in-
centives for agents to interact (D. C. North, 1992). Furthermore, they constrain and
regularize behavior thus creating a predictable environments conducive to eco-
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nomic transaction. The creation, and effective enforcement, of this institutional
framework hinges on the existence of an authority structure able to regulate rules,
enforce them, and manipulate sanctions (Scott, 2008). The (national) State is that
authority structure. Hence the scope and size of transnational economic activity is
constrained, or enabled, by each State’s capacity to provide effective governance.
There is ample evidence that the institutional framework is important for both
trade and FDI volumes and its importance rivals that of physical infrastructure. The
enforcement of property rights decreases insecurity associated with international
trade and solid institutional infrastructures can act as a comparative advantage
(e.g., Anderson & Marcouiller, 2002; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Levchenko, 2007). The
same argument is valid for FDI flows(e.g., Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Kinoshita &
Campos, 2003; Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al., 2007). The main insight from this literature is
that States with the capacity to provide, effective, uncorrupted, and highly legitim-
ated governance are more integrated to the global economy. The index developed
in the previous chapter captures these institutional prerequisites for economic in-
tegration in the first sub-component called “Internal Sovereignty”. The govern-
ment effectiveness, it’s legitimacy vis-a´-vis its people, its ability to control the way
things run by eliminating corruption are all parts of the State Sovereignty index.
With the index in hand we can now test the relationship between economic
Globalization and State Sovereignty by resorting to standard econometric meth-
ods. The questions we need to answer is whether this relationship is positive or
negative and furthermore which way is it more plausible that causality runs? The
different camps of this debate have some clearly conflicting views on what the an-
swer to these questions is. Untangling these questions will help make sense of this
debate. I concentrate on the two competing hypotheses coming from the Liberal
and Institutionalist views:
• Hypothesis 1a : If the Liberalists are correct, we expect that causality runs
from Globalization to State Sovereignty and the sign of this relationship is
negative.
• Hypothesis 1b: If the Institutional view is correct, I expect causality to run
from State Sovereignty to Globalization and the relationship to be positive.
Next section presents the results for these hypotheses along with a discussion
of the methodology.
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7.3 Sovereignty and Globalization: Data and Method
7.3.1 Data and Method
Estimating the effect of economic Globalization on Sovereignty is an econometric
challenge. One of the issues is the absence of a comprehensible model from which
to deduct the equation to be estimated. For that reason, the baseline model includes
a number of variables that appear as standard control variables in similar studies.
The overall aim is to include those variables that both reduce omitted variable bias
but at the same time are recognized as correlates of Sovereignty.
First, I control for the level of development for each country by using GDP per
capita. Income is a determinant of trade volumes as shown by the gravity equation
(Anderson, 1979) and at the same time it is also considered to be highly correl-
ated with good governance (Kaufman et al., 2008). I also control for country size
by means of GDP levels. The rationale behind this is that bigger countries can be
harder to control than smaller ones (Fisman & Gatti, 2002). The last control, a meas-
ure of internet users for every country, is used to proxy for the flow of information.
The importance of this variable is evident, among others, in Friedman (2006) where
the role of the IT revolution is portrait as one of the channels from which Glob-
alization affects the autonomy of the State. In addition, IT infrastructure is also
expected to contribute to better governance through, for example, the promotion
of the Rule of Law (Perritt, 1998). Hence, we could expect either sign for this coef-
ficient. Finally, the preferred measure of economic Globalization is the KOF index
of Globalization. This index contains information on actual flows as well as re-
strictions on trade and investment and captures economic Globalization in a wider
sense including both flows as well as policies (Dreher, Gaston & Martens, 2008).
First, the issue of causality is addressed. To answer this question I use the index
produced in the previous chapter and estimate the following equations:








β jEconomicGlobij−1 + β1Xit
+ αi + φt + e1it








β jEconomicGlobit−1 + β1Xit
+ αi + φt + e2it
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where i stands for country, and t for time period. Xit, is a vector of the control
variables described above. Alpha and phi stand for country and time effects, re-
spectively. Furthermore, epsilon one and two are assumed to be uncorrelated. The
first equation suggests that current levels of State Sovereignty depend on its own
past values as well as those of the Economic Globalization index and a number of
controls while the same reasoning is behind the second equation.
The equation is estimated using a dynamic panel specification, particularly the
system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). There are two good reas-
ons for this. Firstly, State Sovereignty is expected to be a highly persistent vari-
able (Krasner, 1988). Using the lag of the dependent variable as a regressor allows
this persistence to be modeled, and separate its effects from country-specific un-
observed heterogeneity. Lastly, this specification allows me to test the causal re-
lationship between State Sovereignty and economic openness by using a Granger
causality test as proposed by Campos and Nugent (2002) and Jong-a-Ping (2009),
among others.
When using the Granger test, four outcomes are possible (see for example Gu-
jarati (1995, p. 697)):
1. Unidirectional Causality from Globalization to Sovereignty. In this case, the
lagged values of the former in the first equation will be jointly significant
while the lags of Sovereignty will not be jointly significant in the second equa-
tion.
2. Equivalently, if we find the opposite results, then we find unidirectional caus-
ality from Sovereignty to Globalization
3. Bilateral causality, when lags are significant in both estimations.
4. And finally, independence when none of them is jointly significant
The validity of the results depends on a number of assumptions. Particularly
all information about the relationship of the two variables is assumed to be within
their time series. That is, if other variables are driving this relationship then results
are disputable. To deal with this, I control for country specific heterogeneity and
time effects in addition to the other control variables hence mitigating the problem
of omitted variables. Another issue is the length of the lags used since different
lengths can give different results. Given the length of the data and the assumptions
of the system GMM estimator, the lags can be extend for up to two for the endogen-
ous dependent variables and up to five for the lagged variable in either equation.
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Beyond that lag number, the specification diagnostics of the model are not comput-
able hence the quality of the estimation can not be tested.
Before turning to the results, I provide a simple fit of the index of State Sovereignty
together with the three existing indexes of stateness against the variable measuring
economic Globalization. This helps to get a feel of the relationship between meas-
ures of Globalization and Sovereignty at the bivariate level, but also acts as a robust-
ness check for our index against the preexisting ones. These indexes, presented in
the previous chapter in more detail, are; the index of stateness taken by Melville
(2012) (upper right corner), the index of stateness taken by the Bertelsmann Trans-
formation Index project (lower left corner) and the failed states index from the Fund
for Peace (lower right corner). The first scatterplot on the upper left corner is the
index produced in this dissertation. There is a very clear pattern emerging from all
scatterlots, namely that the correlation between economic Globalization and state-
ness, measured in different ways, is positive. Thus I argue that my index conveys a
comparable amount of information regarding State Sovereignty as the preexisting
ones, but substantially increases the time interval available to allow for a test of the
direction of causality -the subject of the next section.
7.4 Results
Table 7.1 shows results from the baseline model. All I use the Internal, External,
and Overall State Sovereignty indexes. The model diagnostics indicate that there
is no indication of misspecification. The test for second degree autocorrelation and
overidentification do not reject their null hypothesis and the number of instruments
is lower than the number of countries. Furthermore, the value of the lagged de-
pendent variable falls within the region bounded by OLS (upward biased) and
within estimation (downward biased)2. A first interpretation is that there is no
significant relationship between Globalization and State Sovereignty. There is no
evidence of economic Globalization Granger-causing State Sovereignty at the one
lag length. In fact the only highly significant regressor is the log of GDP, used as
a measure of size. It receives a negative sign when regressed against the overall
index mostly driven by its negative impact on Internal Sovereignty. Furthermore,
its positive sign on External Sovereignty is to be expected by definition since one of
the items in that component, the Material Capabilities Index, takes under account
the size of the country.
2 Results from OLS and Within estimation are not presented here but are available upon request.
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Figure 7.1. Scatterplots of four indexes on the Economic Globalization variable.
These indexes are (from top left to bottom right): i) The index of State Sov-
ereignty estimated in the previous chapter ii) An index of stateness produced
by Melville et al (2012) iii) An index of stateness produced by the Bertelsmann
Transformation Index and iv) The Failed States Index by the Fund for Peace.
Interestingly, information flow as proxied by internet connections receive some
significance at the 10 per cent level and seems to impact Sovereignty positively
through the second component, internal governance. This lends some support to
the view that the internet is correlated with good governance. Another interest-
ing result is the highly significant estimate of the lagged value of Sovereignty that
attests to the variables persistence.
Next, Table 7.2 is presented depicting the results with causation running from
State Sovereignty to Globalization. Using the same estimation method and control
variables as before I find overall State Sovereignty and its Internal component to
have a significant effect on economic Globalization. States that have a higher de-
gree of State Sovereignty experience higher degrees of Globalization, and given that
I control again for the lagged effect of the dependent variable this hints toward a
Granger causal relationship. With regard to the negative sign on the External com-
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Table 7.1. Sovereignty as Dependent Variable
VARIABLES Dependent Variable







Economic Globalization(t-1) 0.00275 0.00420 -2.52e-05
(0.00258) (0.00322) (0.000595)
Log of real GDP/pc 0.113 0.179 -0.00177
(0.0988) (0.119) (0.00664)
Log of GDP -0.0400** -0.0741** 0.0411**
(0.0185) (0.0292) (0.0179)
Log of Internet Users 0.0471** 0.0637** 0.0071*
(0.0232) (0.0272) (0.00458)
Year Dummies Included Included Included
Constant -0.718 -1.031 -0.147**
(0.620) (0.620) (0.620)
Observations 692 719 1,212
Arellano Bond AR(2) test p-value 0.193 0.165 0.382
Hansen test of overid. p-value 0.696 0.772 0.079
Number of instruments 18 18 41
Number of Countries 102 107 120
System GMM estimations, Windmeijer’s corrected standard errors in parentheses, *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05,
* = p<0.1
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ponent of Globalization, this is according to my expectation. Results in Acemoglu
and Yared(2010) indicate a negative relationship between militarism, proxied by
military size and expenditures, and economic openness. Since most of the variance
in the External component of Sovereignty is due to the Material Capabilities Index
which includes information on militarism, the negative sign was expected. The
control variables have some intuitively appealing interpretations. A higher GDP
per capita and more internet users are positively related to Globalization, while the
size of a country as measured by its GDP receives a negative sign.
Table 7.2. Globalization as Dependent Variable
VARIABLES Dependent Variable
Economic Globalization








Log of real GDP/pc 1.988* 1.594 1.279
-(1.091) (1.008) (1.056)
Log of GDP -1.634*** -1.463*** -0.573*
(0.464) (0.420) (0.333)
Log of Internet Users 1.131*** 1.067*** 0.408**
((0.279) (0.264) (0.179)
Year Dummies Included Included Included
Constant -1-1.787 -0.424 -1.699
(3.748) (3.453) (3.075)
Observations 6693 719 1,214
Arellano Bond AR(2) test p-value 0.813 0.839 0.412
Hansen test of overid. p-value 0.946 0.913 0.964
Number of instruments 14 14 21
Number of Countries 102 107 120
System GMM estimations, Windmeijer’s corrected standard errors in paren-
theses, *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1
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Thus far, results support unidirectional causality running from Sovereignty to
Globalization rather than the other way around. These results support the Insti-
tutional view over the Liberal view. Economic Globalization is a State led phe-
nomenon dependent on the capacity of States to provide the supporting institu-
tional structure it requires. To further investigate this I turn to the issue of lag
length and increase their number in the model. In the tables to come, for economy
of space, I only present information for the value of the joint significance of the lags
included in the model as well as their number, the direction of causality tested, and
whether the hypothesis is supported or rejected. Results can be seen on Table 7.3,
and Table 7.6 in the Appendix.
Table 7.3. Results for One Lag of the Endogenous Variable
Direction of Causality # of Indep. Lags Chi sqr. value Decision
EG→ S 2 1.88 Reject
EG→ S 3 1.89 Reject
EG→ S 4 3.36 Reject
EG→ S 5 4.35 Reject
S→ EG 2 9.45 Do not Reject
S→ EG 3 10.41 Do not Reject
S→ EG 4 10.00 Do not Reject
S→ EG 5 10.74 Reject (at 5%)
EG stands for Economic Globalization, S for Sovereignty. Number of lags of the in-
dependent variable, the value of the test for joint significance and the decision made
upon that value are shown.
The specifications behind the results in Table 7.3 follows that of Tables 7.1 and
7.2 but adds a varying number of lags of either State Sovereignty or Globalization
(as shown in column 2). In Table 7.6 the same logic applies only there I control for
two lags of the dependent variable while increasing the independent lags. Looking
at both tables, the proposition that causality runs from Globalization to Sovereignty
is soundly rejected in all specifications. On the other hand causality running from
Sovereignty to Globalization seems more plausible. In eight out of the nine spe-
cifications this relationship is significant (four of them at the 1% level) while it is
soundly rejected only ones. This further supports the Institutional hypotheses.
7.5 Changes of Globalization
Having dealt with the issue of Granger-causality, I now turn to changes, rather that
the level, of the two main variables. For the Institutional hypothesis to be correct it
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needs to be shown that changes in Sovereignty are significantly and positively cor-
related with changes in Globalization. To asses this relationship I estimate the fol-
lowing equations simultaneously using a three stage least square (3SLS) approach:
∆Sovereigntyi2005−1996 = β0 + β1∆EconomicGlob2005−1996 + β2∆Sovereignty1996
+ β2∆EconomicGlob1996 + β4Xi + β5XiS + e1i
∆Economic.Globi2005−1996 = β0 + β1∆Sovereignty2005−1996 + β2∆EconomicGlob1996
+ β2∆EconomicGlob1996 + β4Xi + β5XiG + e2i
I use as dependent variables the change of Sovereignty and Globalization over the
years 1996-2005. The initial values of these two variables are also included motiv-
ated by my earlier findings regarding the persistence of these variables, and further-
more, to account for the likelihood of convergence. Controls used in the previous
subsection are also included (labeled as Xi in the equations above).
According to the 3SLS requirements I need to include at least one variable that
affects Sovereignty but not Globalization in the first equation while a variable that
affects Globalization but not State Sovereignty directly must be included in the
second equation. For this I choose Ethnic Fractionalization and Polity Fragment-
ation (denoted by XiS) for the first equation. The latter variable is recognized as
a determinant of Sovereignty (Thomson, 1995), while I expect that ceteris paribus
countries with higher levels of ethnic fractionalization experience lower political
stability which is a constitutive part of Sovereignty. Furthermore, the direct effect
of these variables on Globalization is not that straightforward. In the same manner,
I include in the second equation a measure of internal distance as a variable dir-
ectly effecting Globalization (denoted by XiG). All variables used as controls (i.e.
Xi, XiS, XiG) are averaged over the 10 year period of the sample.
Results are presented in Table 7.4 and they are consistent with the results from
the Granger test discussed earlier. Changes of State Sovereignty are significantly
related to changes in Globalization but the reverse is not true. Furthermore, this
relationship bears a positive coefficient consistent with Figure 7.1 and the results
reported in the previous section. Ethnic fractionalization is significantly related
to changes of Sovereignty and has a negative sign as expected. Polity fragment-
ation receives a negative sign after controls are included but remains insignific-
ant throughout. Bigger internal distance is significantly related to lower levels of
Globalization as expected. The failure to reject the overidentifying restrictions in
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Table 7.4. Globalization and Sovereignty using Differences
VARIABLES No Controls With Controls∆ ∆ Econ. ∆ ∆ Econ.
Sovereignty Globalization Sovereignty Globalization
∆ Sovereignty 12.95** 9.278**
(5.106) (4.355)
∆Econ. Globalization -0.0259 -0.0328
(0.0352) (0.0383)
Ethnic Frac. -0.951** -0.924**
(0.434) (0.412)
Polity Fragm. 0.0512 -0.0797
(0.129) (0.154)
Log of Intern Distance -2.240*** -2.735***
(0.850) (0.917)
Sovereignty1996 -0.269*** 3.810*** -0.323*** 1.935
(0.0544) -1.233 (0.0789) -1.327
Econ. Globalization1996 0.00727 -0.440*** 0.00302 -0.409***
(0.00892) (0.0879) (0.0118) (0.0746)
Log of real GDP/pc 0.157 0.350
(0.137) -1.507
Log of GDP 0.00112 -2.893**
(0.156) -1.279
Log of Internet Users -0.0173 3.680***
(0.141) -1.126
Constant 1.608* 25.76*** 1.005 13.86
(0.938) -5.794 (0.890) -9.300
Observations 102 102 99 99
Overid p-value 0.16 0.69
Three stage Least Squares estimation, standard errors in parentheses, *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * =
p<0.1
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both models implies that they are not mispecified. Finally, there is evidence of
convergence both in terms of State Sovereignty and Globalization. Countries with
higher initial values of both variables have experienced a smaller increase implying
a catching up process. Interestingly, the cross effects are not significant, i.e. initial
levels of Globalization do not matter for changes of State Sovereignty while the op-
posite appears to be true in the first specification but as soon as the control variables
are included the results is no more significant. specified. Finally, there is evidence
of convergence both in terms of State Sovereignty and Globalization. Countries
with higher initial values of both variables have experienced a smaller increase im-
plying a catching up process. Interestingly, the cross effects are not significant, i.e.
initial levels of Globalization do not matter for changes of State Sovereignty while
the opposite appears to be true in the first specification but as soon as the control
variables are included the results is no more significant.
Taken together, the results from using both levels and differences point to the
fact that causality is more likely to run from State Sovereignty to Globalization,
rather than the opposite. Furthermore, this relationship is positive. If Globalization
is seen as endogenous to the Institutional capacity of the State, the proposition that
it is eroding State Sovereignty (or stateness, the centrality of the State as an insti-
tution) weakens while the proposition that Globalization is dependent upon State
capacity is favored.
7.6 Conclusions
The relationship between economic Globalization and State Sovereignty has been
puzzling social scientists ever since economic interdependence intensified. Whether
Globalization is a force eroding State Sovereignty or a phenomenon dependent
upon State action is a tangled proposition. Theoretical analysis and case studies
gave good arguments in favor of both cases.
In this final chapter of the thesis I took a distinctly different approach to the
issue, namely a quantitative approach, in order to begin to untangle this idea. Us-
ing a proxy for State Sovereignty I addressed the issue of causality and found that
most likely causality runs from State Sovereignty to Globalization rather than the
opposite. This holds when both levels as well as differences of the two variables are
used, and while controlling for a number of factors. These results lead to the con-
clusion that the weakening effects of Globalization on State Sovereignty, when this
is defined as regulative capacity, appear to be unsupported by empirical evidence.
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Interestingly, when using the first differences of the State Sovereignty and Eco-
nomic Globalization indexes, results suggest a noteworthy relationship of the two
variables. The evidence of convergence of the two variables and the significant
increase of Globalization due to changes of State Sovereignty in Table 7.4, attest to-
wards a State Sovereignty induced convergence in Globalization levels. That is, a
catching up of weaker (in terms of Sovereignty) countries driven by developments
other than Globalization, perhaps a move towards a type of “technological frontier”
of good governance, is allowing more countries to take part in the global system as
functioning players. These results lend support to the first Proposition of this dis-
sertation, stated in Chapter 2. As hypothesized, the capacity of States to provide
effective government is an important prerequisite for Globalization. As such, Glob-
alization should not be viewed as an exogenous force threatening the very existence
of States, rather Globalization is created by States. The next Chapter of this thesis
concludes by putting together all the results and discusses the overarching lesson
gained from the analysis in this dissertation.
Appendix
Table 7.5. Variables Used and Sources
Variables Definition
Log Openness The logarithm of Openness, Openness= (exports + imports) as a per-centage of GDP. Constant prices, reference
year 1996, Source: Heston et al., 2002
Log of Openness Exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Constant prices, reference
year 1996.Source: Heston et al. 2002
Log of FDI FDI inflows (World Bank Development Indicators) scaled by GDP (see
source of GDP below) own estimates.
Economic Globalization Economic Globalization is here defined as the long distance flows of
goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that
accompany market exchanges Source: (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al 2008)
Log of real GDP/pc Real GDP per capita (Chain) Source: Heston et al. 2006
Log of GDP GDP levels in million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars Source :
Maddison 2003
Log of Internet Users Number of Internet Connections per 100 Individuals Source: World
Bank Development Indicators 2010
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Table 7.6. Results for Two Lags of the Endogenous Variable
Direction of Causality # of Indep. Lags Chi sqr. value Decision
EG→ S 2 0.89 Reject
EG→ S 3 0.90 Reject
EG→ S 4 2.64 Reject
EG→ S 5 3.67 Reject
S→ EG 2 6.07 Do not Reject
S→ EG 3 8.05 Do not Reject
S→ EG 4 8.54 Reject (at 7%)
S→ EG 5 8.71 Reject
EG stands for Economic Globalization, S for Sovereignty. Number of lags of the in-
dependent variable, the value of the test for joint significance and the decision made
upon that value are shown.













































































































(3) 0.3914 0.2618 1.000
(4) 0.7509 0.7742 0.1867 1.000
(5) 0.8727 0.8690 0.3199 0.7076 1.000
(6) 0.4894 0.4262 0.7571 0.2685 0.5404 1.000
(7) 0.5850 0.5117 0.5193 0.4297 0.4479 0.6343 1.000
(8) -0.1588 -0.1605 -0.1482 0.0012 -0.1019 -0.1110 -0.1186 1.000
(9) -0.5532 -0.5396 -0.2318 -0.2878 -0.4908 -0.3886 -0.2510 0.0838 1.000




The high rate of economic integration between countries sparked a new under-
standing of the world. In this new world, Globalization is seen as an exogenously
driven process that gives rise to new structures of social life. In this view, non-State
actors are to taking over due to their increased de facto power over economic flows
and normative issues. Consequently, the State is losing its primacy as a form of
organization. This dissertation attempted to refute this view by arguing that Glob-
alization is embedded in local Institutional structures and emerges as the result of
purposeful actions taken by actors, rather than by some exogenously given factors.
Chapter 2, provided a critical review of the main structural theoretical approaches
to the Globalization debate and juxtaposed them to an actor-centered analysis draw-
ing on Institutionalism. With regard to economic integration, it was argued that the
application of the New Institutional framework to the Globalization debate leads
to very different conclusions than the ones arrived at by the standard International
Relations theory. On the one hand, Institutional theories of Organizations predict
that non-State actors are contributing towards the creation of a new structure, but
at the same time their interests and behavior are influenced by the Institutional en-
vironment in which they are embedded. Thus, treating them as an independent
force in the global structure is a one sided argument. On the other hand, i main-
tained that the role of the State as the provider and enforcer of an Institutional
environment that establishes the regulatory rules of the game is necessary for the
realization of transnational economic flows. Hence, not only States are not expec-
ted to wither in the face of Globalization, but on the contrary, Globalization needs
effectively governed States. The remaining chapters provided empirical evidence
to these propositions.
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Due to the resent financial crisis and the surge in interest in the determinants
and effects of Sovereign Bond Ratings (SBR), the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs)
were the non-State actors of choice to illustrate the Institutional approach. In Chapter
3 I dealt with the content of these ratings focusing on the U.S-based CRAs. A signi-
ficantly large literature has been debating the context of these ratings, but has been
a-theoretical and its empirical results are hard to generalize. Drawing from Institu-
tionalism, as it emerged in Organizational Studies, the role of this chapter was to
show how these non-State actors promote and (re)produce regulative, normative
and cognitive rules driving Globalization. Consequently, I expected that variables
reflecting these rules, such as the degree of central bank independence or the com-
mitment and ability to promote market friendly reforms would be among the most
robust predictors of the SBRs. The results showed that, indeed, the relationship of
these variables to the SBR is as robust as that of fundamental variables such as GDP
per capita and External Debt.
Chapter 4 compared the ratings from the U.S agencies to those of a recently
formed Chinese agency (Dagong) so as to support the proposition that the rating
agencies’ valuations are embedded in their local environment. The Institutional ap-
proach predicts that the ratings produced by the Chinese and U.S agencies would
diverge in a consistent manner. It was shown that the differences between Chinese
and American ratings for some regions of the world can be up to 3 notches and are
economically significant. Furthermore, these difference were partly explained by
looking at political relations between the rated countries and the agencies’ home
country. It was thus argued that the CRAs produce ratings that reflect the invest-
ment risk that their domestic investors face when investing abroad. They are thus
context specific and shaped by the particularities of their home environment.
Chapter 5 moved from the determinants of the SBRs to the possible effects they
might have on the rated countries’ policy making. It has been hypothesized that
competition among countries to secure a better rating from the American agencies
might lead to a wave of deregulation towards the Neo-Liberal bottom. In Chapter
5, i argued that this argument critically depends on two assumption. First, that the
CRAs ability to influence market participants is unrealistically great. Second, that
the CRAs’ are a major force in the spread of Liberal ideology. I provided a counter
argument for both assumptions arguing that, on the one hand, the market responds
to CRAs’ actions only when it thinks they have unique information, while on the
other hand, i argued that CRAs are only one of the many vehicles through which
the Neo-Liberal “counter-revolution” of the late 20th century was disseminated. It
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was shown that there is no evidence of an independent effect of SBRs on policy
reform using a sample covering the majority of the rated countries. This result
re-enforces the results found in the previous two chapters. Since the ratings are
shaped by the context within which they were created, the rating agencies should
not be seen as an independent force in the global political economy. Their role is
framed by the same environment that shapes their rating valuations.
Having demonstrated the utility of an Institutional approach to the role of non-
State actors the last two chapters of the dissertation turned to the relationship
between State Sovereignty and Economic Globalization. Standard approaches to
answering this question have been mostly theory driven and have supported con-
flicting views. This dissertation departed from these approaches in two ways. First,
it applied the actors-based approach asking not what is the consequence of Global-
ization for the State, but rather, what is the significance of the States for the process
of Globalization. Economic transactions are dependent on an Institutional environ-
ment that promotes exchange by providing the regulative environments needed to
reduce transaction costs. Since economic integration is cross-national transactions,
countries that can provide such a framework will enjoy higher levels of economic
integration. The second deviation from standard approaches was that this argu-
ment was tested using a quantitative approach. To do that, Chapter 6 developed an
index of State Sovereignty derived from a widely accepted definition of sovereignty
drawn from Krasner (1999b).
Chapter 7 presented the relationship between the index of State Sovereignty
and the most widely used index of Economic Globalization. The results confirmed
the Institutional hypothesis. Countries scoring high on the State Sovereignty in-
dex were also the ones more highly Globalized. Statistically, the information in the
State Sovereignty index preceded that in the Globalization index in all specifica-
tions tested. In addition, it was shown that increases in State Sovereignty lead to
increases in the level of Economic Globalization. The actor-centered Institutional
approach thus provides a different account of the Globalization debate from that of
standard International Relations theories. Contrary to Liberal theories, the State is
not withering away as an Institution, rather, it provides the framework that makes
Globalization work. In addition, and contrary to Realists approaches, Globalization
does not depend solely on the actions of hegemon States. Increase in State Sover-
eignty scores are correlated with increased Globalization and that result is mostly
driven by developments in non-hegemonic States.
Putting together the results from this dissertation, an examination of the Glob-
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alization debate based on an actor-centered approach that draws on Institutional
theories and tries to identify how actors (re)produce structures seems promising.
Several other branches of Globalization Studies could be further enriched by Insti-
tutionalism. A prominent example is the debate on the role of Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) in Global Governance. Much like the CRAs these organiz-
ations are seen as supra-national entities able to enforce their will on States and
affect foreign and domestic policy. An Institutional approach could shade light on
how these NGOs were created in the first place and whether they are in fact in-
dependent players or organizations that mirror policy decisions promoted at the
State level. More attention should be drawn to the context that gave birth and em-
powered NGOs. In short, the main insight from this thesis is that just like in the
case of economic integration, all these processes that we call Globalization can (and
probably should) be analyzed as endogenous. One way of doing this is following a
causal link that leads from actors to structures.
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Samenvatting
De belangrijkste stelling in dit proefschrift is dat mondialisering niet gezien kan
worden als ”exogeen proces” of een ”natuurverschijnsel” dat door inherente ont-
wikkelingen zoals technologische vooruitgang gedreven wordt. Mondialisering
kan beter worden beschouwd als zijnde ingebed, dat wil zeggen, gevormd, be-
perkt en gereguleerd door de omgeving waarin het plaatsvindt. Het belangrijkste
uitgangspunt voor dit argument is dat mondialisering het resultaat is van interactie
tussen meerdere agenten, ongeacht de definitie die gehanteerd wordt of dimensies
die bestudeerd worden, hetzij economisch, politiek, of cultureel van aard. Deze
agenten zijn ingebed in en worden gevormd door de specifieke kenmerken van
hun sociale en politieke omgeving. Zij zijn dragers van normen en waarden, en
zijn onderhevig aan institutionele structuren en sociale relaties die hun belangen,
keuzes en gedrag benvloeden. Het gevolg van deze interactie -”mondialisering” in
het geval dat agenten in meer dan een staat zijn ingebed- komt dienovereenkomstig
tot stand. Zelfs als het ”mondiale” als een nieuw niveau van analyse wordt gezien,
gaat het nog steeds om ingebedde agenten en daarmee is het concept ook ingebed.
De eerste agenten waar dit boek zich op richt zijn de Amerikaanse Credit Rating
Agencies (CRAs; rating bureaus) en hun potentie¨le rol als aanstichters van politieke
en economische hervormingen. Hoofdstuk 3, 4 en 5 gaan uitsluitend over de in-
houd en de mogelijke invloed van soevereine ratings. In het derde hoofdstuk wor-
den aanwijzingen geven over hoe de in de VS gevestigde rating bureaus een we-
reldwijde economisch systeem tot stand brengen, door met hun ratings van staats-
obligaties de liberale opvattingen van het overheidsbeleid te projecteren. Hoofd-
stuk 4 analyseert hoe rating bureaus uit verschillende landen (met name de VS
en China) systematisch verschillen in hun ratings op een manier overeenkomstig
de belangen van het land van herkomst. Daarmee wordt in deze twee hoofdstuk-
ken aangetoond hoe private agenten mondiale structuren (re)produceren, terwijl
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deze agenten tegelijkertijd zijn ingebed in de lokale institutionele configuraties. Tot
slot wordt in hoofdstuk 5 gesteld dat rating bureaus in de algemene modus ope-
randi van de mondiale economie zijn ingebed, en geen onafhankelijke agenten zijn.
Bovendien laat het zien dat er geen sterke aanwijzingen zijn dat landen deregule-
ren als gevolg van druk op hun staatsobligatieratings. Uit deze drie hoofdstukken
wordt geconcludeerd dat een institutionele benadering waardevolle inzicht kan ge-
ven met betrekking tot de rol die rating bureaus (en mogelijk andere private acto-
ren) in het mondialiseringsproces hebben. In tegenstelling tot de benadering die
stelt dat de belangen van deze agenten exogeen zijn, is het juist nuttig om deze be-
langen als zijnde deel van de nationale omgeving te beschouwen, van waaruit de
belangen van de agenten worden vormgegeven en het gedrag wordt aangestuurd.
In de laatste twee hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift wordt de vraag van ”mon-
dialisering versus de soevereiniteit van de staat” vanuit een institutioneel perspec-
tief nader beschouwd. De vernieuwende bijdrage in deze hoofdstukken is de be-
nadering die uitgaat van de rol van de agenten. Mondialisering wordt hier niet als
exogeen gegeven gezien, maar zet de discussie op zijn kop. Er wordt getheoreti-
seerd over het belang van de lokale institutionele omgeving als de bouwsteen van
de mondialisering, waarbij de staat een prominente (maar niet als enige) organi-
satiestructuur biedt om transnationale uitwisseling te faciliteren, door een regelge-
vende kader te verstrekken en te handhaven. Mondialisering, zo luidt het betoog,
is afhankelijk van het bestaan van institutionele omgevingen die daartoe bijdragen
en is noch exogeen (conform het liberale perspectief) noch afhankelijk van enkel de
staat als hegemonie en unitaire agent (conform het realisme).
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een nieuwe index van de soevereiniteit van de staat ont-
wikkeld. Deze index meet de effectiviteit van de organisatie van elke staat in de
voorziening van de meest fundamentele functies van de staat. Het laatste empiri-
sche hoofdstuk (hoofdstuk 7) gebruikt deze index om de relatie tussen economische
mondialisering en de soevereiniteit van de staat te bepalen. Er wordt aangetoond
dat landen met toename in kwalitatieve binnenlandse instituties ook een toename
in economische stromen ondervinden. Daarnaast wordt statistisch aangetoond dat
het causale verband uitgaat van het effect van de soevereiniteit van de staat op eco-
nomische mondialisering, niet andersom. Samengevat wordt geconcludeerd dat
private actoren en mondialisering in het algemeen niet per se een bedreiging vor-
men voor de autonomie en het bestaan van de staat als natie, maar dat deze eerder
gevormd, soms bewerkstelligd en soms beperkt worden door het institutioneel mi-
lieu dat diep in nationale staten verankerd is.
